Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2017

The Master and the Midwife: Levinas and Plato on Teaching
Rebecca Glenn Scott
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Scott, Rebecca Glenn, "The Master and the Midwife: Levinas and Plato on Teaching" (2017). Dissertations.
2851.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2851

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
Copyright © 2017 Rebecca Glenn Scott

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

THE MASTER AND THE MIDWIFE:
LEVINAS AND PLATO ON TEACHING

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY

BY
REBECCA G. SCOTT
CHICAGO, IL
DECEMBER 2017

Copyright by Rebecca G. Scott, 2017
All rights reserved.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

v

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER TWO: THE MODES OF ALTERITY OF THE OTHER
Exteriority: The Other as “absolutely” Other
Interiority: The “feminine” Other
Enjoyment and the dwelling
Alterity in the dwelling
Alterity in Eros
Feminist scholarship on Levinas
Summary

11
12
24
25
31
38
43
46

CHAPTER THREE: THE OTHER AS MY TEACHER
The “sense” of the Other
Meaning in solitude
The development of Levinas’s conception of “teaching”
Early references to “teaching”
Jewish education
The primordial teaching relation in Totality and Infinity
Exteriority and intimacy in the teaching relation
Summary

48
50
59
65
65
72
75
79
84

CHAPTER FOUR: THE TEACHING RELATION AND LEVINAS’S PLATONISM
Levinas’s Platonism
The transcendence of Desire
Speech and writing
Levinas’s critique of Socratic education
A Defense of Socratic education
The role of Desire in teaching and learning: anamnēsis
The Symposium
The Meno
The Phaedo
Teaching as hospitality: maieutics
Summary

86
90
91
104
110
122
123
123
127
132
137
145

CHAPTER FIVE: THE PRACTICE OF TEACHING
A phenomenological ethics
A phenomenological definition of teaching and learning
Teaching as a practice of hospitality
Summary

147
148
151
160
165

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

167
iii

BIBLIOGRAPHY

175

VITA

180

iv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Works by Levinas
AE: Autrement qu'e tre ou au-delà de l'essence. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
BPW: Basic Philosophical Writings. Ed. Adriaan Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert
Bernasconi. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1996.
DF: Difficult Freedom; Essays on Judaism. Trans. Seán Hand. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1990.
DL: Difficile liberté; essais sur le judai sme. 3e édition. Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 1976.
EDHH: En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger. 2e édition. Paris: Vrin, 1967.
EI: Ethics and Infinity; Conversations with Philippe Nemo. Trans. Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1985.
ENE: Entre Nous; essais sur le penser-à-l'autre. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1991.
EN: Entre nous: on thinking-of-the-other. Trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
HAH: Humanisme de l’autre homme. Saint Clement: Fata Morgana, 1987.
HS: Hors Sujet. Saint Clement: Fata Morgana, 1987.
NP: Noms Propres. Saint Clement: Fata Morgana, 1976.
OB: Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1997.
OS: Outside the Subject. Trans. Michael B. Smith. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
PhI: “La philosophie et l'idee de l'Infini.” Collected in Peperzak, Adriaan. To the Other: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press,
1993. 73-87. Originally published in Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale. 62 (1957): 241-53.
PN: Proper Names. Trans. Michael B. Smith. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
v

PI: “Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite.” Trans. Adriaan Peperzak. To the Other: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press,
1993. 88-119.
PS: Parole et Silence et autres conférences inédites au Collège philosophique. ed. Rodolphe
Calin and Catherine Chalier. 2011.
TeI: Totalité et Infini. 2e édition. La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.
TaI: Totality and Infinity. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.
ThI: The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology. 2ed. Trans. Andre Orianne. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press. 1995

vi

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Emmanuel Levinas is now recognized as one of the most influential French philosophers
of the twentieth century, but appreciation for his work took time to develop. While Levinas was
greatly respected by his contemporaries in the French intellectual community of the midtwentieth century—especially by members of the Collège philosophique organized by Jean
Wahl—for much of his life, Levinas was not widely recognized as an important philosopher by
the broader academic world. Not only did he publish his first masterpiece, Totality and Infinity,
relatively late in life at the age of 55, but his first attempt to publish it proved unsuccessful.
When, however, Totality and Infinity was successfully published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
in 1961, Levinas’s status in the philosophical world quickly rose. He became a full professor at
the University of Poitiers and his work spread throughout Europe and the rest of the world.
While there is now extensive scholarship on much of Levinas’s published writings, his
professional life before he became a highly regarded philosopher is not often discussed in
relation to his philosophical work. While scholars sometimes note that Levinas spent nearly three
decades, from 1947-1973,1 as the director of the École Normale Israélite Orientale (Enio) in
Paris, they rarely recognize the influence that his work as a teacher had on his philosophical
writings. But as the present dissertation seeks to show, a careful study of Levinas’s conception of
what he calls a “primordial” teaching can help us to better understand Levinas’s work,
1

Although Levinas became a full professor at the University of Poitiers in 1961, he remained the director
of the Enio, in name at least, until 1973.

1

2
particularly Totality and Infinity, as well as our own understanding of what it means to teach and
learn.
Levinas’s account of this primordial teaching does not appear in the context of a formal
philosophy of education, but the references instead appear scattered throughout his early postwar period. The earliest references appear in “The Transcendence of Words” (1948)2 wherein he
describes teaching [enseignement] as what allows speech to come to life in a dynamic and
ongoing conversation. This concept of teaching is then further developed in a set of lecture notes
for a paper titled “Les Enseignements” (1950)3 given at the Collège philosophique. In these
notes, Levinas further develops his conception of teaching as that which also marks the advent of
responsibility to the Other. In addition to these early formulations of the concept of teaching, in
Difficult Freedom, there are three essays explicitly dedicated to Jewish education.4 And, finally,
references to teaching are woven throughout Totality and Infinity, the primary focus of this
dissertation.5
Among Levinas scholars, Claire Katz is notable as one scholar who has extensively
explored the theme of teaching in Levinas’s work,6 and my own work will build on her

2

“The Transcendence of Words: On Michel Leiris’s Biffures.” Outside the Subject. Trans. Michael B. Smith.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. 144-150.
3

Parole et Silence et autres conférences inédites au Collège philosophiqe. Ed. Rodolphe Calin and Chatherine
Chalier. 2011.
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See “Reflections on Jewish Education,” (1951) “Education and Prayer,” (1963), and “Antihumanism and
Education” (1973) in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. Trans. Seán Hand. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990.
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Totalité et Infini. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. Translated into English under the title Totality and Infinity:
An essay on exteriority. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.
6

Katz, Claire. Levinas and the Crisis of Humanism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. “Turning Toward
the other: Ethics, Fecundity, and the Primacy of Education.” Totality and Infinity at 50. Ed. Scott Davidson and
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scholarship. While Katz focuses primarily on Levinas’s concept of teaching in the context of his
Judaism, my own point of entry instead considers Levinas’s work insofar as it engages the
Western philosophical tradition rooted in Classical Greek thought. Pursuing this perspective is
not meant to imply that Levinas’s Jewish faith is not also critical to understanding his account of
the Other as my teacher. Rather, my own work is intended as a supplement, not a challenge to
that of Katz. Levinas’s work can and should be read as in dialogue with a multiplicity of authors
and traditions.
In particular, here I will explore the theme of teaching through Levinas’s complex, and at
times ambivalent, relationship to Plato and Platonism. In his early summary of Totality and
Infinity, Levinas famously describes the work as a “return to Platonism.”7 This “return” in
Levinas’s view is needed to critique the dominant philosophy in Europe at the time, which
largely rejected ontologies that embraced a transcendent source of meaning. As Levinas argues
in “Meaning and Sense,”8 the prominent philosophers of the day (such as Merleau-Ponty and
Heidegger), viewed meaning as arising out of immanent networks of reference ordered by the
projects, needs, and desires of contingently situated subjects. Levinas, however, insists that there
is a transcendent source of meaning beyond culture that is not dependent on the particular ways
of signifying offered by the language of a particular community. This sense is the ethical sense
of the Other, by means of which, according to Levinas, we come to understand ourselves as
Diane Perpich. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2012. 209-226. See also Levinas and Education: At the
intersection of faith and reason. Ed. Denise Egéa Kuehne. New York: Routledge, 2008
7

This formulation appears in the summary of Totality and Infinity published in the Annales de l’Université de Paris.
It is translated in Adriaan Peperzak’s Platonic Transformations. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997.
120-121.
8

“Meaning and Sense.” Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings. Edited and translated by Adriaan T.
Peperzak, Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. 33-64.
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responsible.
The transcendence of the ethical beyond culture, Levinas argues, has been overlooked by
what he calls the “anti-Platonism” of his time. Levinas differentiates himself from his
contemporaries by arguing for a reality beyond appearances, what Plato names the Good
“beyond being” [epekeina tēs ousias].9 For Levinas, the ethical sense of the Other is like the
transcendence of the Good in Plato insofar as the ethical persists as the orientation towards
which we must always direct ourselves regardless of changes in our social, political, and cultural
landscapes. In other words, we are always responsible to the Other, according to Levinas, and
this responsibility is not dependent on the particular forms of meaning provided by a specific
culture. We are inevitably and unavoidably obligated to serve the Other.
But it is not only Plato’s conception of a transcendent reality “beyond being” that inspires
Levinas. He also admires Socrates’s insistence on the importance of understanding the ethical
relation as a conversation, a “living breathing discourse,”10 as Socrates says in the Phaedrus. The
relation with the Other, Levinas argues in Totality and Infinity, is a relation in which the Other is
present in his manifestation. He “attends” his speaking and, as such, offers the possibility of
explaining himself, that is, of offering an “apology,” a defense of his ideas. For Levinas, to speak
with another person is to be engaged in a relationship of responsivity in which the Other is
available to answer my questions.
It is in this sense, as one who is present in speaking and able to respond to me, that the
Other teaches me according to Levinas. The Other who addresses me is attendant to his speaking

9

Plato. “Rebublic.” Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. 509B
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Plato. “Phaedrus.” Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. 276A.

5
in a way that opens up the possibility of a living conversation and thereby makes possible my
own understanding of and speaking about the world. That is, according to Levinas, without the
Other who speaks to me, it would not be possible for me to speak about the world, insofar as all
speaking about is always embedded in a speaking to. Our being spoken to, for Levinas, thus
opens us up to the possibility of engaging with the world as an object of knowledge and
expression. In this way, he argues that the teaching of the Other makes possible all teaching and
learning in the traditional sense, insofar as teaching and learning are practices of speaking and
listening.
But while Levinas is inspired by Plato, his relationship with Plato is, as a number of
scholars have noted, complicated.11 Levinas is also critical of Plato who at times, according to
Levinas, exemplifies the tendency of “Western” thought to describe the subject as independent
and self-sufficient. In fact, Levinas often defines his own conception of teaching in opposition to
Socratic education for this very reason. He argues that Socratic education, understood as
anamnēsis (recollection) and maieutics (midwifery), presents the learner as free and
invulnerable, already in possession of what she eventually learns. By contrast, Levinas insists
that the relation with the Other who teaches me is one in which the Other offers me something
more than what I could ever contain within myself.
This tension that is exhibited in Levinas’s relationship to Plato’s work is, I will argue,
reflective of a broader tension in Totality and Infinity between “interiority” and “exteriority,” the
11

In addition to Peperzak’s Platonic Transformations, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997, see
Achtenberg, Deborah. Essential Vulnerabilities: Plato and Levinas on Relations to the Other. Evanston,
Northwestern UP, 2014; Allen, Sarah. The Philosophical Sense of Transcendence: Levinas and Plato on Loving
Beyond Being. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 2009; Gonzales, Francisco. “Levinas Questioning Plato on Eros and
Maieutics,” Levinas and the Ancients. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008. 40-61; Staehler, Tanja. Plato and Levinas:
The Ambiguous Out-side of Ethics. New York: Routledge, 2009.
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Same, and the Other. My investigation of the concept of teaching will, therefore, also lead me to
a discussion of what some have found to be a problematic aspect of Levinas’s first major work,
namely the apparently strict differentiation between the Same and the Other.12 Levinas, in
Totality and Infinity, often describes the alterity of the Other as an “absolute” alterity that is
wholly separate from the sphere of the Same. That is, the Other is Other precisely as one who
resists being subsumed by the identificatory movement that defines the domain of the Same.
How, readers have asked, can we welcome the Other into the interior economy (oiko-nomos) of
the dwelling, which is a part of the sphere of the Same, while still maintaining the absolute
separation of the Same and the Other that is necessary, in Levinas’s view, to overcome a
Parmenidean metaphysics?
Levinas’s solution to the problem of how there can be a relation between the Same and
the Other in the dwelling is the introduction of a third metaphysical possibility in addition to
those of the Same and the Other. “Feminine” alterity, Levinas claims, involves the appearance of
another form of alterity that is unlike the absolute demanding presence of the Other as a stranger
who comes from “on high,” and from a distance. Instead, feminine alterity is gentle, and
hospitable. The feminine Other, whom Levinas describes as appearing within the dwelling,
withdraws and allows the subject to accomplish subjectivity. In this way, the feminine Other as
generous and hospitable, is necessary for ethics by being the condition of the possibility of
subjectivity itself. But while Levinas offers this solution to the paradox of the Other being
12

This critique is most famously leveled by Derrida in “Violence and Metaphysics.” Levinas, Phenomenology and
His Critics, edited by Claire Katz and Lara Trout, 88-173. Volume 1 of Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of
Leading Philosophers. New York: Routledge, 2005. We will see in Chapter Four that a similar critique is also raised
by Maurice Blanchot in Infinite Conversation. Trans. Susan Hanson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1993, and more recently by Francisco Gonzales in “Levinas Questioning Plato on Eros and Maieutics.” Levinas and
the Ancients. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008. 40-61
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welcomed into the sphere of the Same, Levinas’s account of the “feminine” is not only
problematic in many ways from a feminist perspective, but it is also underdeveloped.
Despite these problems, I will argue in this work that the role of “feminine” alterity is
essential for the coherence of Totality and Infinity and, in my view, a further development of this
concept is helpful for fleshing out Levinas’s conception of teaching. Within the teaching relation
as Levinas describes it, both the absolute demanding presence of the utterly exterior Other and
the gentle hospitality of the intimate “feminine” Other are needed. That is, if the Other as my
teacher is the Other who opens up for me the possibility of a meaningful world, the Other qua
teacher must appear both as a stranger and as a friend, as one who calls into question my
comfortable way of being in the world and as one who hospitably welcomes me into a
conversation.
Levinas, however, is inconsistent in recognizing the presence of both modes of alterity in
his account of the primordial teaching relation. While Levinas sometimes recognizes the
importance of what he names “feminine” alterity, at other times, he is hesitant to acknowledge
that this gentle intimate alterity is, in fact, a part of my relation with the Other who teaches me.
But in my view, recognizing the role that intimacy plays in the teaching relation can help us to
strengthen and further develop Levinas’s notion of the primordial teaching. The critique of
Levinas that I will develop here is, therefore, not meant as a rejection of his conception of ethics
or of the teaching relation. Rather, my aim in this work is to develop Levinas’s notion of
teaching by further investigating the intimate dimension of the relationship with the Other who
teaches me, a dimension that Levinas, at times, seems hesitant to explore.
One way of further developing this underexplored aspect of Levinas’s conception of
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teaching, I will show, is by re-examining Socratic education, which Levinas himself rejects.
Socratic education, however, contrary to Levinas’s own claims, recognizes both dimensions of
alterity that he himself describes. That is, I claim that we can interpret Socratic education,
understood as anamnēsis and maieutics, as revealing the ways in which teaching and learning
involve a complex navigation of intimacy and distance. Socrates, as both the gadfly and the
midwife, shows how teaching can be understood as a gesture of hospitality in which the Other
qua student is welcomed into a conversation without collapsing the difference between the I and
the Other. In this way, Socratic education can be read, despite Levinas’s claims to the contrary,
as consonant with and helpful for the development of Levinas’s ethics.
In particular, Socratic education can help us to see how Levinas’s conception of the
teaching relation can inform the concrete practice of teaching itself. While Levinas’s primordial
teaching relation extends well beyond the relations that make up the practice of teaching as we
normally understand it, this practice is, nevertheless, an important example of what Levinas
names the primordial teaching relation. That is, insofar as all speaking is a kind of teaching in the
primordial sense, all teaching in the practical sense is also necessarily a teaching in the
primordial sense. And while Levinas’s work does not provide specific ethical principles against
which we can check our actions to see if they are good or bad, his work is, nevertheless,
important for guiding us in our practices, in this case, the practice of teaching. Levinas does not
provide principles, but he does orient us towards the Other and demands of us that we
perpetually consider how we can be ever more hospitable. Thus, I argue that Levinas’s
conception of the primordial teaching relation, together with Socratic education, can orient our
concrete pedagogies toward the others whom we welcome into our classrooms as our students.

9
In these ways, the present work will draw together several themes in Levinas’s work and
in scholarship on Levinas that have not yet been brought together. In particular, I show how
examining the underexplored concept of the primordial teaching relation helps to illuminate
questions concerning the unity of Totality and Infinity as well as the complexity of Levinas’s
relationship to Plato. Furthermore, through this examination of the primordial teaching relation,
this work also aims to further explore the role of intimacy in the ethical relation. By developing
these concepts and tracing their interconnections, my ultimate goals are both to better illuminate
Levinas’s work from a scholarly perspective and also to help us consider how we might continue
to work to make our pedagogies more welcoming of the Other.
The structure of the remainder of the work is as follows: Chapter Two provides the
framework for my interpretation of Totality and Infinity, which I will make use of as I explore
the nature of the teaching relation in subsequent chapters. I argue in this chapter that there are
two modes of alterity of the Other--an “absolute” alterity of the exterior Other who remains at a
distance, and an “intimate” alterity of the “feminine” Other. Both modes of alterity, I argue, are
essential for ethics according to Levinas. In Chapter Three, I examine what Levinas means when
he claims that the Other is my teacher in a “primordial” sense. And I argue that the Other of the
teaching relation presents both modes of alterity described in Chapter Two, that is, both
“absolute” and “intimate” alterity. In Chapter Four, I turn to an examination of the way in which
Levinas’s understanding of the primordial teaching relation is articulated through an engagement
with Plato. I will show that Levinas’s emphasis on the teacher as the Other of “absolute” distance
is part of what motivates his critique of Socratic education. I will argue, however, in Chapter
Four that Socratic education does not reduce the alterity of the teacher to a moment of
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recognition within the Same, as Levinas worries. Instead, I argue that Socratic education
recognizes the inherent tension in the teaching relation between distance and intimacy. Finally,
in Chapter Five, I reflect on what we can learn about the concrete practice of teaching from the
preceding analyses. I argue that concretizing Levinas’s ethics into a practice of teaching requires
that we come to see our students as our teachers in the sense that we must be open to learning
from our students how best to welcome them into the conversations that make up philosophy.

CHAPTER TWO
THE MODES OF ALTERITY OF THE OTHER
The central theme of Totality and Infinity is what Levinas calls the “metaphysical
relation,” the relation between the Same [le Même] and the Other [l’Autre], which is also
simultaneously characterized as the ethical relation between the I or Me [le Moi] and the human
Other [Autrui]. This chapter will explore this essential relation in Levinas’s work and will show
that the Other of the metaphysical relation appears in Totality and Infinity in at least two different
modes—as a challenging exterior presence and as an intimate welcoming source of generosity.
First, as I will explore in greater detail below, the Other appears as an exterior presence,
as one who is “absolutely” other, insofar as she cannot be appropriated by or made
commensurate with my own understanding of the world in concepts that I can master. In
appearing in this mode, the Other unsettles my comfortable being in the world by calling me to
be responsible to and for others. The Other reveals to me that I am not alone and must not simply
enjoy and possess the world without regard for the needs of those who face me. In calling me to
responsibility in this way, Levinas describes the Other as appearing from “on high,” as my
Master and judge even as she also appears as vulnerable and needy, as the one for whom I am
responsible.
But while the Other appears in this way as an exterior presence that is “absolutely” other,
the Other also appears within the space that Levinas names interiority. In appearing there, the
Other is an intimate Other, designated as “feminine” by Levinas. This Other is one who shares
11

12
the interior space of the dwelling and welcomes me into the world in gentleness and familiarity.
And as we will see in the analysis of the dwelling below, this intimate, interior Other plays an
essential role in Levinas’s project as the one who makes possible the accomplishment of the
separated subject necessary for ethics.
But while this “feminine” alterity is recognized by Levinas as essential, the importance of
the feminine is sometimes overlooked by scholars and, as I will argue in greater detail in Chapter
Three,1 also by Levinas himself. In fact, Levinas’s own primary emphasis in the text is revealed
by his subtitle, “An essay on exteriority,” which shows that his focus is on the Other as
“absolutely” other. But as we will see, the ethical relation that Levinas describes necessarily
involves both modes of the alterity of the Other. The intimacy of the Other’s hospitality makes
possible the separation of subjectivity, while the exteriority of the Other of “absolute” alterity
orients me towards a transcendent reality beyond myself.
Exteriority: the Other as “absolutely” other
By titling Section I of Totality and Infinity, “Le Même et L’Autre,” “The Same and the
Other,” Levinas immediately places his work within the history of Western philosophy’s
attempts to reckon with these basic metaphysical concepts. Specifically, he enters into dialogue
with Plato’s Sophist among other canonical philosophical works.2 In the Sophist, the primary
interlocutors--Theaetetus and the Stranger from Elea--attempt to find a definition of the sophist
using the method of diairesis, the division of beings into genera and species. Their goal is to
figure out what kind of a being a sophist is. As they make several attempts to define the sophist

1

2

See pp 79-84.

For instance, Levinas in discussing the categories of the Same and the Other likely also has Hegel,
Husserl, Sartre, and others in mind.
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as a kind of angler of men, however, they find that it is difficult (or perhaps impossible) to place
the sophist into a category of being. The sophist proves difficult to define because his being
always involves non-being. That is, the sophist, the interlocutors agree, is a kind of imitator, and
as such, his being involves also that which is not.
The Eleatic philosopher, Parmenides, however, has claimed that non-being is irrational
and unspeakable and that, therefore, we must give up on attempting to speak of it.3 Every attempt
to say what is not immediately transforms what is not into what is, insofar as something that is
said has being as something said. That is, if I describe non-being, my description is not nonbeing itself but partakes in being insofar as it is a description. But if the sophist’s being
inherently involves non-being, the interlocutors must figure out a way to speak of non-being if
they are going to truly define the sophist. They must, therefore, overcome Parmenides’s
prohibition on speaking of non-being, a move that the Stranger from Elea describes as a form of
parricide, insofar as it requires him to refute his philosophical “father,” Parmenides.4
Levinas confronts a similar problem in his attempt to describe the Other. For the Other to
truly be Other, the Other must have alterity, he writes, as its “formal characteristic.”5 The formal
characteristic is that which makes something what it is, its form or its eidos. But, the very notion
of form entails identity or self-sameness. For the Other to have alterity as its “formal
characteristic” is, therefore, a paradoxical notion. Although Levinas does not identify the Other
with non-being, we can see that the problem of finding an “essence” of alterity is not unlike the

3

A translation of Parmenides’s poem can be found in “Parmenides of Elea: Fragments.” in McKirahan,
Richard D. Philosophy Before Socrates. 2ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. 2011. 145-150.
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problem the interlocutors in the Sophist have in finding an essence of a being, namely the
sophist, whose existence is defined by non-being. For something to be other, it must be other
with respect to something else. Alterity does belong to a category or “kind” of being; it’s
“essence” is to be a negation of what can be named an essence. For something to be other than X
is for it to be not X in some respect. Levinas’s challenge, therefore, like the interlocutors of the
Sophist, is to find a way to speak about a reality that always seems to slip away as soon as it is
described. The method of diairesis in which beings are ordered into categories on the basis of
their characteristics will not be sufficient.
Because of its paradoxical nature, the alterity of the Other, Levinas claims, must be given
a different kind of account than one in which beings are located within categories of genera and
species. Instead, Levinas claims that, with regard to the alterity of the Other, “[i]ts formal
characteristic, to be other, makes up its content.”6 That is, Levinas argues that if we understand
the metaphysical category of the Other [l’Autre] as the concrete human Other [Autrui], we find
that the paradox can be resolved. He writes, “L’absolument Autre, c’est Autrui.”7 That is, the
absolutely Other, as a metaphysical concept [l’Autre], is the human Other [Autrui]. Or, as Lingis
translates, “The absolutely other is the Other.”8 By identifying the Other [l’Autre] with the
human Other [Autrui], Levinas argues, we can truly overcome Parmenides--that is, we can
discover a genuine alterity that is not defined only by its opposition to other beings. The human
Other, Levinas argues, is a presence that cannot be subsumed under a category that renders its
difference from other concepts or categories temporary or merely provisional once subsumed
6

Ibid.
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under the category “Being.” Instead, the Other, as one who speaks, is, by her very presence,
Other.
In order to see why this is the case, it is helpful to first examine the other term of the
metaphysical relation, the Same, which, in Levinas’s analysis, corresponds to what he calls “le
Moi,” “the Me,” or as Lingis translates, “the I.” While the Other has alterity as its form, the I is
fundamentally characterized by identity. The I, Levinas writes, is “primal identity” and the
“primordial work of identification,”9 i.e. the I consumes what it encounters by converting what is
other--food, ideas, experiences, thoughts, language, etc.—into itself.
This “work” of identification is ongoing. In enacting its identificatory power, the I,
Levinas claims, does not remain the same by maintaining an unchanging essence. Rather, the I
dynamically transforms everything that it encounters into its own sphere of mastery and
possession. He writes, “The I is not a being that always remains the same, but is the being whose
being consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it.”10
The I is fundamentally consumptive, according to Levinas, and converts all that it encounters
into itself. To be a subject, for Levinas, is to enact this unification of the subject through selfidentification with what it consumes and masters.
The Other, Autrui, is, however, not consumable by the identificatory movements of the I.
The Other, rather, presents me with a demand that impels me to question my consumption of the
world. While there are aspects of the Other’s concrete presence that I can see, know, and
understand, the Other is not reducible to these qualities. The Other faces me, and this facing
involves a demand that I not reduce him to an object of my own comprehension but to reflect on
9
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the responsibility to him and to all of the other others. The absolute alterity of the Other is thus
differentiated from the relative alterity of that which can be consumed and incorporated into the
Same. For Levinas, the world from which I live--what I eat, see, know, remember, etc.--is
“other” in a certain sense, but “[b]etween the I and what it lives from there does not extend the
absolute distance that separates the same from the other.”11 That which I live from12 becomes a
part of me, part of my sphere of possession; it belongs to what I can master by converting it into
what is mine. The Other, Levinas argues, by contrast, appears at an “absolute distance,” as that
which fundamentally calls into question my possession of the world. That is, the Other, in facing
me, presents me with a non-possessable presence. The Other cannot be consumed by me because
she must not be consumed by me. Her presence demands, rather, that I give what I possess to her
and to others.
Levinas’s claim that the Other calls into question the identificatory movement of the I is
supported, he argues, by phenomenological evidence, although he insists that the concept of
intentionality in phenomenology needs to be transformed before we can give a
phenomenological account of the Other. Levinas argues that the “face” of the Other shows up as
something that cannot be received by the kinds of intentional structures that Husserl and
Heidegger describe.
Levinas argues in his dissertation13 and elsewhere that, for Husserl, theoretical
intentionality is given too much weight. He writes with regard to Husserl’s position, “Theory and
11
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representation play a dominant role in life, serving as a basis of the whole of conscious life; they
are the forms of intentionality that give a foundation to all others.”14 Levinas argues that while,
for Husserl, every noesis has a noematic correlate, theoretical intentionality plays an essential
role in the constitution of objects in a way that other forms of intentionality do not. Specifically,
Levinas points to Husserl’s distinction between “objectifying acts,”—perception, judgment, and
acts of “pure representation”—and “non-objectifying acts,” such as willing, valuing, and so on.
Levinas points out that in the Logical Investigations Husserl insists that all non-objectifying acts
presuppose an objectifying act needed to constitute the “matter” of the object of the nonobjectifying act.15
A similar argument appears in Totality and Infinity. The problem with Husserlian
intentionality, according to Levinas, is that the exteriority of the object of intentionality is lost in
its representation by and availability to consciousness. The event of an object giving itself to
consciousness in Husserl’s work is parallel, Levinas claims, to the Cartesian notion of clear and
distinct ideas. “In clarity an object which is first exterior is given that is, is delivered over to him
who encounters it as though it had been entirely determined by him. In clarity the exterior being
presents itself as the work of the thought that receives it.”16 According to Levinas, objectifying
intentionality, which serves as the basis for the constitution of the world, operates on the
presumption of adequation between consciousness and what it thinks. Consciousness, according
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to Levinas, is understood to have complete mastery over the object insofar as the object can
never exceed the intentional structures that give it its meaning. Levinas writes, “This mastery is
total and as though creative it is accomplished as a giving of meaning: the object of
representation is reducible to noemata.”17 Levinas argues that, for Husserl, in principle, there is
nothing in the object of consciousness that exceeds the intentional structures that allow it to
appear. Everything that can appear is capable of being subsumed into the horizon of the world of
the subject.
While according to Levinas, Husserl over-privileges representation and intelligibility,
Heidegger, in his account of Dasein in Being and Time, also reduces the world to the mastery of
the subject in “com-prehension.” That is, Levinas argues that to comprehend [comprendre] for
Heidegger, is also to engage in a kind of mastery or handling [prendre] of the world. We find
Levinas’s critique early on in Levinas’s career in “Is Ontology Fundamental?”18 Despite what he
sees as the advances of Heidegger’s ontology, which help us to see that theoretical intentionality
is not our first or primary mode of engaging with the world, Levinas argues in this essay that, for
Heidegger, fundamental ontology presents the meaning of being as its openness to Dasein’s
being as understanding. Levinas writes, “Our concrete existence is interpreted in terms of its
entry into the ‘openness’ of being in general. We exist in a circuit of understanding with reality.
Understanding is the very event that existence articulates. All incomprehension is only a
deficient mode of comprehension.”19
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In the above passage, Levinas refers to Heidegger’s account of meaning and
understanding in Being and Time §32. At this point in his text, Heidegger has already described
how signification originates in a network of references oriented by Dasein’s concerns in §17-18
and argued for understanding as a fundamental existential of Dasein in §31. In section §32,
Heidegger goes on to offer an account of the nature of meaning in light of his previous analyses.
He writes:
Meaning is an existential of Da-sein, not a property which is attached to beings, which
lies ‘behind’ them or floats somewhere as a ‘realm between.’ Only Da-sein ‘has’ meaning
in that the disclosedness of being-in-the-world can be ‘fulfilled’ through the beings
discoverable in it. Thus only Da-sein can be meaningful or meaningless.20
For Heidegger, meaning is a structure of the being of Dasein who finds itself in the mode of
already understanding the world in which it lives. For Heidegger, the meaning of being shows up
only by way of Dasein’s own being as a being who is concerned with the question of the
meaning of being.
By tracing back the meaning of being to the horizon of Dasein’s being as understanding,
Heidegger, according to Levinas, situates the particular being, the existent, in a subordinate
position to a more general notion of being. Levinas writes:
The understanding of a being will thus consist in going beyond that being (l’etant) into
the openness and in perceiving it upon the horizon of being. That is to say,
comprehension, in Heidegger, rejoins the great tradition of Western philosophy: to
comprehend the particular being is already to place oneself beyond the particular. To
comprehend is to be related to the particular that only exists through knowledge, which is
knowledge of the universal.21
The meaning of every particular existent, for Heidegger, is possible only on the background of

20

21

Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: SUNY Press, 1996. 151.
BPW 5

20
the “clearing” that Dasein’s being accomplishes, in which the meaning of being can be
illuminated. There can be no meaning for Heidegger outside of this openness to meaning that is
Dasein’s mode of being as understanding. Levinas argues that this move of understanding the
particular being in terms of its illumination by the being of Dasein amounts to a reduction of the
particular to the universal, which has always characterized “the great tradition of Western
philosophy.” This reduction of the particular prevents us from recognizing the particularity of the
Other as an existent irreducible to the categories of being that we already understand if only
implicitly.
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas makes a similar argument concerning Heidegger’s
ontology. In the section “Metaphysics Precedes Ontology,” he writes, “Being and Time has
argued perhaps but one sole thesis: Being is inseparable from the comprehension of Being
(which unfolds as time); Being is already an appeal to subjectivity.”22 This comprehension of
being is further characterized as a kind of mastery or possession. Levinas writes with regard to
the practical action that grounds Heidegger’s account of signification, “The hand takes and
comprehends” [La main prend et comprend].23 The “understanding” that Dasein gains of being
through pre-theoretical practical action, is, for Levinas, already mastery—a way of reducing the
world to the totality of the horizon of Dasein’s being as understanding. Thus, it is in this sense
that for Levinas, to comprehend [comprendre] is to handle [prendre] phenomena; it is, like all
the structures of the Same, a form of relating that reduces what is other to that which is already
my own.
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But when I am face to face with another human being, I find that the Other insists that I
24

not view her only in relation to my own projects or as a species of a more general kind. Rather,
her appearance arrests my mastery of the world and requires that I consider not what I know or
need, but what she needs. By calling me to responsibility, the Other’s presence, Levinas argues,
places an ethical demand on me that requires me to reconsider my possession of the world. If
someone is hungry, I must offer him food. If someone is in pain, I must offer myself to comfort
him. If someone needs a seat on a crowded bus, I must stand up to allow him to sit. If I see an
injustice, I must engage in action to remedy it. Precisely what the Other demands of me varies,
but when another person faces me, I realize that I am not free to do what I want. I am responsible
to and for this person (and all the others) without having chosen this responsibility. Although I
can, and far too often do, turn away from my responsibility, the Other’s presence insists that I not
do so. My refusal to listen to the Other’s demands does not remove my responsibility.
It is in this sense, as a presence that teaches me my responsibility,25 that the Other as
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human Other [Autrui] provides a concrete manifestation of the category of the Other [l’Autre].
The Same is the I, the movement of self-identification. The Other, by ordering me to
responsibility, calls into question my right to be only this self-identifying force that consumes all
that I encounter. And in doing so, the Other, according to Levinas, calls to me from from on
“high,” from what he names a “transcendent” dimension that exceeds the world as it is given to
me in com-prehension.
This transcendence is not the transcendence of an ideal realm, separated from the world.
Rather, the Other appears, Levinas claims, as “transascendent,”26 a term he borrows from his
friend and mentor Jean Wahl to whom, along with Wahl’s wife Marcelle, Totality and Infinity is
dedicated.27 The Other, Levinas insists, comes to me from a direction other than that presented
by the world as encountered only through the intentional structures of subjectivity, a world that,
according to Levinas, can be understood and consumed. The Other is, rather, absolutely other as
one who introduces a totally different dimension of intentionality, one that challenges the
structure of intentionality as one defined by mastery.
To summarize, if we understand the Other [l’Autre] as the human Other [Autrui], we find
that the Other is “essentially” Other, that is, the Other has alterity as its “essence.” The human
Other concretely manifests this alterity by resisting and calling into question the identificatory
movement of the I, in the demand that I listen to what the Other has to teach me about how I
ought to exist in the world. In this way, the Other, as the human Other, Levinas insists, presents
the possibility of a genuine overcoming of Parmenides’s paradox, which says that it is
26
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impossible to speak about anything other than being. The Other, as one who faces me, however,
presents me with an alterity that can never be swallowed up by being, understood as that which
can enter the sphere of comprehension. The Other is not other as “not-me,” but as one who gives
me something that I cannot give myself, namely responsibility.
In addition to this sense of “absolute” alterity as that which is essentially irreducible to
the identificatory powers of the Same, there is also another sense in which the Other is
“absolutely” Other for Levinas. As Sarah Allen notes, Levinas plays on the term “absolute” by
insisting that we also hear in it an act of “absolution,” that is, a setting free of the terms of the
relation from one another even as they remain in relation.28 As Levinas writes, “The same and
the other at the same time maintain themselves in relationship and absolve themselves from this
relation, remain absolutely separated.”29 To overcome Parmenidean metaphysics, Levinas
argues, we must find a relation that allows for this kind of freedom within the relation. That is,
the I, for Levinas, must be able to exist on its own, even if such an existence would be unethical.
The I is “absolved” of the relation insofar as the I is separate, capable of contemplating the world
from the privacy of interiority. The I must not turn away, but at the same time, the I always has
the possibility of and temptation to do so.30
The relation that Levinas insists allows for this kind of absolution is the speaking relation
between the Other and me. In this relation, those speaking to one another remain absolutely
separated, i.e. “absolved” in the sense that they remain at a distance while also being in relation.
28
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The speaking relation, Levinas argues, is defined by this separation. We speak precisely because
we cannot read each other’s minds or immediately experience what another person experiences.
“Language,” he writes, “presupposes interlocutors, a plurality.”31 When I am spoken to, I
encounter the full presence of the Other who reveals to me my responsibility to listen to what he
has to teach me and to give myself to others in turn. I am obligated by the Other, but I do not
merge with the Other. The Other and I remain set apart from each other, absolved within our
relating to one another. And as we will see in what follows, it is an intimate Other who appears
within the sphere of possession who makes this separation or absolution possible.
Interiority: the “feminine” Other
While much of Totality and Infinity is devoted to describing the ways in which the
relation with the Other is one of “absolute” difference, there is another kind of relation with
human alterity described in the work that is less often emphasized both by scholars and by
Levinas himself. In Sections II and IV of Totality and Infinity, Levinas describes a relation with
the Other that is not marked by “absolute” alterity but by what he calls “feminine”32 alterity or
intimacy [intimité]. Levinas’s account of the feminine first appears in Totality and Infinity in
Section II, in the description of the Other who abides in the dwelling. The purpose of Section II
is to describe the movements that constitute the structure of interiority or the Same. As we have
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seen, the Same is, for Levinas, associated with the identificatory movement of the I. The
feminine plays an important role in this process insofar as she is an Other who makes possible
the accomplishment of the separation of subjectivity necessary for ethics. The feminine also
appears in Section IV in Levinas’s description of the intimacy of eros. Each of these descriptions
of “feminine” alterity will be explored in turn below.
Enjoyment and the dwelling
In order to understand the role of “feminine” alterity in the dwelling, it is first necessary
to see how the dwelling relates to the identificatory structure of the subject. For Levinas, the
most basic structure of the I is enjoyment [jouissance], which he describes as “living from…”
[vivre de] the contents of our life. He writes, “We live from ‘good soup,’ air, light, spectacles,
work, ideas, sleep, etc….”33 This notion of “living from…” is importantly different from the
intentional structure that Heidegger describes as fundamental to our engagement with the world,
namely as using the world with tools that are “at-hand.”34 We “live from” [vivre de] the contents
of our lives, Levinas insists, in a manner that is not how we engage with tools, which function as
means to an end. Rather, the contents of life--the “good soup,” air, light, etc.--are primordially
“objects” of enjoyment, even when they also serve as tools or implements.
Phenomenologically, he argues, there is always in the experience of using a tool, a
surplus beyond the use of the tool to accomplish its task, namely its presence as something to be
enjoyed. He writes, “The enjoyment of a thing, be it a tool, does not consist simply in bringing
this thing to the usage for which it is fabricated—the pen to the writing, the hammer to the nail to
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be driven in—but also in suffering or rejoicing over this operation.” The experience of living
our lives, Levinas argues, is not exhausted entirely by the meaning offered by our projects, but
involves a relation to the content of life that exceeds any system of finality.
In this way, enjoyment is, according to Levinas, independent to a certain extent, from any
kind of telos. At the same time, however, enjoyment is also, in a different sense, a relation of
dependence. That is, Levinas claims that enjoyment involves a dependence on its contents--life
must be full of “good soup,” air, light, spectacles, etc. This dependence, however, is not, Levinas
argues, a dependence that can be understood in terms of a lack in the subject. Rather, according
to Levinas, enjoyment constitutes the earliest emergence of the subject. The subject does not preexist enjoyment as one who has needs, but is already, on the deepest level, one who enjoys
himself. He writes:
To live from bread is therefore neither to represent bread to oneself nor to act on it nor to
act by means of it. To be sure, it is necessary to earn one’s bread, and it is necessary to
nourish oneself in order to earn one’s bread; thus the bread I eat is also that with which I
earn my bread and my life. But if I eat my bread in order to labor and to live, I live from
my labor and from my bread.36
It is not the case that the subject first exists and then enjoys life. Rather, to be a subject is to
enjoy living the contents of one’s life. Actions of a subject are only possible because of a
primordial enjoyment of the contents of one’s life, of what one lives from.
Living from the contents of our lives involves a kind of dependence on that from which
we live, but this dependence is not an enslavement. Levinas writes, “The human being thrives on
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his needs; he is happy for his needs.” In having needs and satisfying them, the subject is not a
37

slave but, in fact, becomes a master. Sovereignty, our mastery of the world, arises through the
satisfaction of our needs. Drawing on Diotima’s account in the Symposium of Eros as the child of
Poros and Penia, wealth and poverty,38 as well as Pausanius’s distinction between a heavenly and
a commonly Aphrodite,39 Levinas writes, “Need—the vulgar Venus—is also, in a certain sense,
the child of πόρος and of πενία; it is πενία as source of πόρος, in contrast with desire, which is
the πενία of πόρος” (TeI 87, TaI 114-115). Need, according to Levinas, corresponds to
commonly love. Although it begins in penia, in lack, it brings about a kind of richness. The
poverty of what we do not have is the source of our wealth; the satisfaction of our needs is what
allows for the sovereignty of the subject. In the metaphysical relation with the Other, however,
here understood as the heavenly Aphrodite, or Desire, the poverty of our richness is itself
revealed as never satisfied, insofar as my responsibility to the Other can never be fully met.40
This accomplishment of subjectivity in enjoyment, Levinas claims, following MerleauPonty, is primordially found in the capable body,41 the body that, though vulnerable and
dependent, also provides mastery over the world through the development of skills, the handling
37
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of possessions, laboring, and so on. Levinas writes, “My body is not only a way for the subject to
be reduced to slavery, to depend on what is not itself, but is also a way of possessing and of
working, of having time, of overcoming the very alterity of what I have to live from.”42 The body
as “I can” is a temporal body that enjoys its experience of being capable of working and doing.
What we enjoy in our experience as capable bodies, however, is not reducible to a system
of references organized by the practical concerns of a subject, as Heidegger seems to indicate in
his discussion of signification in §18 of Being and Time.43 Rather, according to Levinas, what is
enjoyed remains always situated in a milieu. He writes, “They [the contents of enjoyment] are
found in space, in the air, on the earth, in the street, along the road. The medium [milieu] remains
essential to things, even when they refer to property...which constitutes the things qua things.”44
Things qua things are what can be lifted from a milieu and become possessable, but the milieu
itself, that from which things emerge, is, Levinas argues, non-possessable as the necessary
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background against which a thing can become a thing.
This non-possessable background from which things emerge, Levinas names the
“elemental.” And the elemental, though non-possessable, can, to a certain extent, be known. We
can learn the patterns of the weather, for instance. But Levinas insists that the elemental remains
unmeasurable. Unlike an object, which we can move around and see from all sides, the elemental
background in which we are steeped has no borders that define it. He writes, “To tell the truth the
element has no side at all. One does not approach it. The relation adequate to its essence
discovers it precisely as a medium: one is steeped in it; I am always within the element.”45 In
labor, we work with the elemental and, thereby overcome it to a certain extent, but our
possession of the world always occurs on the background of the elemental milieu that is never
fully mastered. In this sense, the elemental reality that underlies enjoyment is similar to the Other
insofar as both resist possession by the self-identificatory movements of the Same. The important
difference to note here, however, is that the resistance to possession by the human Other is, for
Levinas, an ethical resistance, whereas the resistance of the elemental is one that is mysterious
and at times threatening, even as we enjoy it.
Before possession and representation, therefore, is enjoyment, and enjoyment is
accomplished in an elemental milieu. I do not first represent the world to myself. Rather,
elemental enjoyment is what allows me to, subsequently, represent the world. Levinas writes,
The earth which upholds me does so without my troubling myself about knowing what
upholds the earth. I am content with the aspect this corner of the world, universe of my
daily behavior, this city or this neighborhood, or this street in which I move, this horizon
within which I live, turn to me; I do not ground them in a more vast system. It is they that
ground me.46
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In being supported by the horizons I find myself in, I am able to live from a world that supports
me. The truth of this world is not one that I immediately question or represent. Rather, the world
is what allows me to represent and question it.
While the elemental supports my enjoyment and the satisfaction of my needs, this support
is not however, predictable. This unpredictability arises precisely because the elemental is what
underlies my ability to represent and, therefore, predict the world. Enjoyment, thus, involves a
kind of dependence that is always uncertain. I cannot be sure that the food present today will be
present tomorrow. The political situation which today allows me to do philosophy and support
myself and to be supported by others, could crumble tomorrow. The contents that I depend on in
enjoyment to satisfy my needs only satisfy me precariously.
As a result, Levinas claims, we try to postpone this uncertainty, and we do so by
retreating into the dwelling, a place that provides protection, stability, and a degree of certainty
in the face of an unpredictable reality. The stability of the dwelling is, according to Levinas,
necessary for our ability to represent the world to ourselves. He writes, “Concretely speaking the
dwelling is not situated in the objective world, but the objective world is situated by relation to
my dwelling.”47 The dwelling is a necessary condition for my representing the world; it gives me
a site from which I can take a stance, work, know, and live. This structure of being at-home is
necessary for the subject to be able to enter into a relation with the Other for whom I am
responsible. I need stability and a position from which I can move and to which I can retreat, in
order to be able to offer what I have to others.
One of the characteristic features of the dwelling, according to Levinas, is that it provides
47
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a transition between interiority and exteriority. The dwelling is able to offer up this transitional
moment because it has an inside and an outside. As Levinas writes, “It has a ‘street front,’ but
also its secrecy...Circulating between visibility and invisibility, one is always bound for the
interior of which one’s home, one’s corner, one’s tent, or one’s cave is the vestibule.”48 In this
way, as that which is both exterior and interior, the dwelling provides the subject with a home
from which it can emerge into the world. Levinas writes, “Man abides in the world as having
come to it from a private domain, from being at home with himself, to which at each moment he
can retire…Simultaneously without and within, he goes forth outside from an inwardness
[intimité].”49 Fundamental to subjectivity, Levinas argues, is the need for a home, a place of
intimacy that is a comforting and protected space to which one can retreat. In this sense, the
dwelling is an interior sphere that is also open to the outside, and as we will see in the following,
the dwelling includes alterity, but not the absolute alterity of absolute exteriority but an intimate,
“feminine” alterity.
Alterity in the dwelling
The dwelling provides the condition of subjectivity by being a space of recollection
according to Levinas. That is, the dwelling allows me to re-collect myself as a subject, which, in
the phenomenological tradition is often identified as among the most fundamental structures of
intentionality.50 Too often, Levinas insists, the subject is posited as if it comes out of nowhere
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and we forget that dwelling is necessary for this accomplishment of subjectivity. He writes
But, the dwelling cannot be forgotten among the conditions for representation…[T]he
subject contemplating a world presupposes the event of dwelling, the withdrawal from
the elements...recollection in the intimacy of a home.51
Again using the language of intimacy, Levinas insists that it is the intimacy of the home that
conditions the subject’s ability to represent the world to itself. For Levinas, intimacy and
familiarity, are preconditions for knowledge about the world. We must view the world from a
particular position, and it is the dwelling, and the intimate comfort we find therein, that gives us
this ability to take up a perspective in the first place.
The notion of intimacy necessarily involves intimacy with someone. It already indicates a
relation with the Other, and as Levinas claims, the dwelling as the locus of recollection, is not a
place of solitude. Rather, dwelling involves a relationship with the Other, and it is this
relationship with an intimate Other that allows me to become myself through a re-collection of
myself. This recollection [recueillement] of the self, Levinas argues, is made possible by another
person who also lives in the home and welcomes [accueille] me. He writes:
The familiarity of the world does not only result from habits acquired in this world,
which take from it its roughnesses and measure the adaptation of the living being to a
world it enjoys and from which it nourishes itself; familiarity and intimacy are produced
as a gentleness that spreads over the face of things. This gentleness is not only a
conformity of nature with the needs of the separated being, which from the first enjoys
them and constitutes itself as separate, as I, in that enjoyment, but is a gentleness coming
from an affection [amitié] for that I. The intimacy which familiarity already presupposes
is an intimacy with someone. The interiority of recollection is a solitude in a world
already human. Recollection [recueillement] refers to a welcome [acueil]. [emphasis in
original]52
Husserl’s account in History of the Concept of Time. Trans. Theodore Kissel. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1992 and later in Being and Time.
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The subject in enjoyment, according to Levinas, thrives on being nourished by a world that
precariously satisfies its needs. This satisfaction of needs by the world and the subsequent
development of habits and capabilities that allow the subject to enjoy the world which it lives
from, cannot, however, produce the full gentleness and comfort characteristic of the dwelling. In
order for the subject to have a dwelling as a space of respite, and thereby to have a place in
which it can recollect itself and from which it can emerge into the world, he must first be
welcomed in hospitality, familiarity, and affectionate intimacy.
In concrete terms, to become a subject capable of understanding and functioning in the
world, it is clear that we need the hospitality of others. In a literal sense, we are born from the
body of another person whose corporeal hospitality makes possible our very being alive.
Furthermore, as infants, we could not survive without others who parent us. And throughout our
lives, we find ways of being at home in the world by living in community with others who
welcome us into sharing a world with them.
But, as Levinas himself recognizes, the presence of another person with whom I am
familiar and intimate, poses challenges for Levinas’s account of the metaphysical relation as it is
presented in Section I of Totality and Infinity. The Other in Section I of the work is the absolute
Other who, as we have seen, is characterized by his unsettling of the identificatory movement of
the I. Levinas describes the Other as one “who disturbs the being at home with oneself [le chez
soi].”53 The Other as absolute exteriority is precisely one who resists subsumption into the
economy [oiko-nomia] of the Same. How, then, can an Other also be a condition of the
possibility of the home [oikos]? Or, as Levinas puts it, “How can the separation of solitude, how
53
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can intimacy be produced in the face of the Other?” The Other who speaks to me comes from
54

the exterior; he is precisely the one who calls into question my right to the comfort characteristic
of interiority.
Levinas’s solution to this problem of an intimate other who dwells alongside me in
interiority, is to describe a new mode of alterity, which he here names the alterity of the
“Woman,” or femininity. While the relation with the feminine Other is different from the relation
with the Other as described earlier in the work, Levinas goes on to insist that he is not claiming
that this presence is akin to the alterity of things over which the subject can exercise its mastery.
He continues:
This alterity is situated on another plane than language and nowise represents a truncated,
stammering, still elementary language. On the contrary, the discretion of this presence
includes all the possibilities of the transcendent relationship with the Other. It is
comprehensible and exercises personality, which, however, in the woman, can be
reserved so as to open up the dimension of interiority. And this is a new and irreducible
possibility, a delightful lapse in being, and the source of gentleness in itself.55
The feminine presents neither the relative alterity of the elemental that can be possessed,
mastered, and controlled, but neither is it fully identified with the absolute Other who appears in
the speaking relation. She is, instead, “on another plane than language.” In this way, the feminine
presence offers a third possibility in addition to the categories of the Same and the Other. Neither
subsumable to the I nor marked by the absolute alterity of the exterior Other, the feminine is
neither a moment of pure interiority nor of pure exteriority. She is transcendent insofar as, like
everyone, she escapes the grasp of a subject who knows and com-prehends the world. And yet,
she appears within the sphere of interiority, where the subject feels at home in familiarity.
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In describing the alterity of the Other who welcomes me in the dwelling, Levinas
characterizes the relation with this feminine Other as akin to Martin Buber’s I-Thou relation56
and in doing so, reveals his ambivalence about the role of feminine alterity in ethics. Buber,
according to Levinas, fails to take into account the asymmetry of the metaphysical relation but
instead presents the I-Thou relation as a reciprocal relation in which we are equal and similar.57
In the section on the dwelling, Levinas equates the I-Thou relation with the relation with
feminine alterity. He writes:
The Other who welcomes in intimacy is not the you [vous] of the face that reveals itself
in a dimension of height, but precisely the thou [tu] of familiarity: a language without
teaching, a silent language, an understanding without words, an expression in secret. The
I-Thou in which Buber sees the category of interhuman relationship is the relation not
with the interlocutor but with feminine alterity.58
We see that intimacy is here identified with the I-Thou relation which in turn is understood in
terms of the relation with feminine alterity. Regardless of whether or not this characterization of
Buber is accurate, Levinas’s point is that intimacy involves us in a relation that is different from
the ethical relation. The feminine Other, Levinas claims, is not the “interlocutor” of the
metaphysical relation as described elsewhere in the work.
While intimacy necessarily presupposes the ethical relation with the absolute Other, the
intimate Other, Levinas claims, plays a different role than that of the absolute Other in the life of
the subject. The intimate Other approaches me not immediately from “on high” but from within
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the intimate space of the dwelling. And as one who appears in interiority, the intimate Other also
offers a mode of discourse that is different from the unsettling discourse that marks the relation
with absolute alterity. The language of feminine alterity is, according to Levinas, “a language
without teaching,” a claim that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.59 The
discourse of the intimate Other, unlike the speech of the Other of absolute distance, offers
familiarity and affection by extending a silent expression that allows me to rest and recover
myself. In intimacy, the Other (whom Levinas still calls Autrui) does not first call me into
question and demand that I justify myself or offer an “apology,” but provides me instead with
hospitality and acceptance.
While the introduction of intimacy in Totality and Infinity complicates the distinction that
Levinas draws early on in the work between the Same and the Other, intimate alterity is,
nevertheless necessary for Levinas’s philosophical project. And there are moments when Levinas
even seems to give the relation with “feminine” alterity priority, as the peaceful relation that
necessarily precedes a war of all against all. In his account of her presence in the dwelling, he
writes:
The welcoming of the face is peaceable from the first, for it answers to the unquenchable
Desire for Infinity. War itself is but a possibility and nowise a condition for it. This
peaceable welcome is produced primordially in the gentleness of the feminine face, in
which the separated being can recollect itself, because of which it inhabits, and in it
dwelling accomplishes separation. Inhabitation and the intimacy of the dwelling which
make the separation of the human being possible thus imply a first revelation of the
Other.60
In this passage, we see that the “first revelation” of the Other is the welcoming extended by the
Other who makes possible our very inhabitation of the world in the dwelling. That is, the
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hospitable intimate Other is the first Other because it is this hospitality that allows us to become
subjects in the first place. It is this peaceful and generous hospitality that “make[s] the separation
of the human being possible.” Separation, the accomplishment of subjectivity, is supported and
made possible by my being peacefully welcomed by an intimate Other. In this way, insofar as
separation is necessary for the ethical relation, insofar as the terms of the relation must “absolve”
themselves from the relation, hospitality is a condition for the possibility of the concrete ethical
relation.
And yet, Levinas insists that the relation with an intimate feminine alterity is not enough
to establish ethics. The relation with intimate alterity is necessary for me to accomplish
separation, but the ethical relation requires a further relation with absolute alterity. Levinas
writes:
This withdrawal [of the feminine in the dwelling] implies a new event; I must have been
in relation with something I do not live from. this event is the relation with the Other who
welcomes me in the Home, the discreet presence of the Feminine. But in order that I be
able to free myself from the very possession that the welcome of the Home establishes, in
order that I be able to see things in themselves, that is, represent them to myself, refuse
both enjoyment and possession, I must know how to give what I possess. Only thus could
I situate myself absolutely above my engagement in the non-I. But for this I must
encounter the indiscreet face of the Other that calls me into question. The Other-absolutely other--paralyzes possession, which he contests by his epiphany in the face. He
can contest my possession only because he approaches me not from the outside but from
above.61
The relation with the intimate other who provides the space of dwelling is neither the elemental
reality that I live from nor the absolute alterity of the Other who comes to me from a dimension
of “height.” Her “discreet presence” creates the space of recollection necessary for me to become
a subject. But, Levinas claims, the relation with intimate alterity is insufficient for ethics. I must
also encounter an indiscreet other who calls me into question and “paralyzes my possession.”
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Only then, according to Levinas, can I not only receive hospitality from the Other but offer up
my own dwelling in generosity and hospitality to others.
Alterity in Eros
In addition to describing the intimate alterity of the dwelling in Section II of Totality and
Infinity, Levinas also discusses another form of feminine alterity in his account of the erotic
relation with the Beloved in Section IV of the work titled “Beyond the Face.” Just as the
presence of the Other in the dwelling presents an ambiguous alterity that is neither wholly
exterior nor wholly interior, the erotic relation also reveals the ambiguity of intimate alterity. In
fact, Levinas characterizes the erotic relation as fundamentally ambiguous, beginning the section
on eros with a chapter called “The Ambiguity of Eros.” The erotic relation, like the relation with
the intimate presence in the dwelling, complicates the distinctions Levinas makes earlier in the
work between interiority and exteriority, the Same and the Other, by presenting an Other who is
the object of both need and Desire. The Beloved is another intimate Other, Levinas claims, but
an Other whom I enjoy.
Like the relation with the intimate Other in the dwelling, the relation with the Beloved is
a relation that occurs in interiority as a relation in privacy. As Levinas describes it, the erotic
involves a turning away from the public sphere where justice as an appeal from the third party is
primary. Levinas describes the difference between the intimate relation of love and the relation
of justice as follows:
Language as the presence of the face does not invite complicity with the preferred being,
the self-sufficient ‘I-Thou’ forgetful of the universe; in its frankness it refuses the
clandestinity of love, where it loses its frankness and meaning and turns into laughter or
cooing. The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other—language is justice.62
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Although this passage comes from an earlier section of the work, Levinas’s references to the
“clandestinity of love” and “laughter or cooing” are parallel to phrases that he uses later in his
descriptions of the relation with the Beloved. Thus, although Levinas does not mention eros here,
it is clear that the erotic relation is already at issue.
And we see that the intimacy of eros is presented as different from the ethical face-toface relation. The ethical relation is described as one that “refuses the clandestinity of love.” That
is, in love, lovers close themselves off from the rest of the world. Ethics, however, does not
allow us to forget other others in this way. Ethics puts us in a relation of responsibility to
everyone, not just to the person we love. Furthermore, in love, the relation with the Beloved is
marked by a laughter and cooing in which “frankness” is lost in the clandestinity of the dyadic
relation. That is, once again, as in the relation with the intimate presence in the dwelling, the
intimacy of eros presents a mode of discourse that is different from that which characterizes the
ethical relation, marked by straightforwardness.
To better understand what Levinas means when he claims that the erotic relation closes
us off from the “third party,” it is helpful to turn to the chapter titled “The Other and the Others.”
Here Levinas writes that “the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity.”63 That is, the
demand placed on me in the ethical relation extends beyond the other person who is immediately
in front of me to include all the others for whom I am also responsible. The intimate erotic
relation, however, closes itself off from other others, according to Levinas. With regard to the
erotic relation, he writes, “[I]t remains intimacy, dual solitude, closed society, the supremely
non-public. The feminine is the other refractory to society, member of a dual society, an intimate
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society, a society without language.” The relation with the intimate Beloved is one which
occurs in private and foregoes the publicity of rational speech understandable by all. In an
intimate mutual enclosure, Levinas argues, we close ourselves off from the world in a silent
embrace.
Although in the intimate relation the couple or the intimate community, closes itself off
from the public realm, it is important to note that the justice demanded by the third party who
looks at me in the eyes of the Other, is never completely absent from intimate relations,
according to Levinas. He writes:
Everything that takes place here ‘between us’ concerns everyone [regarde tout le monde],
the face that looks at it [le regarde] places itself in the full light of the public order, even
if I draw back from it to seek with the interlocutor the complicity of a private relation and
a clandestinity.65
While intimacy closes us to the third, this closure is never total. The demand of ethics is absolute
and includes our relationships with intimate others. Nevertheless, the intimacy of eros presents a
relation in which the third party is rendered less dominant.
The intimate Other in the erotic relation, like the feminine Other who appears in the
dwelling, also retreats from the kind of discourse that is characteristic of the ethical relation with
absolute alterity. While the face of the absolute Other as Levinas describes it, is marked by the
straightforward “frankness” of its expressing which renders illusory the independence of the ego,
the expression or “saying” of the Beloved is, Levinas claims, equivocal. The Beloved does not
speak but remains silent.
[E]rotic nudity is as it were an inverted signification, a signification that signifies falsely,
a clarity converted into ardor and night, an expression that ceases to express itself, that
64

TeI 242, TaI 265

65

TeI 187, TaI 212

41
expresses its renunciation of expression and speech, that sinks into the equivocation of
silence, a word that bespeaks not a meaning but exhibition.66
Levinas insists that in the erotic relation, discourse is not defined by the attendance of the
interlocutor to her expression but by her withdrawal. The Beloved renounces speech and sinks
into silence. She inverts signification by not offering a direct, frank signifying but a playful
equivocation. That is, the expression of the Beloved in the erotic encounter is not the same kind
of expression involved in apologetic discourse in which the interlocutor is present to answer
questions and offer an account of what she means. In eros, communication takes another form-one that remains equivocal.
It is interesting to note that this description of the expression of the Beloved as a silent
inversion of signification, parallels Levinas’s descriptions of another “inversion” of
signification—that of Descartes’s evil genius who, as we will see in Chapter Three,67 is dispelled
finally by the Other who teaches me. Both the evil genius and the Beloved appear in laughter,
mockery and equivocation. In the case of the evil genius, Levinas writes, “Its equivocation is
insinuated in a mockery [raillerie].”68 And also, “The evil genius’ lie is beyond every lie…like a
laughter that seeks to destroy language.”69 With regard to the Beloved, Levinas writes,
“Expression is inverted into indecency, already close on [toute proche] to the equivocal which
says less than nothing, already laughter and raillery.”70 Thus, both in the relation with the
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Beloved and in the relation with the evil genius, signification appears threatened by a mocking
refusal to attend one’s expression and engage in apologetic discourse.
As a kind of silent non-sense, the Beloved also parallels the il y a, the anonymous pulse
of being that is closely tied to the an-archic world rendered evident in Descartes by the evil
genius. Levinas writes, “Alongside of the night as anonymous rustling of the there is extends the
night of the erotic, behind the night of insomnia the night of the hidden, the clandestine, the
mysterious, land of the virgin….”71 The Beloved, according to Levinas, is a “raw density, an
exorbitant ultramateriality.”72 But the inversion of signification of the flesh is not that of the il y
a. While the il y a “precedes” and threatens the establishment of subjectivity, Levinas claims that
the feminine Beloved presents a “not yet” that is not an unfulfilled possible within the horizon of
a projected future but a future that is utterly ungraspable. “’Being not yet’ is not a this or a that;
clandestinity exhausts the essence of this non-essence.”73
In this way, the erotically encountered Other presents us with an inverted signification
that is not an anonymity “before” being but a future that is otherwise than essence. As Levinas
writes, “in love transcendence goes both further and less far than language.”74 The silence and
laughter of the intimate Other, though similar in some ways to the silence and laughter of the evil
genius, is, as we discover in Levinas’s account of fecundity, the guarantor of meaning as the
condition of the possibility of future temporality. For Levinas, it is the birth of the child that
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provides a future that is both mine and yet not mine. The birth of the child, is a creation ex nihilo
that opens up the possibility of hope for a future after death. In this way, the Beloved erotically
encountered, opens up a horizon of future temporality.75
As in the case with the intimate presence in the dwelling, we find that although the
Beloved occupies a necessary role in Levinas’s account of the subject’s relation with the future,
the intimate relation with the Beloved is quite different from the relation with the absolute Other.
The Beloved appears in a private sphere, one that is turned away from or forgetful of the third
party, and the discourse of the Beloved is marked by silence and laughter as opposed to the
straightforward expression characterized by the relation with the absolute Other.
Feminist scholarship on Levinas
Given the account of the feminine presented above, there are many reasons to be
concerned about Levinas’s conception of femininity, and some feminist readers of Levinas have
provided a number of important criticisms.76 Many of the qualities of the Other that Levinas
names “feminine” perpetuate harmful stereotypes about women. In locating the “feminine” Other
in the home, for example, Levinas furthers the association between women and the private
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sphere of domesticity. Historically, the idea that a woman’s “place is in the home” has been used
to limit the public pursuits of many women. Furthermore, by describing discourse with the
“feminine” Other as a silent or even silly, Levinas implicitly affirms the idea that women’s
voices are less valuable. This construct of the demure and/or irrational woman has and continues
to silence the voices of many women.
But while most, if not all, scholars who have written about the concept of the feminine in
Levinas’s work acknowledge that there are problems with Levinas’s account, some have also
found promising resources in his descriptions of “feminine” alterity. For example, Katz has
argued that the feminine serves an important role in Levinas’s work, arguing that if we
supplement Levinas’s account of the feminine with his references to women from the Jewish
tradition, we find an account of ethics that demands a “feminization” of the masculine virile
powerful subject who desires mastery and control.77 Katz considers a number of references
Levinas makes to women in the Bible, including the figure of Ruth who, after being widowed,
leaves her homeland in order to stay with her mother in law, Naomi. Katz argues that we must
see Ruth as a paradigmatic ethical figure whose loyalty and generosity show that ethics
culminates finally in a feminine hospitality that interrupts the self-absorbed movement of the I,
which is characterized by domination and possession according to Levinas.
Like Katz, Lisa Guenther also argues for a way of reading Levinas’s account of the
feminine as a paradigm of the ethical. Guenther argues that, while Levinas seems to relegate the
feminine to a pre-ethical status, the “silent voice” of the feminine welcome is in fact essential to
the ethical relation. She argues that the demand to be ethical is a demand that I become like the
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feminine Other who welcomed me. In this way, Guenther argues that the feminine Other “far
from disappearing on the horizon of ethics...provides both its condition and its privileged
example.”78 In this way, Guenther argues, like Katz, that the feminine, while not sufficiently
treated by Levinas, can be seen as providing the paradigmatic example of an ethics of hospitality.
While I sympathize with critics of Levinas, I, like Katz and Guenther, find that the role
that the feminine plays in Levinas’s account of subjectivity is important and cannot be entirely
rejected. The feminine, understood as a relation with intimate alterity, is necessary, for the
accomplishment of subjectivity, as Levinas acknowledges. That is, the intimate space of the
dwelling, wherein we are welcomed by a gentle and hospitable other, is necessary to provide us
with the space of recollection, the space needed to accomplish subjectivity and to find a place in
a meaningful world in which we our in community with others.
In order to embrace this notion of an intimate alterity, however, it is not necessary, in my
view, to use gendered language, and the term “feminine,” does more to obscure the phenomenon
that Levinas wants to describe than it does to illuminate it. For example, when Levinas describes
our dependency on the “feminine” Other, it is important to recognize that we are fundamentally
dependent not only on a mother who gives birth to us, but also on many others who support us in
our accomplishment of the separation required for subjectivity. These others may or may not be
our biological parents and may or may not be women. The others who parent us can be of any
gender, and it would be strange to describe our intimate relations with friends, family, and
colleagues as a relation with “femininity” when the gender of our intimate others varies.
In short, while many people may experience their intimate relations as gendered in the
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way Levinas describes, many of us do not. And yet intimacy, as I have proposed to characterize
this phenomenon, does seem to be essential to subjectivity. We do not all have to be raised by a
woman, but we all need others to give us the world and to support us in our development and
accomplishment of becoming who we are. In my view, therefore, the best way to preserve the
important functions of what Levinas calls the “feminine” is to use different language such as
intimacy, generosity, affection, and hospitality instead.79 Doing so allows us to continue to value
the aspects of life that Levinas names “feminine” without limiting the possibilities of empirical
women or excluding from the discussion the diverse experiences of intimacy that people may
have.
Summary
We have seen that in Totality and Infinity, there are at least two modes of alterity of the
Other--absolute alterity and intimate alterity. Absolute alterity is the alterity of one who comes to
me from a “transascendent” dimension of height and calls me into question by revealing to me
my responsibility to others. The exterior Other unsettles me as I go about dissolving the relative
alterity of the world in enjoyment and comprehension. The Other of exteriority halts my
consumption and demands that I listen to her and respond to her needs. The Other of exteriority
demands that I question my right to possess the world and thereby reveals me to be a sojourner in
a foreign land, a guest in the land that is not mine.
The relation with an intimate hospitable alterity, which Levinas names “feminine,” is, by
contrast, a relation in which I am not immediately unsettled and called to account for my
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possession of the world. Instead, the intimate Other welcomes me from within the interior sphere
of possession where we share a dwelling. The intimate Other is not a Stranger but someone I
know well and trust. While I remain responsible to this Other just as I am to the exterior Other,
the intimate Other is one with whom I can relax, laugh, and communicate by means of a shared
understanding of the world. The intimate Other is generous and hospitable, and this intimacy is
necessary for me to become myself.
The relationship between these two forms of alterity is, however, complex. And it is not
the case that each particular other that I encounter is either an exterior or an intimate Other.
Rather, these modes of alterity intertwine and evolve in our relationships with specific others.
Every intimate Other is always also an exterior Other insofar as the Other always calls me to
account. But some others are also intimate Others and this intimacy is essential for the ethical
relation as Levinas understands it. Intimacy is necessary for the accomplishment of separation
which is, in turn, necessary for the ethical relation to be one of “absolute” difference. At the
same time, intimacy alone is not enough for the ethical relation and, as such, intimacy must also
be oriented by the ethical relation with the absolute Other who calls me into question. In the next
chapter, I will examine more closely how these two forms of alterity appear in what Levinas
calls the teaching relation.

CHAPTER THREE
THE OTHER AS MY TEACHER
In Chapter Two, it was established that the relation with the Other involves two central
moments. The Other who appears in the intimacy of the dwelling welcomes me in hospitality,
creating the space that allows me to become a subject in community with others. And the
absolute Other who comes from “on high” calls into question the consumptive powers of my
subjectivity by revealing to me my responsibility. In this chapter, I turn to an analysis of
Levinas’s understanding of what he calls a “primordial teaching”1 and examine the alterity of the
Other who is encountered as one who teaches me. As will be explored in greater detail below,2
this teaching is “primordial” in the sense that it underlies and makes possible all teaching in the
traditional sense. We will see that the Other is my teacher, according to Levinas, insofar as the
very meaningfulness of the world is made possible by the Other who offers the world to me in
speech.
In offering me a meaningful world, the Other who teaches me, I will argue, appears in
both modes of alterity explored in Chapter Two. The Other qua teacher appears as an absolute
Other who comes from “on high” and offers a “sens unique” that serves as an orientation of
signification. At the same time, the Other who teaches me also appears in the mode that Levinas
names intimate and “feminine.” In welcoming me into the world of signification the Other who
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comes from “on high” and offers a “sens unique” that serves as an orientation of signification. At
the same time, the Other who teaches me also appears in the mode that Levinas names intimate
and “feminine.” In welcoming me into the world of signification the Other teaches me by
inviting me to take part in an ongoing conversation. But in order for me to take part in listening
and speaking, I must be offered a space in the conversation by the Other who withdraws to make
room for me and my questioning. Without the generosity and hospitality of the Other, I could not
become an ethical subject capable of participating in the practice of making sense of the world.
In this way, the Other who teaches me further highlights the way in which the Other appears both
as one who unsettles my mastery of the world and one who makes possible my being in the
world.
In describing the Other qua teacher, however, Levinas often identifies the teaching
relation exclusively with the absolute alterity of the Other who unsettles me and calls me into
question. He even writes that the relation with feminine alterity offers “a language without
teaching.”3 I will argue here, however, that the teaching relation that Levinas describes, can be
more fully developed if we recognize the way in which both modes of alterity are revealed in my
relation with the Other qua teacher. The critical element of the present analysis is, thus, not a
rejection of Levinas’s account of the Other as my teacher, but rather an attempt to more fully
develop his notion of teaching by recognizing the importance of the intimacy that it necessarily
presupposes.
I will begin in the first section, with an exploration of the “sense” of the Other in
Levinas’s 1964 essay, “Meaning and Sense” and in Totality and Infinity. In the second section, I
will continue this line of investigation into Levinas’s conception of signification through a close
3
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reading of his phenomenological interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations. In the third section, I
trace the development of Levinas’s references to teaching as they appear both before and within
Totality and Infinity. We will also see in this section how the reception of meaning by the subject
is informed, in part, by Levinas’s understanding of Jewish education. And finally, in the last
section, I challenge Levinas’s claims that the teaching relation is not a relation with “feminine”
alterity. It is here that I will argue for the need to further develop the intimate dimension of
Levinas’s conception of teaching.
The “sense” of the Other
When we examine Levinas’s work surrounding the publication of Totality and Infinity in
1961, we find that, like many French intellectuals of his time, he was concerned with questions
of language and meaning. His most extended and developed meditation on these questions
appears in the 1964 essay, “La Signification et le Sens,” translated as “Meaning and Sense” in
Basic Philosophical Writings and “Signification and Sense” in Humanism of the Other Man.4
But we can find the early seeds of the ideas found in this work as far back as “The
Transcendence of Words” (1948).5 And, as we will see, Totality and Infinity also prepares the
way for the 1964 essay.
In “Meaning and Sense,” Levinas is in explicit dialogue with Merleau-Ponty,6 but the
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essay also aims to critique a general trend of “anti-Platonism” that Levinas finds in the work of
7

his contemporaries. He insists that the approach to language that his fellow philosophers
articulate has forgotten or has denied a transcendent orientation of meaning, and that they have
instead attempted to understand and explain meaning in terms of pure immanence. That is,
Levinas challenges what he sees as a form of cultural relativism among his contemporaries. He
argues that the ethical is not contingent on a particular cultural and historical perspective. Rather,
the sense of the ethical demand is absolute and independent of any particular context. To explain
this dimension of language, which he names transcendent, Levinas draws a distinction between
the two terms that give the essay its title. His thesis is that meaning [signification] arises from a
particular cultural historical context while the relation with the Other provides a transcendent
sense [sens] that cannot be derived from such a context.
But while Levinas criticizes Merleau-Ponty and others for failing to recognize the
transcendence of the ethical, in “Meaning and Sense” Levinas also often acknowledges the
advances that phenomenology has made with regard to the question of meaning. Merleau-Ponty
is correct, Levinas believes, to insist that meaning must be understood as fundamentally
corporeal.8 That is, the meaning of an expression does not exist in a realm abstracted from its
incarnation in a concrete reality. Levinas writes:
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It is then clear that the language through which meaning [signification] is produced in
being is a language spoken by incarnate minds. The incarnation of thought is not an
accident that has occurred to it and has complicated its task by diverting the
straightforward movement with which it aims at an object. The body is the fact that
thought is immersed in the world that it thinks and, consequently expresses this world
while it thinks it.9
When I speak to another person, Levinas argues, following Merleau-Ponty, there is no ideal
meaning of what I say that is obscured by the fact that I speak with this voice, in this time, and in
this cultural context. Rather, the incarnation of expression is essential to its meaning. One may
be able to abstract a meaning from what I say when, for example, I express that 2 + 2 = 4. But
this abstraction itself arises from a particular historical context that presents the possibility of and
desire for such abstractions. We only say that 2 + 2 = 4 because this expression plays a role in
the way that we, who share a culture, understand our world. The meaning of the abstraction,
which we may say is true at all times, insofar as 2 + 2 will always equal 4, nevertheless is
expressed in an incarnate, temporal, historical context. And the meaning of my specific
expression of this claim depends on the context in which I say it. For example, here I am using 2
+ 2 = 4 as an expression that you, my reader, will recognize as an example of what many
consider to be an ahistorical truth. I might also utter 2 + 2 = 4 in order to teach a child how to
add. In each case, what my expression signifies, comes, in part, from the context in which I am
expressing it. Even when I talk about what 2 + 2 = 4 means abstracted from every context, this
abstract meaning itself exists in a context. I cannot stand in a position outside of every context.
Accepting this idea that the meaning of an expression cannot be completely abstracted
from the specificity of a concrete context has consequences for our understanding of the
relationship between words and the world or between signifiers and the signified. When we think
9
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about expressions of what “is,” we find that the meaning of these expressions arise out of the
particularity of the situations in which they are expressed. When we learn another language or
learn about an era of the past, we find that the multiplicity of contexts across cultures and history
offer reality to us in different and seemingly inexhaustible ways. In this way, expression has a
power to not only describe the way things are but to creatively give us the world in new ways.
Levinas writes in “Meaning and Sense” that we sometimes think of words, or signifiers,
as containing less content than that which is signified by them. That is, we may think of words as
as abstract representations of a reality that is richer than its representation in words. Levinas,
however, argues that the creative power of language to call forth reality makes possible our
experience of the world as meaningful. In this way, signification, Levinas claims, exceeds the
given.
To understand what he means, take, for example, The Great Gatsby. This novel offers a
way of seeing life in the 1920s that, in one sense, contains less richness than the experience of
actually living in Long Island in the 1920s. That is, there is much of daily life that is not
described in the book. We are not given an account of every minute, every meal, and every
conversation experienced by the characters. But, in another sense, the novel gives us life in the
1920s in a way that living it would not. The book does not merely present us with an account of
a period of time but continues to shape our understanding of this era of the United States. In this
case, the signified, i.e. The Great Gatsby, exceeds the given, i.e. life in Long Island in the 1920s,
because it offers us a way of understanding the meaning of our culture and history in a way that
living it could not. Levinas writes, “The signified would surpass the given not because it would
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surpass our ways to capture it…but because the signified is of another order than the given….”10
This other “order” than the given is the creative act of arranging and assembling the
meaningfulness of the world that creates new possibilities within the given.

In this way, Levinas argues that these kinds of creative articulations of the meaning of the
world underlie ontology. That is, it is not as if the given just is and then we describe it in
different ways. Rather, the creative assembling of meaning gives us the world in the only way
that it can be given, that is, within the horizon of a historical, temporal, cultural context. Levinas
writes, “Culture and artistic creation are part of the ontological order itself. They are ontological
par excellence, they make the understanding of being possible.”11 When Levinas claims that
culture makes understanding possible, he is insisting on the primordiality of culture in any
articulation that we can make about the meaning of the world. A meaningful world, Levinas
argues, does not preexist our expression of that world. Rather, expression gives rise to meaning
itself.
While Levinas agrees with Merleau-Ponty that meaning cannot be disentangled from its
cultural and historical context and that the signifying expression surpasses the given, he also
argues that Merleau-Ponty, and other philosophers of his time, fail to see that the Other as the
one who signifies surpasses the given in another way--as that which orients meaning. According
to Levinas, Merleau-Ponty’s account of meaning, by acknowledging the role that culture plays in
10

11

HAH 29, BPW 41-42

HAH 28, BPW 41. See also “On the Phenomenology of Language” in Signs wherein Merleau-Ponty
claims that we must “admit as a fundamental fact of expression a surpassing of the signifying by the
signified which it is the very virtue of the signifying to make possible” (90). That is, the signifying
intention never reaches the signification that it attempts to express and yet there is no signified that
precedes the signifying. It is the signifying intention itself that makes possible signification.

55
the ontological order, gives us a diversity of meanings, each of which has its own kind of
coherence. But there is nothing, Levinas argues, to orient these diverse meanings. It is in this
way that the philosophy of his time is “anti-Platonic,” Levinas claims. He writes,
Whether it be of Hegelian, Bergsonian, or phenomenological origin, the contemporary
philosophy of meaning is thus opposed to Plato at an essential point: the intelligible is not
conceivable outside of the becoming which suggests it. There exists no meaning in itself,
which a thought would have been able to reach by jumping over the deformorming or
faithful but sensory reflections that lead to it.12
In Plato’s dialogues, true reality is found outside the realm of change and becoming and must be
sought by the philosopher who ascends beyond the realm of becoming to catch a glimpse of what
truly is. Contemporary philosophy is anti-Platonic insofar as it does not seek a source of meaning
“behind” appearances, which can be misleading. Although Levinas believes that Merleau-Ponty
is correct to insist on the cultural basis of meaning, he does not think we should reject entirely
the notion that there is something beyond or outside of culturally constituted ontologies. Levinas
argues that there is a sense [sens] that provides us with an orientation of meaning [signification]
that is independent of the meanings produced by cultures.
Developments in the study of the diversity of cultures,13 Levinas argues, has justifiably
insisted on the value of a plurality of cultures. But what has not been recognized is that this move
of “decolonization,” as Levinas describes it,14 is itself inspired by an orientation. Levinas writes,
“[W]hat has not been taken into consideration in this case is that an orientation is needed to have
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the Frenchman take up learning Chinese instead of declaring it to be barbarian (that is, bereft of
the real virtues of language) and to prefer speech to war.”15 The very possibility of a plurality of
cultures and languages that do not seek only to destroy each other but speak to one another, i.e.
the very possibility of ethics, requires, according to Levinas, that there be an orientation outside
of a particular historical and cultural arrangement.
We find such a sense, Levinas argues, when we are addressed by the Other. In the
speaking relation, Levinas insists, we are in relation “with that which signifies of itself.”16 In
speaking to me, the Other presents me not with a meaning [signification] that can be understood
relative to the horizon of meaning offered to me by my culture, but with a sens unique17 that
exceeds the meaning bestowed by the context in which the Other appears and orients my
response. That is, in being present in speaking to me, the Other does not show up in experience
only as a signified, but as one who signifies, as one who speaks to me and as one to whom I am
responsible.
As we saw in Chapter Two, the Other resists being subsumed under a concept or a set of
categories that that I can com-prehend.18 I cannot (because I must not) reduce the Other to only
what I understand her to be. The Other, according to Levinas, rather, presents me with an excess
over the categories and concepts given to me by my culture. For example, when I encounter
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another person, there are a number of things that I can know about her--her appearance, interests,
family relationships, and so on. But no matter how much I know about a particular person, there
is always more to her than what I know. When she faces me and asks me a question, her
presence requires me to leave room in my comprehension of her, to not assume that I already
know what she will say or what she means. As Levinas says in his interview with Philippe
Nemo, “The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When
one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other.”19 In order to
respond in the way that the Other’s presence demands, I cannot rely exclusively on the categories
that my culture has offered me. Rather, I must remain open to receiving from the Other more
than what I already know.
This distinction that Levinas draws between the meaning [signification] offered by my
cultural context and the ethical sense [sens] offered by the Other, can also be found in an earlier
form in Totality and Infinity. Levinas does not yet use the language of the “sens unique” but
instead names the Other the “principle” that orients meaning. He writes, “The world is offered in
the language of the Other; it is borne by propositions. The Other is the principle of
phenomena.”20 Just as the sens unique provides a “one-way” direction in “Meaning and Sense,”
the Other in Totality and Infinity serves as the principle that orients the world,
phenomenologically understood.
That is, for the world to be “given,” i.e. to appear as meaningful, Levinas insists, I must
be given the world by someone who can speak to me. I must be offered the world as something
about which one can think and speak, which requires a relation with one who speaks to me about
19
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the world. He writes, “This relationship [with the Other] is already necessary for a given to
appear as a sign, a sign signaling a speaker, whatever be signified by the sign.”21 In other words,
whatever the signification of the given sign, the given must be given by someone who signals for
it to show up as a sign, as something that signals. “And,” he continues, “it is necessary that the
given function as a sign for it to be even given.”22 That is, the given, Levinas insists, is always
given as meaningful; it is given through the context of signification. This is the argument made
by Merleau-Ponty that is rehearsed by Levinas in “Meaning and Sense.”23 There is no
meaningful world prior to the cultural and historical arrangement of the world in signification.
But in order for me to experience the given as a sign offered in a network of signification, the
given must be given by one who signifies. In this sense, the Other is the one who makes possible
my having a meaningful world, according to Levinas.
In this way, Levinas goes beyond Merleau-Ponty in insisting that the significance of the
Other’s presence in giving me the given, is a significance that is fundamentally different from
and higher than the significance of the given signs. In speaking to me, the Other does not only
signal what he says. The Other signals himself. He writes, “He who signals himself by a sign qua
signifying that sign is not the signified of the sign—but delivers the sign and gives it.”24 As in
“Meaning and Sense,” Levinas draws a distinction in Totality and Infinity between the sense of
the Other and the kind of meaning given as a network of signifiers. The Other, in speaking to me,
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does not just offer one sign among many, but offers himself in his signifying as the one who
signifies.
Furthermore, this unique sense of the Other is the principle that serves to found and orient
meaning. Levinas argues that the entire system of signification that allows for the world to
appear to us as meaningful depends on the presence of one who speaks. He writes:
The objectivity of the object and its signification comes from language. This way the
object is posited as a theme offered envelops the instance of signifying--not the referring
of the thinker who fixes it to what is signified (and is part of the same system), but the
manifesting of the signifier, the issuer of the sign, an absolute alterity which nonetheless
speaks to him and thereby thematizes, that is proposes the world.25
If we are in search of truth about the world--the “objectivity of the object,” we find that we are
involved in a thematization of the world in language. That is, expressions of objectivity involve
us in proposing to one another that the world is in a particular way. But when we propose the
world to one another, Levinas argues, what we propose is always “enveloped” by the instance of
our speaking. All speaking is necessarily a speaking to someone else. The one who signifies,
however, cannot be reduced to the meaning of another sign in the play of signification. Rather, as
the one who speaks, the Other is an “absolute alterity” who nevertheless appears in a concrete
situation of speaking. In this way, the absolute alterity of the Other is concretized in the act of
proposing the world in speech.
Meaning in solitude
To further make his case that signifying (in the sense of addressing) is presupposed by
signification or meaning, Levinas offers an account of what happens when we attempt to give an
account of meaning without the presence of one who speaks. Through a phenomenological
reading of Descartes’s Meditations, which is simultaneously a critique of Husserlian and
25
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Heideggerian phenomenology, Levinas argues that without the presence of the Other, the world
would remain hopelessly an-archic, i.e. without a principle or arche. Only the presence of one
who speaks to me can give me the orientation needed for the given to be meaningful.
According to Levinas, the attempt to ground meaning in the subject in solitude can be
found in several moments in the history of philosophy, not only in Descartes’s Meditations but
also in Gyges’s position of seeing without being seen in the Republic, and also, as we will see in
Chapter Four,26 in Socratic education. These presentations of the subject share the fact that they
involve an isolating withdrawal from the world, which Levinas claims is characteristic of the
search for truth in much of the history of philosophy. If I want the certainty of truth, it seems I
need to separate myself from that about which true claims can be made. I need to establish an
private sphere of interiority into which I can retreat and from which I can view the world. This
movement of separation from the world, according to Levinas, is an accomplishment of the
subject that creates an interior space into which it is both possible and tempting to withdraw.
Subjectivity is structured such that I can, like Gyges in the Republic, take up a position wherein I
view the world as if I am invisible, as if I am not already ensnared by my responsibility to the
Other.
We have already seen, however, that Levinas insists that our ability to accomplish this
separation is made possible by our dependence on the intimate Other in the dwelling.27 That is,
for Levinas, my ability to “re-collect” myself through a withdraw into interiority presupposes
that I am already in relation to the Other of the dwelling who makes it possible for me to become
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a subject by extending to me a welcome.
Nevertheless, Levinas acknowledges that subjectivity gives us this possibility of taking
up a stance in which truth seems to be independent of our responsibility. We can take up the
position of Gyges who sees without being seen, and from this perspective, ethics appears to be
something that I can forego. I can, Levinas argues, withdraw from the world and from others and
seek knowledge as though I am only a viewer of a spectacle of appearances. Ultimately,
however, while this move of separation is necessary for ethics, the temptation to see and
understand the world from a position of solitude proves to be based on an illusion.
When I, like Descartes or Gyges, withdraw into myself, the world appears strange. What
appears becomes, as Levinas describes it, a “pure spectacle.”28 That is, I, as an observer, am
detached from what I see. Others show up to me, from this perspective, like characters that I
observe at a distance. The Other does not speak to me any more than the actors in a movie speak
directly to me. When I am alone in interiority, I am not addressed in the way that I am addressed
in the immediacy of discourse. In this way, the world is silent, according to Levinas. That is,
when I move into the space of my own interiority, what appears no longer involves hearing or
listening to others.
When I view the world in this way, from the position of the withdrawal into interiority,
Levinas insists that I inevitably find myself mistrusting that which appears. When I see the world
as a “pure spectacle,” the world is no longer that which I implicitly trust as I go about my day to
day life, but is able to be doubted. When I treat the world as what appears to me, I transform the
world into something which, qua appearance, is dubitable. It is this doubt which gives rise, in
Descartes, to the threat of the evil genius. Levinas writes:
28
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On first contact the phenomenon would degrade into appearance and in this sense would
remain in equivocation, under suspicion of an evil genius…The possibility of their fall to
the state of images or veils codetermines their apparition as a pure spectacle, and betrays
the recess that harbors the evil genius; whence the possibility of universal doubt, which is
not a personal adventure that happened to Descartes.29
When I withdraw into myself, I do not discover a new fact that was already true of appearances,
viz. that they are dubitable. Rather, it is by withdrawing into myself that phenomena “degrade”
into appearances, that is, become something to be doubted. The movement by which I isolate
myself is simultaneously the movement that makes the world untrustworthy.
The fact of the appearance of this kind of doubt, Levinas argues, is not particular to
Descartes but is a structure of subjectivity as such. The possibility or temptation to withdraw into
myself is possible because the identificatory movement of the subject creates this interior space.
In becoming a subject, the I creates a site of possession thereby distinguishing what is “mine”
from what is “not mine.”
The universal doubt that arises from this withdrawal into the space of interiority, Levinas
argues, is not the kind of uncertainty that arises because one has not yet acquired enough
information or because one may be mistaken about a world that is coherent once mistakes are
cleared up. Rather, this doubt, according to Levinas, is renewed in every attempt to overcome it
that does not involve the introduction of something exterior to the subject. In Descartes’s
Meditations, the discovery of the cogito appears to halt my doubt, but Levinas argues that a
careful reading reveals that the cogito alone is incapable of putting the threat of the evil deceiver
to rest. We might also think here of Heidegger’s account of Angst. For Heidegger, Angst is
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overcome when Dasein assumes its own foundation and gives itself a meaning. Levinas insists,
30

however, that the idea that meaning can be guaranteed by an independent subject is a great
misconception of philosophy. The cogito, Levinas argues, is insufficient on its own to free us
from universal doubt and it is not until the introduction of something outside the subject that
radical doubt can be halted.
In Levinas’s reading of Descartes, that which halts doubt is the idea of the Infinite. The
cogito, Levinas argues, does not end skepticism. He writes:
In the cogito the thinking subject which denies its evidences ends up at the evidence of
this work of negation, although in fact at a different level from that at which it had
denied. But it ends up at the affirmation of an evidence that is not a final or initial
affirmation, for it can be cast into doubt in its turn. The truth of the second negation, then,
is affirmed at a still deeper level—but, once again, one not impervious to negation.31
It seems that the cogito gives us a piece of indubitable evidence, viz. that I am a thinking thing,
but we find that the threat of the evil genius remains. In the Meditations, the ability to trust the
senses and gain knowledge about the world is impossible until after the discovery of the idea of
the Infinite, i.e. the discovery of the necessity of God’s existence. It is only after Descartes has
established the existence of a beneficent God that he can rebuild the world shattered by his
doubt.32 In this way, the cogito does not, on its own, provide a sufficient basis for knowledge.
For Levinas, Descartes’s formulation of the idea of the Infinite as that which subtends
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and makes possible the cogito is one of the few moments in the history of Western philosophy
that genuine transcendence receives expression. In Levinas’s work, the Other parallels the role of
the idea of the Infinite in Descartes. For Levinas, it is the Other who speaks to me that ultimately
reveals the illusory nature of every attempt to ground truth in solipsistic withdrawal. Just as the
idea of the Infinite halts doubt in the Meditations, the Other who speaks to me presents me with
my responsibility, which is indubitable. Levinas writes, “The I in the negativity manifested by
doubt breaks with participation, but does not find in the cogito itself a stopping place. It is not I,
it is the other [l’Autre]33 that can say yes.”34 It is the Other, Levinas argues, who gives me the
possibility of truth, because he speaks to me. The Other, unlike the silent world that appears
when I withdraw into myself, addresses me. Once I am addressed, my skepticism is halted
because the Other places a demand on me that I am not free to ignore. Of course, I could pretend
as if the Other does not really exist and question whether or not she is real or a mere apparition,
but such a reaction would be unjust; it would violate the demand that the Other’s presence makes
on me. I can withdraw into solitude and question the meaning of everything only until I am
spoken to.
In this way, Levinas argues, the Other, like the idea of the Infinite for Descartes, gives me
the principle or arche that is needed to orient the meaningfulness of the world. He writes, “The
ambivalence of apparition is surmounted by expression, the presentation of the Other to me, the
primordial event of signification.”35 I may not be sure of anything, but when you speak to me, I
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can no longer be like Gyges for whom everything is permitted, because I am responsible. It is in
this way that the Other says “yes” to me, by breaking through the spiral of negation in which
everything is called into doubt. It is as if, while watching a film, one of the actors miraculously
turned towards me and began addressing me directly. I am no longer alone in the world, no
longer an invisible voyeur, but am spoken to. A radically new dimension is introduced into
experience.
The development of Levinas’s conception of “teaching”
Early references to “teaching”
In describing the relationship between the Other and the meaning of the world, Levinas
names my relation with the Other in this context a “teaching” relation as early as 1949 in his
essay, “The Transcendence of Words,” which is a reflection on Michel Leiris’s autobiography,
Biffures.36 In this essay, Levinas explores what he calls the transcendence of language and
makes a distinction between vision and sound that is not unlike the distinction between meaning
and sense he later formulates in the 1964 essay. Just as he will claim that the sense of the Other
exceeds what is given as signification by a culture, in this early essay, Levinas claims that sound
exceeds vision. He writes:
There is in fact in sound--and in the consciousness understood as hearing--a shattering of
the always complete world of vision and art. Sound is all repercussion, outburst, scandal.
While in vision a form espouses a content and soothes it, sound is like the sensible
quality overflowing its limits, the incapacity of form to hold its content--a true rent in the
fabric of the world--that by which the world that is here prolongs a dimension
inconvertible into vision.37
36
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Phenomenologically, Levinas claims that while vision is “complete,” sound overflows its own
form. Vision allows an object to be laid out before us. It presents us with boundaries, but sound
has no distinct borders. Sound cannot be reduced to a form that can be displayed before us. And
as that which exceeds any definition, sound, Levinas goes on to write, is paradigmatically
symbolic. He writes, “It is thus that the sound is symbol par excellence--a reaching beyond the
given.”38 Sound is, at root, he claims, transcendent, as something that points beyond its own
manifestation. The reason that sound is transcendent, Levinas goes on to argue, is that
fundamentally, sound refers to speech. He writes:
If, however, sound can appear as a phenomenon, as here, it is because its function of
transcendence only asserts itself in the verbal sound. The sounds and noises of nature are
words that disappoint us. To really hear a sound is to hear a word. Pure sound is the
word.39
In other words, for Levinas, hearing originates in listening to those who speak to us, that is, in
receiving speech. All other meaningful sounds, he insists, are based on this original listening.
He goes on to explain, in a way that prefigures the arguments of “Meaning and Sense,”
the importance of verbal sound by claiming that it is the social relation that grounds all other
meaning. He describes how Robinson Crusoe who “has maintained his ties with civilization
through his use of utensils, his morality and his calendar...experiences in meeting Man Friday the
greatest event of his insular life--in which a man who speaks replaces the ineffable sadness of
echoes.”40 Civilization is here equated with tools, the calendar, and even morality. But these
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trappings of civilization mean nothing without the concrete presence of another person. The
event of being spoken to by someone disrupts solitude and provides the possibility of a
meaningful existence.
Shortly after this account, Levinas goes on to name this encounter with another person
who disrupts solitude and gives life meaning “teaching.” He writes:
The presence of the Other is a presence that teaches us something; that is why the word,
as teaching is more than the experience of the real, and why the master more than a
midwife of minds. He wrenches experience away from its aesthetic self-sufficiency, from
its here, where it rests in peace. And by invoking it he transforms it into a creature. In this
sense, as we have said elsewhere,41 critique, the spoken word of a living being speaking
to a living being, leads the image, with which art was content, back to fully real being.42
Levinas claims that the Other’s presence transforms our experience of reality from something
complete and unquestioned into something that lives, a “creature.” The words spoken are brought
to life by being spoken by someone to someone else. In this early text of Levinas’s, we find that
the Other’s presence in speaking animates what would otherwise be a sterile and lifeless world.
Teaching is the dimension of speech that brings conversation to life.
Levinas goes on to explain the connection between this transcendence of speaking and
critique. He continues:
The language of critique takes us out of our dreams, of which artistic language is an
integral part. Clearly, in its written form, critique always attracts further critique. Books
call for more books, but that proliferation of writing stops or culminates the moment the
living word enters in, the moment critique flowers into teaching.43

41

See Levinas’s essay, “Reality and its Shadow.” This essay was originally published in Les Temps
Modernes 38 (1948). 771-89 under the title “La réalité et son ombre.” An English translation appears in
The Levinas Reader. ed. Sean Hand. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 129-143.
42

Ibid., 148-9

43

Ibid., 149

68
It is the fecundity of critique, Levinas claims, that allows language to come alive as a teaching.
In this way, we find that in his earliest formulation of “teaching” as a key philosophical concept
identifies teaching as the dimension of language that, by means of critique, brings conversation
to life.
The notion of critique as that which animates conversation is also explored in “Reality
and its Shadow” (1948). Art, Levinas claims in this essay, involves a kind of closure of the
finished work that is opened up in the proliferation of criticism that allows art to enter an
ongoing conversation. It is this “blossoming” of language into a living reality that Levinas again
names teaching. The Other who teaches me is the Other who, by speaking to me, exceeds reality
as it is given and transforms it into something that can be taken up again and again in
conversation.
In the years that followed the publication of “The Transcendence of Words” and “Reality
and its Shadow,” Levinas continued to develop a philosophical conception of teaching as is
shown by his participation in 1950 at a meeting at Jean Wahl’s Collège philosophique at which
he gave a paper titled “Les Enseignements.”44 In this previously unpublished work, Levinas
defines teaching as the relation with the Other that breaks with what he calls the world of
nourishment and tools. In these notes, he claims that the teaching of the Other reveals to me my
status as what he calls a “created” and “elected” being.
The world of nourishment described in “Les Enseignements” is similar in many ways to
what Levinas later calls “signification” in “Meaning and Sense.” The world of nourishment is
identified with the world given to us by our culture’s history, the world of civilization described
44
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in “The Transcendence of Words.” Levinas claims that the Other appears to me in this context
only as one with whom I do business. Our interactions are transactional, what we exchange can
be measured and made commensurate.
This transactional exchange, he argues, offers a neutral mediation that does not require
me to encounter the Other in his uniqueness. My coming together with the Other in economic
exchange is, rather, founded on participation, sharing [partage]. And sharing consists “in a
balance of freedoms--dominating one another, associating with one another other, exterminating
one another.”45 The world of nourishment, he claims, is one in which other people are
encountered in terms of what we share and how we can be of use to each other. This way of
relating, however, fails to allow for the uniqueness of the individual that is necessary for ethics.
We encounter other people in the world of nourishment as collaborators alongside us not as
speaking beings who call into question our right to possession.
And yet even in the world of nourishment, we find traces of the ethical in the experience
of shame. The fact that I can experience shame, Levinas claims, reveals something that
conditions subjectivity, something underneath its power to engage with the Other as one with
whom I share a world. The presence of shame he argues, reveals that I have what he terms an
“absolute past,” a past given to me by one who teaches me. He writes, “I call the manner in
which this absolute past of my election and of my creation may be given to me -- teaching.”46 In
describing my relation with the Other who teaches me as a relation with an “absolute past,”
Levinas indicates the primordiality of the teaching of the Other. My relationship with the Other
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qua teacher is a relation that precedes and orients the world of nourishment in which I can
engage in an economic exchange with others. Just as Levinas later describes the sens unique of
the Other as that which renders possible signification, the Other who teaches me in “Les
Enseignements” teaches me “before” I enter a world in which I can relate to others as economic
partners.
Levinas describes this primordial teaching as one in which I learn that I am “created” and
“elected.” To understand what Levinas means he makes this claim that about the the teaching of
the Other, it is helpful to look to Levinas’s later discussion of creation in Totality and Infinity. In
a consideration of the need for a separation between the I and the Other, he names separation
“creation ex nihilo.” He writes:
But the idea of creation ex nihilo expresses a multiplicity not united into a totality; the
creature is an existence which indeed does depend on an other, but not as a part that is
separate from it. Creation ex nihilo breaks with system, posits a being outside of every
system, that is, there where its freedom is possible.47
To be a created being is to be a being who is separate, free. This separated being is dependent on
the Other, but this dependence does not define the subject. Rather, the separated being
accomplishes a truly independent existence through the accomplishment of subjectivity. When
Levinas claims in “Les Enseignements” that my experience of shame is received as a teaching
that reveals my being to be a created being,48 he means, therefore, that the relation with the
Other, experienced as shame, reveals to me my separation, my utter uniqueness, the
inescapability of being myself.
But at the same time, this experience of my concrete separation in shame is also an
47
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experience of “election.” When the Other calls me to responsibility, the uniqueness of my
existence as a subject means that no one can take my place. I am called to responsibility and I
cannot relegate this responsibility to someone else. The use of the term “elected” invokes
Levinas’s Jewish faith. For, to be Jewish for Levinas, is to be chosen for responsibility. This
election, he argues, reveals both the universality and the particularity of the teachings of
Judaism. In “A Religion for Adults” (1957), for example, he writes,
This election is made up not of privileges but of responsibilities. It is a nobility based not
on royalties [droit d’auteur] or a birthright [droit d’aînesse] conferred by a divine
caprice, but on the position of each human I [moi]. Each one as an ‘I’, is separate from all
the others to whom the moral duty is due.49
To be Jewish, to be “chosen” by God, according to Levinas, is to be chosen for responsibility and
my responsibility is uniquely mine. I cannot escape it by transferring it to someone else.
Responsibility cannot be located in an economic system whereby equal goods are traded. It is in
this sense that we can understand Levinas’s claim that the Other teaches me my status as
“created” and “elected” in “Les Enseignements.” What the Other teaches me, according to
Levinas, is the very fact of my unique and non-transferable responsibility.
As in “The Transcendence of Words,” we thus see that “teaching” in these notes is
described as a reception of that which transforms and makes possible the significance of the
world. In “The Transcendence of Words,” teaching breaks open the complete, self-sufficient
world of vision through the blossoming of language into critique. And in “Les Enseignements,”
Levinas identifies teaching as the introduction into the world of nourishment, a recognition that I
am chosen for responsibility. While these ideas are not identical to Levinas’s later formulations
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in Totality and Infinity, we can see the early development of Levinas’s notion of the Other as
my teacher beginning to emerge.
Jewish education
In addition to these early writings that reference teaching, there are also three essays
explicitly devoted to teaching in Difficult Freedom. As I noted in the introduction,51 Levinas
worked as the director of the Enio for nearly three decades, and he was working at the school
when he wrote Totality and Infinity and many of the essays in Difficult Freedom. In these essays,
Levinas argues that Jewish education is especially important for continuing the sacred traditions
of Jewish life.
In “How is Judaism Possible?” (1959), for example, Levinas outlines with some
specificity what he believes the curriculum of Jewish education should be. Essential to Jewish
education, he argues, is a rigorous study of the Talmud. And we can see in Levinas’s
understanding of the role of Talmud study in Jewish education, resonances with his account of
the presence of the Other as the one who assures the blossoming of criticism into teaching in
“The Transcendence of Words” as explored above.52 For Levinas, what is essential in the
rabbinic commentary of the Talmud is its plurality of voices, what he calls “talmudic
pluralism,”53 which opens up an ongoing series of questions without giving a definitive or
dogmatic answer. This mode of perpetual commentary, he argues, allows for the spiritual truth of
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Judaism to be renewed in different cultural and historical eras. In Talmudic commentary, a
plurality of voices provide different and at times opposing views, which are arrived at through
the careful and rigorous study of the most minute details of the text. It is this intellectual rigor
applied ceaselessly that makes Judaism continually relevant in vastly different cultural and
historical time periods. To be Jewish is to be a part of this tradition of reading and responding to
the sacred texts in one’s own time.
It is only through a Talmud-centered Jewish education that Judaism can survive,
according to Levinas. In “Reflections on Jewish Education,” he writes, “The existence of Jews
who wish to remain Jews - even apart from belonging to the State of Israel - depends on Jewish
education. Only this can justify and nurture such existence.”54 This education must include the
study of the Talmud because, he writes, “[i]n a world in which nothing is Jewish, only the text
reverberates and echoes a teaching that no cathedral, no plastic form, no specific social structure
can free from its abstract nature.”55 Jewish education cannot be reduced to a formalized
abstraction of its teachings because a culture and a tradition cannot survive in the abstract but
must be renewed continuously in a living manifestation of its teachings. Christianity, unlike
Judaism, he argues, is concretely manifested everywhere in the West. Judaism, however, has its
concrete manifestation only in its texts. For this reason, “If we detach them [modern Jews] from
the deep and real life that animates these square letters with its precise rhythms, we reduce them
to the poverty of a theoretical catechism.”56 The task of the Jewish educator is, thus, to bring the
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texts to life in a contemporary setting. The texts have to be, as he writes, “turn[ed] back into
teaching texts.”57
To turn the texts back into teaching texts, Levinas argues that the study of Jewish texts
must be intellectually rigorous. “In order for the permanent values of Judaism, contained in the
great texts of the Bible, the Talmud and their commentators, to be able to nurture souls,” he
writes, “they must once again be able to nurture brains.”58 Judaism, he argues, must be
“raise[d]..to the level of a science.”59 Doing so, Levinas insists, does not involve a philological
tracing of the history of texts and their influences. To approach a text as capable of teaching,
Levinas argues, is to allow the texts to continue a perpetual conversation that raises relevant
questions about the meaning of being human. We must read texts in such a way that their
meanings can live in a contemporary context and dialogue and are not treated as relics of history.
In his own Talmudic interpretations, Levinas himself struggles to bring the text of the
Talmud into a contemporary context. In describing his method Levinas writes,
Many of you are undoubtedly thinking, with good reason, that at this very moment, I am
in the process of rubbing the text to make it spurt blood—I rise to the challenge! Has
anyone ever seen a reading that was something besides this effort carried out on a text?
To the degree that it rests on the trust granted the author, it can only consist in this
violence done to words to tear from them the secret that time and conventions have
covered over with their sedimentations, a process begun as soon as these words appear in
the open air of history. One must, by rubbing, remove this layer which corrodes them.60
The work of reading and interpreting the Talmud consists in reading the text in order to find
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what it can offer to us in our experiences living in a place and time different from that of the
text’s original expression. Reading the Talmud, according to Levinas, demands of us that we
struggle to bring the letter of the text to life, allowing it to “spurt blood” in our own time, to be a
“creature” capable of teaching us.
In contrasting his approach with a historical/philological approach, Levinas once more
uses the language of teaching. He writes, “We take the Talmudic text and the Judaism which
manifests itself in it as teachings and not as a mythic web of survivals.”61 What distinguishes a
“web of survivals” from “teachings” is the ability of a text to enter into a “living breathing
discourse.”
Thus, throughout these references to teachings in Levinas’s Jewish writings, we see that
Levinas’s understanding of Jewish education influences the development of his conception of
teaching. A fundamental teaching lies at the origin of conversation; it brings words to life and
allows what is said to enter into an ongoing, living, breathing, even bleeding, speech. In this way,
we see that Levinas identifies the teaching relation as a relation that transforms the given into a
meaningful world about which I can speak and in which I am responsible.
The primordial teaching relation in Totality and Infinity
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas continues to name the relation with the Other a teaching
relation. And in this text, we find that Levinas emphasizes not only that the Other breaks with the
world offered by our culture, but also that the Other is what makes possible my very ability to
understand and represent the world to myself in language, a theme that we saw developed in
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“Meaning and Sense.” Teaching, he argues in Totality and Infinity, makes possible
thematization. He writes,
To comprehend a signification is not to go from one term of relationship to another,
apperceiving relations within the given. To receive the given is already to receive it as
taught—as an expression of the Other...the world becomes our theme, and hence our
object as proposed to us; it comes from a primordial teaching, in which scientific work
itself is established and which it requires.63
The meaning of the world as it is given, as we have seen above, cannot be established by
examining a network of references making up a totality of significations offered by a particular
cultural and historical arrangement. Rather, Levinas insists that the Other speaking to me is a
necessary condition for my own speaking about the world.
Levinas then goes on to claim that what makes it possible for me to receive the world in
this way from the Other is that the Other is present in expression. He writes, “Language is
exceptional in that it attends its own manifestation. Speech consists in explaining oneself with
respect to speech; it is a teaching.”64 This “attendance” of the Other to her manifestation is here
described as a kind of promise that the Other’s presence makes to me, a promise that she will
continue our conversation. He writes,
Thematization manifests the Other because the proposition that posits and offers the
world does not float in the air, but promises a response to him who receives this
proposition, who directs himself toward the Other because in his proposition he receives
the possibility of questioning.65
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The Other qua teacher is an Other who does not abandon me but enters into a conversation with
me insofar as I receive her speaking. This promise of a response is what makes questioning, and
thereby learning, possible.
In opening up the possibility of questioning, by proposing the world and promising to
answer my questions, Levinas claims that the Other offers the key to interpreting what he says.
In this way, he claims, there is an element of teaching in all speaking. He writes, “The presence
of the interpretative key in the sign to be interpreted is precisely the presence of the other in the
proposition, the presence of him who can come to the assistance of his discourse, the teaching
quality of all speech.”66 In speaking to me and offering to respond to my questions, the Other’s
presence gives me the possibility of understanding his speaking.
In this way, the element of speech that Levinas describes as its “teaching quality” is one
in which discourse is opened up to an ongoing discussion and clarification of what is said. The
Other does not simply propose the world to me and abandon me to my interpretation (like the
“fatherless” texts that Socrates describes in the Phaedrus). Rather, her presence guarantees the
“plenitude of discourse”67 and the “inexhaustible surplus of attention which speech, ever
teaching, brings me.”68 Thus, “[t]o have meaning is to teach or to be taught, to speak or to be
able to be stated.”69 In other words, for Levinas, the very fact that the given is given as
meaningful presupposes the presence of the Other who signifies, the signifier. In being present in
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signifying, the Other opens up the plane of discourse in which we can continue to question and
answer one another. The Other, just as we saw in “The Transcendence of Words,”70 by being
present in speaking, allows for speech to “blossom” into teaching, to come to life through the
living, breathing presence of the interlocutors.
In being received by me, what the Other teaches me, Levinas insists in Totality and
Infinity, is the ethical relation itself or my being “elected.” Levinas claims that the first teaching
is that I am responsible, that I am in a community with others. This teaching is not something
that I learn as I learn objective knowledge. Rather, it is the very presence of the teacher himself
that teaches me this very presence. Levinas writes:
The presence of the Master who by his word gives meaning to phenomena and permits
them to be thematized is not open to an objective knowing; this presence is in society
with me. The presence of being in the phenomenon, which breaks the charm of the
bewitched world, which utters the yes of which the I is incapable, which brings the
preeminent positivity of the Other, is ipso facto as-sociation.71
For Levinas, in order to have a meaningful world, I must be given the world by one who speaks
to me. In speaking to me, the Other opens up the possibility of a continued dialogue through his
presence. At the same time, this presence reveals to me the fact of my responsibility.
In this way, the Other, as my teacher, is higher than me, is my Master. The Other
“judges” me, that is, calls my freedom into question by revealing to me that I am not free to do
whatever I please but am responsible to and for the other.
The moral relation with the Master who judges me subtends the freedom of my
adherence to the true. Thus language commences. He who speaks to me and across the
words proposes himself to me retains the fundamental foreignness of the Other who
judges me; our relations are never reversible. This supremacy posits him in himself
outside of my knowing, and it is by relation to this absolute that the given takes on
70

See above pp 65-68.

71

TeI 73, TaI 100

meaning.

79

72

While in speaking to me the Other offers me the promise of an ongoing discussion, it is not the
case, Levinas insists, that the Other and I are in interchangeable positions. The Other is “higher”
than me, in that I am inescapably responsible for the Other.
Here, we see that there is a kind of exchange that occurs in the speaking relation, but it is
an exchange that does not involve the counting up of debts or the economic exchange that
Levinas describes in “Les Enseignements” as participation or sharing. The exchange between the
Other who teaches me and me is not a reciprocal exchange. Rather, the exchange is an exchange
of hospitality. The Other welcomes me into the world of discourse by offering me a promise of a
response and I, in turn, welcome the teaching of the Other, which reveals to me that I am
responsible for her. But my responsibility is not that of a debt owed. Rather, in giving me the
world as meaningful, the Other gives me the gift of being responsible. I am “elected,” chosen for
responsibility. As Guenther writes, “In calling my possession into question and teaching me the
idea of infinity, the Other also teaches me how to give to the Other, how to be responsible for a
stranger whom I cannot grasp or comprehend. The Other gives to me the capacity to give to
him.”73 The teaching which gives me the world is thus a gift that in turn makes it possible for me
to give and to know how and what I ought to give.
Exteriority and intimacy in the teaching relation
In the descriptions of the Other as teacher explored above, we can already see elements of
both modes of the alterity of the Other--the absolute alterity of the Other who unsettles me and
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the hospitality of the intimate Other who welcomes me into conversations about the world. As
we will see, however, Levinas expresses some ambivalence about the possibility that the Other
who teaches me presents me with the hospitable intimate presence that Levinas names feminine.
The alterity of the Other who teaches me is most often described as the absolute alterity of the
Other as an utterly exterior and foreign presence. In describing the teaching relation, Levinas
writes, for example, “The absolutely foreign alone can instruct us,”74 implying that teaching is
not accomplished through intimacy, but requires the distance of the foreign Other, the Other who
comes from outside the sphere of interiority.
Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter Two,75 in describing the difference between feminine
alterity in the dwelling and the absolute alterity of the Other who calls me to responsibility,
Levinas writes:
But in order that I be able to free myself from the very possession that the welcome of the
Home establishes, in order that I be able to see things in themselves, that is, represent
them to myself, refuse both enjoyment and possession, I must know how to give what I
possess. Only thus could I situate myself absolutely above my engagement in the non-I.
But for this I must encounter the indiscreet face of the Other that calls me into question.
The Other--the absolutely other--paralyzes possession, which he contests by his epiphany
in the face.76
The absolute Other, unlike the “discreet” presence of the intimate Other, is “indiscreet.” And it is
this indiscretion of absolute alterity that is necessary for me to be able to not only receive the
world from the intimate Other but to give away what is mine. That is, in order for there to be
ethics, I must be called into question by the absolute Other, not only supported and welcomed by
an intimate Other.
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In drawing this distinction between the intimate other who welcomes me in generosity
and the absolute Other who calls into question my possession of the world, Levinas goes on to
identify the height of absolute alterity with teaching. In the next paragraph, he writes, “The
calling in question of the I, coextensive with the manifestation of the Other in the face, we call
language. The height from which language comes we designate with the term teaching.”77 It is
the height of the absolute Other that marks him as my ethical teacher. And this height is, as we
have seen, not characteristic of the intimate Other who welcomes me. As we saw in the previous
chapter, according to Levinas, “The Other who welcomes in intimacy is not the you [vous] of the
face that reveals itself in a dimension of height, but precisely the thou [tu] of familiarity: a
language without teaching, a silent language, an understanding without words, an expression in
secret [my emphasis].”78 We see that, for Levinas, the Other qua teacher is here identified with
the absolute Other, the Other who “paralyzes possession” and not with the Other who welcomes
me within the space of interiority.
Levinas makes a similar move of distinguishing the teaching relation from intimacy in a
discussion of teaching in Difficult Liberty. In a Talmudic commentary on messianism from 1961,
the same year that Totality and Infinity was published, Levinas comes to a text which discusses
the names of the Messiah. Three names are given--Shiloh, Yinnon, and Haninah--which
correspond to three schools of Jewish thought. Levinas writes:
The experience in which the messianic personality is revealed therefore comes back to
the relationship between pupil and teacher. The pupil-teacher relationship, which
seemingly remains rigorously intellectual, contains all the riches of a meeting with the
Messiah. This is the truly remarkable thing: the fact that the relationship between pupil
and teacher can confirm the promises made by the prophetic texts in all their grandeur
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and and tenderness is perhaps the most surprising novelty in this passage.

We see here that Levinas grants an immense reverence to the teacher-student relationship,
comparing it to an encounter with the Messiah. Levinas continues, however, with a fourth name
of the Messiah, Menahem, “the comforter.” He writes:
The comforter does not appear in the teacher’s face, he is announced outside the teaching.
The comforter goes further than the man of peace, justice and favour. Peace, justice,
favour concern a collectivity, but the comforter has an individual relationship with the
person he consoles. One can favour a species, but one consoles only one person.80
The similarities between Levinas’s description of the comforter or consoler, who is here
described as one who is not a teacher, and the intimate other are apparent. The comforter,
Levinas writes, goes “further” than peace, justice, and favor, just as the feminine goes “both
further and less far than language.”81 Similarly, the comforter, Levinas claims, has an individual
relationship with another person, which is what we have seen defines intimate relations in which
the third party is not necessarily recognized.82 This relation with the comforter is precisely not,
according to Levinas, characteristic of the teaching relation, which is identified with the justice
of a public discourse for all, rather than a private relation of caring for a single individual. In
intimacy, as we have seen, there is an exclusivity to the relationship. Teaching, for Levinas, it
seems, is marked not by the exclusivity of love but by the public nature of justice.
But, in Levinas’s descriptions of the Other as my teacher, there are also nevertheless
resonances of the Other who welcomes me in intimacy and hospitality. The Other who teaches
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me, in doing so, promises that she will respond to my questions. The Other’s presence in
speaking opens up the ongoing plane of discourse. In this way, the Other invites me to converse,
which implies that the Other will not only speak to me, but will also listen to me. If I am to
converse with the Other, the Other must not only speak but also, at times, remain silent so that I
can speak as well. Only in this way can the Other invite me into the ongoing project of trying to
make sense of the world. If the teaching dimension of all speaking is the promise of a response,
this promise also entails the withdrawal of the Other so that I might ask questions. And it is the
withdrawal of the Other in silence that characterizes the relation with the intimate alterity of the
Other who welcomes me in hospitality.
Furthermore, phenomenologically, when we consider our initiation into a meaningful
world, we find that those who first teach us, that is, those who first give us the world as
meaningful, appear in intimacy and familiarity. It is the intimate others who support me in the
accomplishment of subjectivity that first offer me the possibility of a meaningful world that is
familiar. It is my parents and friends who first address me and teach me what things are, what is
allowed and disallowed, what I might hope for, and so on. My inauguration into the world of
speaking is made possible in large part by the intimate others who support my development as a
subject capable of speaking and being spoken to.
If the teaching relation is the relation that gives me the world as meaningful, Levinas
cannot, therefore, claim without contradiction that the relation with the intimate Other is a
relation “without teaching.” The Other who teaches me does not only challenge me and call me
into question, but also supports me in my development and offers me a space where I am
welcome. I can only come to understand, propose, and give the world to others if I have been
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provided the possibility of developing into the adult subject called to responsibility by the Other
who appears as an absolutely exterior Other.
In this way, the teaching relation points to a tension in Levinas’s work and to his
ambivalence about the role of intimate alterity. While he recognizes the need for what he names
“feminine” alterity, he seems unsure at times exactly how to reconcile our intimate relationships
with concrete others with the absolute distance that he feels it is necessary to maintain between
the spheres of the Same and the Other. The Other who teaches me further reveals this tension. As
one who welcomes me into a world that makes sense and as one who promises to stay with me to
answer my questions, the Other shows up as an intimate, gentle, and sometimes silent presence.
And at the same to time, to be taught is to have one’s world transformed by the presence of one
who complicates my comfortable being at home and demands that I recognize my unique and
unchosen responsibility. A fuller conception of the teaching relation, however, must
acknowledge and celebrate both the absolute height of the Other as the one who calls me into
question and the intimacy that is inherently involved in teaching. And as I will argue in the
following chapter, we can develop the underemphasized intimacy of the teaching relation by
reconsidering the relationship between Levinas’s conception of teaching and Socratic education.
Summary
In this chapter we have seen that for Levinas, the Other teaches me by giving me the
possibility of meaning, which Levinas understands phenomenologically as a network of
significations that arises out of particular embodied cultural historical situations. Levinas argues
that every act of signifying presupposes at some level, one who signifies. In this way, I only
come to have a meaningful world by being spoken to by the Other. Meaning is a gift that I am
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given by the Other who teaches me in attending his speaking by promising to remain and answer
my questions. Furthermore, the teaching relation also presents the possibility of critiquing or reorienting meaning. Because meaning is given to me by the Other, meaning already presupposes
ethics. The first teaching of the Other is the ethical relation itself. The Other who teaches me
calls me into question and reveals to me my responsibility. In this way, the Other offers me a
sens unique that orients signification from outside of a historical/cultural context, offering a
space for me to critique my own ways of being in the world.
Thus, we also see that both modes of alterity--intimate hospitality and absolute demand-are involved in the primordial teaching relation as Levinas understands it. For Levinas, the Other
is my teacher because the Other, in attending her presence in expressing, gives me the possibility
of a meaningful world. This attention to expressing must occur both in my being hospitably
welcomed into the world of discourse and in my being called into question such that I can
become hospitable to others.
In the following chapter, we will see that the tension described here between intimate
“feminine” alterity and absolute exterior alterity appears also in Levinas’s relationship to Plato,
specifically with regard to the question of teaching. We will see that Levinas’s hesitancy to fully
acknowledge the role of intimate alterity in the teaching relation plays a role in his rejection of
Socratic education. I will argue, however, that such a rejection is unjustified and that Levinas’s
own conception of teaching could be strengthened and deepened through a recognition of the
role of intimacy in teaching.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE TEACHING RELATION AND LEVINAS’S PLATONISM
As we saw in Chapter Three, Levinas’s claim that the Other is the sens unique orienting
meaning involves a rejection of what he saw as the widespread anti-Platonism pervasive in
European philosophy at the time.1 In fact, especially in the period surrounding the publication of
Totality and Infinity, Levinas saw his philosophical project as a retrieval of a kind of Platonism.
When Levinas completed Totality and Infinity, which was his thesis for his Doctorat ès Lettres,
he was required to write a short summary of the work for the Annales de l’Université de Paris. In
the final lines of this brief overview, he writes the following concerning his primary thesis:
To show that the first signification emerges in morality--in the quasi-abstract epiphany of
the destitute visage bared of all qualities--an absolute that absolves itself from all
cultures--is to restrict the understanding of the reality on the basis of history; it is a return
to Platonism.2
Levinas claims that his work is Platonic insofar as it describes a signification--the signifying of
the face of the Other who speaks to me--that does not receive its meaning from a particular
culture and history. Rather, the Other offers a transcendent sense that orients ontology. Like
Plato, who seeks an original and orienting reality beyond that of appearances, Levinas argues
that the significations offered to us by a particular culture are meaningful only if understood in
light of an ethical sense that cannot be reduced to a particular cultural expression.
But while Levinas’s conception of the primordial teaching as an orienting sens unique is
1
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part of his “return to Platonism,” he is also often critical of “Western” thought, which, for him, is
fundamentally rooted in Greek philosophy. For Levinas, one of the central problems with
“Western” philosophy lies in the primacy it gives to the individual subject understood as
independent and self-sufficient. The subject in “Western” thought is believed to be
fundamentally free, not obligated by the ethical demand that precedes our ability to make
choices. Levinas sees “Western” thought as problematic insofar as it often denies the
transcendent relationship to the Other that precedes individual freedom.
While, as we will see below,3 Totality and Infinity is inspired by Plato’s descriptions of
transcendence, the self-sufficient subject is nevertheless also expressed, in his view, in Greek
mythology through the fantasy of a nostalgic return to an origin. Levinas criticizes the figure of
Odysseus by presenting the alternative figure of the Jew in exile. While Odysseus seeks to return
home to a place that is rightfully his, the subject, for Levinas, is perpetually a sojourner in a
foreign land, always on someone else’s terrain. For him, to be an ethical subject is to long for “a
land not of our birth, for a land foreign to every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to
which we shall never betake ourselves.”4 That is, to be a subject is to always have one’s site of
possession called into question by the Other. To be, is not to be autochthonous,5 sprung from the
soil of a place of one’s own, but to be forever both hosted by and called upon to be a host to the
Other.
This concern that “Western” thought in general and “Greek” thought in particular is often
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predicated upon a self-sufficient conception of the subject, is reflected in Levinas’s critique of
Socratic education understood as anamnēsis (recollection) and maieutics (midwifery).
Anamnēsis, which appears explicitly in the Meno and the Phaedo, is the idea that learning is a
process of “remembering” what we somehow already “know” from a time before birth.
Maieutics, which appears in the Theaetetus, is the idea that the role of the teacher is to be a
“midwife” to the student who needs help giving birth to her own ideas. As we will see in the
second section below, Levinas often defines his own understanding of the teaching relation by
placing it in opposition to that outlined by Socrates who, according to Levinas, teaches that we
receive nothing from the Other but already possess all that we learn.
In what follows, I will explore the complexity of Levinas’s relationship to Plato insofar
as he both retrieves central Platonic themes and also rejects Socratic education. And I will show
that the complexity of this relationship is reflective of tensions within Levinas’s own thought. I
argued in Chapter Three that the relation with the Other who teaches me involves both absolute
and intimate alterity even though Levinas is at times hesitant to acknowledge that the teaching
relation involves intimacy.6 I will argue, however, that if we acknowledge and embrace the dual
nature of teaching as a relation that is at once intimate and distant, hospitable and unsettling, we
will find that understanding teaching and learning as maieutics and anamnēsis does not
necessarily conflict with Levinas’s account of the teaching relation. Instead, Socratic education
offers us a way of understanding the teaching relation as one that involves both moments of the
relationship with the Other qua teacher.
Before examining the details of Levinas’s critical engagement with Plato, however, it is
first necessary to say something about the nature of the claims being made about Plato in this
6
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chapter. In talking about Levinas’s “return to Platonism,” we must recognize the multiplicity of
possible meanings of “Platonism” and ways to read Plato’s texts. The profound influence of
Plato’s dialogues on the development of philosophy in Europe and the United States has left us
with many versions of Plato and many Platonisms. For example, there is the Plato who emerges
through the rigorous historical study of Greek language and culture. There is a neo-Platonic Plato
who is interpreted as pre-figuring Christian revelation. There is a neo-Kantian Plato in whom
scholars find accounts of a priori knowledge. There is a Heideggerian Plato in whom we can
purportedly find an account of truth understood phenomenologically, and so on. Throughout the
history of philosophy, Plato’s texts are read in ways that support a variety of different and, at
times contradictory, philosophical positions. As we will see, Levinas, like scholars before him,
reads Plato’s texts for what they offer his own philosophical project. My goal here is, therefore,
not to make definitive claims about Plato himself; rather my goal is to think through the way that
Levinas’s Plato figures in Levinas’s own philosophical project by examining both Levinas’s own
texts and the Platonic dialogues that are most influential to him.
The chapter will be organized as follows. In the first section, I offer an overview of two
major Platonic themes that appear in Totality and Infinity--the transcendence of Desire and the
privileging of speech over writing--and consider some recent work by scholars to understand the
nature of the relationship between Levinas and Plato with regard to these themes. Next, I
examine Levinas’s critique of Socratic education as it appears in Totality and Infinity showing
how this critique also reflects the tension in Levinas’s work between the absolute exteriority and
the intimate presence of the Other who teaches me. This analysis will set the stage for the third
section, in which I will offer a response to Levinas’s critique of Plato, arguing that Socratic
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education, understood as anamnēsis and maieutics, can, in fact provide guidance for developing
a practice of teaching oriented by Levinas’s ethics.
Levinas’s Platonism
Throughout Totality and Infinity, there are nearly fifty explicit references to Platonic
dialogues and/or clear Platonic themes. These references include allusions to the “Good beyond
Being,” the myth of Gyges, the priority of speech over writing, the nature of Eros in the
Symposium and the Phaedrus, among other themes.7 In addition to these explicit references,
there are numerous other passages that may be read as alluding indirectly to Plato’s texts. Here, I
will focus on two central themes in these references insofar as they are important for
understanding the teaching relation. First, I will explore how Levinas is inspired by Plato’s
conception of philosophy as a Desire for a reality that transcends culture and history. And
second, I will show how Levinas draws on Socrates’s privileging of the dynamic possibilities of
apologetic speech over the fixed nature of writing. Both of these themes are found in Plato’s
Phaedrus, which Levinas refers to more than any other Platonic dialogue in Totality and Infinity
and which he claims is one of the greatest philosophical works of all time.8
One of the biggest challenges when interpreting the Phaedrus is understanding how the
various themes of the dialogue relate to one another. The work is simultaneously about love,
speech, writing, rhetoric, mythology, pedagogy, divinity, philosophy, and more. The question of
the unity of the dialogue is, therefore, one that has been often raised in scholarship on the
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Phaedrus. In fact, according to Derrida, for a long time, the dialogue was thought to be badly
constructed.10 And today, scholars of Plato still struggle to locate the work in the context of
Plato’s development. As Graeme Nicholson points out, many scholars see the Phaedrus as a
transitional dialogue including both elements of the so-called “Socratic dialogues” and elements
of Plato’s sophisticated dialectic method as it appears in later dialogues like the Sophist.11 I will
show here that it is precisely through a surprising unity of the themes of the Phaedrus that
Levinas discovers his own philosophical project reflected in the text. That is, it is by combining
the Desire for a transcendent reality with the primacy of the speaking relation that Levinas finds
the central ideas of his own ethics expressed in Plato’s dialogue.
The transcendence of Desire
While Levinas names the Phaedrus among the greatest philosophical works of all time,
Levinas’s Platonism is most often discussed in relation to Plato’s conception of the Good that
lies “beyond being,” [epekeina tēs ousias]12 in Book VI of the Republic. In fact Levinas names
the concept of the Good beyond being “the most profound teaching, the definitive teaching, not
of theology but of philosophy.”13 The phrase appears in the central passage of the Republic just
before the account of the divided line and the famous allegory of the cave. Socrates’s
9

See Heath, Malcolm. “The unity of Plato’s Phaedrus.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 7:151-73
(1989); Rowe, C.J. “The Unity of the Phaedrus: A Reply to Heath.” Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 7:175-88 (1989) Werner, Daniel. “Plato’s Phaedrus and the Problem of Unity.” Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 32:91-137 (2007)
10

Derrida, Jacques. “Plato’s Pharmacy.” Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1981. 61-172.
11

Nicholson, Graeme. Plato’s Phaedrus: The Philosophy of Love. West Lafayette: Purdue University
Press, 1999.
12

Plato, Rebublic. 509B

13

TeI 76, TaI 103

92
interlocutors implore him to give an account of the nature of the Good, but Socrates is reluctant
to do so claiming that such a task is beyond his abilities. He agrees, however, to give an account
of the “offspring” of the Good.14
This offspring of the Good is the sun which, as the origin of light, makes seeing possible.
The light of the sun is neither sight itself nor the object of sight but is the third term that
illuminates the objects of vision, making them visible. In a similar way, Socrates claims, the
Good makes knowing possible in the intelligible realm. That is, just as the light of the sun is
what allows us to see the true reality of visible objects, the “light” of the Good is what allows us
to know what a being really is, i.e. its form or essence.
Furthermore, Socrates claims, the sun is the source of growth and change in the visible
world insofar as without the sun, all life would wither and die. But while the sun is the source of
generative growth, the sun itself, according to Socrates, does not undergo a similar kind of
growth and change. Rather, the sun is the cause of generation without itself being generated.
Similarly, Socrates insists, the Good is the source of the ideas, as that which makes beings what
they are, but the Good itself is not an idea. Instead it lies beyond essence.
This notion that there is an ethical reality that lies beyond essence, is, for Levinas, the
preeminent example of a moment in the history of philosophy in which genuine transcendence is
expressed.15 For Levinas, the transcendence of the ethical lies at the heart of his entire
philosophical project and this is one of the major ways that we can understand Totality and
Infinity as a “return to Platonism.” As we saw in Chapter Three, for Levinas, our ability to think,
14
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question, and make sense of the world--in other words, our ability to do philosophy itself--is
made possible and oriented by the Other whose teaching opens up the possibility of
conversation, and thereby of meaning itself.16
When we turn to Levinas’s references to the Phaedrus in Totality and Infinity, we see that
Levinas also finds the expression of this kind of transcendence in a reading of Plato’s famous
chariot myth. In “Transcendence as the Idea of Infinity,” the final chapter of part A of Totality
and Infinity, Levinas offers an interpretation of the myth from Socrates’s second speech in the
Phaedrus, sometimes called Socrates’s “Great Speech.” In this speech Socrates does not argue
against the madness of love, as he had done in his first speech,17 but explains that there is a kind
of divine madness that we ought not reject but embrace as the origin of philosophy.
To explain the nature of divine madness, Socrates compares the soul to a charioteer with
two horses. One of the horses is good and noble while the other is wicked, impulsive, and lacks
self-control.18 The soul has wings which allow it to fly above the earth to the heavens like the
immortal gods. Each soul, depending on its nature, follows one of the twelve Olympian gods.
The wings of the soul are nourished by beauty, goodness, and virtue, and are destroyed by
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wickedness. Only immortal souls can fly above the vault of heaven and see what lies beyond it.19
The best mortal souls, while unable to reach the vault of heaven themselves, can nevertheless
catch a glimpse of what lies beyond as they fly by but only if their wings have been well
nourished.20 Socrates claims that it is the beloved that nourishes the wings of the lover and helps
his wings to grow. Beauty, he claims, flows from the beloved into the lover. Because of this, the
openings in the soul from which the feathers grow are loosened and opened up. The lover,
undergoing this process of growing wings seems mad as his soul is being pricked all over by the
growing wings like a child whose teeth are coming in.21 But, Socrates claims, this madness is
divinely inspired, as it is nourished by beauty.22 He claims that the madness inspired by divine
love is not to be rejected like the unhealthy kind of madness but is to be pursued above all else,
as it is this divinely inspired love that can help us to catch a glimpse of the true reality beyond
the heavens.
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas refers directly to Socrates’s Great Speech in explaining
how the Other both exceeds the boundaries of our ability to think and also makes thought
possible. Levinas, citing Plato, claims that thought becomes delirious by a divine possession that
is not irrational but is identified with “reason itself, rising to the ideas, thought in the highest
sense.”23 As we saw in Chapter Three, for Levinas, the subject alone in interiority requires the
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exteriority of the Other to be able to make sense of the world. The idea that reason can be
grounded in a subject who withdraws from the world in solitude is, according to Levinas, an
illusion. In fact, he argues, our ability to make sense of the world requires the presence of the
Other who teaches me. The Other overflows the capacity of the thinking subject but does not, in
doing so, render our thinking irrational. Rather, it is precisely by overflowing our categories of
signification that the Other provides the sens unique that gives us an orientation and an arche of
meaning.
Similarly, Levinas argues, the divine madness Socrates describes in the Phaedrus appears
at first glance to subvert rational thought--see, for example, Socrates’s first speech about the
dangers of love. But in fact, divine madness provides the condition and direction for rational
thought. The madness of a “winged thought” that lifts the soul to the heavens to catch a glimpse
of what lies beyond the ideas, is the source of philosophy itself and is not a destructive or
irrational madness.
In Levinas’s interpretation of this myth, the transcendent source of thought is figured as a
relation with the Other who teaches me. He reads the movement of the soul towards a
transcendent reality as “the end of the solitary (and which we will later call ‘economic’) or
inward thought.”25 When Levinas refers to “solitary,” “economic,” or “inward” thought, he is
describing the kind of thinking that arises through the withdrawal of the subject into its own
sphere of interiority described in Chapter Three above.26 As we saw in Levinas’s analysis of
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Descartes’s Meditations, the subject who attempts to ground truth in a purportedly self-sufficient
subject, finds meaning to be an-archic, without principle. It is the the transcendence of the Other
who teaches me and gives me the sens unique that grounds and orients meaning. In describing
the flight of the soul in the Phaedrus driven by Eros to catch a sight of the Beautiful, Levinas
thus draws a parallel between the movement of Eros in the Phaedrus and the shattering of the
solitude of the subject by the Other who teaches me.
As we saw in the analysis of “Meaning and Sense” above,27 the sense that the Other
provides differs from cultural signification insofar as the Other, in speaking to me, “signifies of
itself.”28 The Other who teaches me, as we have seen, teaches me by teaching me his very
presence as one who calls me to responsibility.29 The Other, in offering me meaningful signs,
does so by signifying, i.e. by speaking, by addressing me. The sense of the Other who speaks to
me cannot be reduced to the categories of understanding offered by any particular culture.
Rather, the Other is present and responsive in speaking to me, and in this way, the Other’s
presence transcends any meaning that can be defined by the concepts and categories of a
particular sign.
Just as, for Levinas, the meaning of the world as something that can be com-prehended,
questioned, doubted, and so on, depends first on the sense of the Other who both precedes and
orients the meaning of the world, the rational pursuit of philosophy for Plato in the Phaedrus is
grounded in a pre-rational inspiration. For Plato, the pursuit of the highest objects of thought
begins in a divinely inspired madness. The height of the rational for Plato is thus, on Levinas
27
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reading, grounded in a pre-rational Eros. It is in this way that Levinas finds in Plato an
expression of what he understands to be the transcendence that many of his contemporaries, such
as Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, have failed to articulate.
For Levinas, the transcendence of the Other must also be understood as motivating a
response on the part of the subject. That which lies beyond being is the “highest” goal of
thought, and is “already Desire.”30 That is, the Other, for Levinas, does not only make meaning
possible by dispelling the illusion of solitude, but the Other also inspires us to continue to strive
for the Good. This work, the work of Desire, Levinas insists, is never completed. Desire, unlike
need, he claims, is never satisfied and, in fact, only grows stronger as we approach the
desideratum. He writes:
The metaphysical desire does not long to return, for it is desire for a land not of our birth,
for a land foreign to every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to which we
shall never betake ourselves. The metaphysical desire does not rest on any prior kinship.
It is a desire that can not be satisfied.31
True Desire--metaphysical desire--is never fully accomplished. Rather the work of Desire, is
work that is forever unfinished. My responsibility to the Other (and to all of the others who
appear in the face of the Other)32 is endless.
In the myth of the chariots in the Phaedrus, Levinas thus finds a description of this
structure of Desire as a task that is never completed. Mortal souls circle the heavens, straining
their necks to catch a glimpse of what lies beyond, but they never arrive at what they seek and
will eventually be weighed down by their own finitude. Similarly, to be a subject, for Levinas, is
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to always be obligated beyond what one is capable of achieving. We will never fulfill our
responsibilities to the multitude of others who face us. But we must, nevertheless, continue to
struggle to do so, because to cease struggling would be to turn away from the face of the Other
who obligates me.
But while Levinas is clearly inspired by the accounts of transcendence that he finds in
Plato’s descriptions of our pursuit of the Good/Beautiful, his account of Desire also reveals the
complexity that often characterizes Levinas’s relationship to Plato. While Levinas finds a
parallel between Plato’s conception of a divine madness as it is found in the Phaedrus and his
own conception of thought as subtended by the teaching of the Other, his distinction between
need and Desire takes issue with Eros as it appears in the Symposium.
In the Symposium, Diotima offers a myth of origins for Eros, claiming that Eros is the
child of Poros [wealth] and Penia [poverty]. But Levinas makes clear in his own work that
metaphysical Desire does not originate in poverty, i.e. in need or lack. Levinas identifies need
with satisfaction. The need for things is filled by their attainment. But true Desire is never
satisfied, not because it is always in need, but because the movement of this Desire is not one of
fulfillment, but, as he writes in “Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite,” one of emptying. He
writes,“The true Desire is that which the Desired does not satisfy, but hollows out. It is goodness.
It does not refer to a lost fatherland or plenitude; it is not homesickness, is not nostalgia. It is the
lack in a being which is completely, and lacks nothing.”33 The desire for things, is a desire to
dominate and possess. True Desire, however, is not a desire to increase one’s freedom, but to
weaken it for the sake of the Other.
In his account of enjoyment, as we have seen, we find that Levinas describes our
33
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neediness as the source of our sovereignty as subjects. It is by learning to satisfy our needs that
we become capable subjects who take possession of the world.34 Desire, however, does not
increase our mastery of the world but calls it into question. Desire, for Levinas, is not a need, it is
a response to the Other who always obligates me beyond my capacity to respond.
By both embracing and critiquing Plato’s conception of Eros, Levinas, thus, uses one
Platonic myth, that of the winged chariot in the Phaedrus, to point out what he sees as a problem
with another myth, that of the birth of Eros in the Symposium. In this way, Levinas’s retrieval of
Plato is not simple, but involves a simultaneous recovery and critique of Plato’s work. And as we
will see, examining the tension in Levinas’s relationship to Plato raises important questions in
Levinas’s own thought about the relationship between the two modes of alterity (i.e absolute
exteriority and intimate hospitality) that characterize my relationship with the Other qua teacher.
Among scholars who have studied the relationship between Levinas and Plato, Deborah
Achtenberg has focused much of her work on the concept of Eros. In Essential Vulnerabilities,
she argues that both Levinas and Plato are philosophers of vulnerability. Both philosophers, in
her view, articulate a concept of Desire by means of which the subject is fundamentally exposed
to alterity. But while both Plato and Levinas understand the subject to be essentially vulnerable,
their understanding of the nature of Desire differs.
In particular, she argues that Levinas’s and Plato’s conceptions of Desire have different
aims. In the Symposium, Achtenberg notes, Diotima asserts that the goal of love is to reproduce
in beauty and, thereby, to attain the only kind of immortality that is available to mortals. For
Levinas, by contrast, the erotic relation, as it is described in Section IV of Totality and Infinity,
culminates in the creation ex nihilo of the child, who is not a means of obtaining immortality for
34
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the parent. Rather, the fecundity of Eros in Levinas is not a perpetuation of the Same but is the
creation of genuine alterity.35
Achtenberg argues that Levinas and Plato differ in their conceptions of Desire because
their understanding of the relationship between subjectivity and that which renders it vulnerable
differ. For Plato, the aim of philosophy is a shared knowledge of being. Philosophy, on this
account, aims at a commonality among subjects who participate in the reality of the forms.
Levinas, however, insists that the object of Desire remains always at an absolute distance. I
speak with the Other, but in this speaking relation, the Other and I remain apart. Plato,
Achtenberg argues, understands reality to be what it is through participation in the forms while
Levinas understands ethics to originate in multiplicity and separation. It is Levinas’s aversion to
the possibility of a commingling between the Same and the Other, she argues, that leads him to
reject Diotima’s conception of Eros as aiming at reproduction in beauty through participation in
the form of the Beautiful.
In his work on Levinas and Plato on Eros and maieutics, Francisco Gonzales makes a
similar argument regarding this point of tension between Levinas and Plato.36 Gonzales, like
Achtenberg, claims that the notion of participation lies at the heart of Levinas’s criticisms of
Plato. Gonzales describes the difference between Levinas and Plato as one between Levinas’s
conception of “separation” and Plato’s conception of “participation.” As we have seen, the
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ethical relation for Levinas requires that the terms of the relation remain at an absolute distance,
“absolved” from the relation.37 For there to be ethics there must be an irreducible multiplicity.
Plato’s conception of “participation,” however, according to Gonzales, presents the subject not
as separate but as dependent on the ideas for its existence. All beings are what they are by virtue
of their dependence on and participation in a transcendent reality.
Following Derrida’s critique of Totality and Infinity in “Violence and Metaphysics,”38
Gonzales asks whether Levinas is right to emphasize separation in the way that he does. He
writes, “How can we welcome the Other, if our home is not in its being open to the Other, if it is
fundamentally ‘egoist’?”39 That is, Gonzales worries that the seemingly strict differentiation that
Levinas makes between interiority and exteriority, the Same and the Other, makes the
welcoming of the Other on the part of the Same impossible. He argues that it is Levinas’s own
rejection of any possibility of the Other abiding within the sphere of the Same that leads to his
ambivalence about Plato’s conceptions of Eros.
Platonic Eros, according to Gonzales, however, is preferable because it presents our
relationship with transcendence as fundamentally ambiguous. Plato, he argues, presents an
alternative to the distinction between self-sufficiency and the exteriority of the transcendence we
seek. Pointing to Levinas’s rejection of an image in the Phaedrus in which souls nourish
themselves on the truth,40 Gonzales shows that Levinas draws a distinction between the egoic
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movement of nourishment and the transcendent movement of our encounter with the truth.
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Gonzales argues, however, that Plato presents us with a third possibility, whereby we are
nourished precisely by that which exceeds us. He argues that Plato offers us a way of
understanding truth as simultaneously transcendent and immanent, beyond us but also within us,
an image that is borne out by the metaphor of teaching as maieutics.42
Thus, both Achtenberg and Gonzales claim that it is Levinas’s rejection of “participation”
that leads to his critique of Plato. Gonzales, however, in presenting his Platonic response to
Levinas, overlooks the role of Levinas’s conception of intimate or “feminine” alterity, which I
propose offers a moment in Levinas’s text when he, in fact, embraces what Gonzales calls
participation.
Gonzales asks how we can welcome the Other in the home if the I is fundamentally
egoic, that is, if the home is not already open. As we saw in Chapter Two, Levinas poses a
similar question in Totality and Infinity. “How,” he writes, “can the separation of solitude, how
can intimacy be produced in the face of the Other?”43 And as we also saw in Chapter Two,44
Levinas’s answer to this question is to present another mode of alterity, the alterity of the
feminine who resides in interiority and makes possible subjectivity. Levinas answers his own
question as follows:
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For the intimacy of recollection to be able to be produced in the oecumenia of being, the
presence of the Other must not only be revealed in the face which breaks through its own
plastic image, but must be revealed, simultaneously with this presence, in its withdrawal
and in its absence. This simultaneity is not an abstract construction of dialectics, but the
very essence of discretion. And the other whose presence is discreetly an absence, with
which is accomplished the primary hospitable welcome which describes the field of
intimacy, is the Woman. The woman is the condition for recollection, the interiority of
the Home, and inhabitation.45
Levinas, therefore, provides an answer to Gonzales’s question. How can the Other enter the
home, the domain of the Same? The answer is that the Other is already in the home; the Other
who welcomes in generosity, gentleness, and hospitality is the very condition of the home.
This intimate Other who appears in the dwelling is, nevertheless, transcendent. Levinas
refers to the intimate Other as the Other [Autrui], and claims that feminine alterity “includes all
the possibilities of the transcendent relationship with the Other.”46 The alterity of the intimate
Other is, therefore, not akin to the alterity of things that I can possess. The intimate Other as one
who welcomes me, presents the possibility of genuine transcendence within the sphere of
interiority. We see, therefore, that Levinas does not always draw as stark a contrast between the
Same and the Other as Gonzales claims.
Nevertheless, Gonzales’s point is not without textual justification. As we saw in Chapter
II, Levinas, at times, does seem to draw a strict boundary between interiority and exteriority.47
We see this tendency, for example, when he claims that the feminine is “a relation without
teaching.”48 In this moment of the text, Levinas seems to indicate that the alterity of the Other
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qua teacher leaves no room for the intimacy of the “feminine” Other. I have argued, however,
that both modes of alterity are necessary for the teaching relation and for ethics more broadly and
that we ought not forget the importance of intimate alterity in this relationship. The text of
Totality and Infinity is, therefore, not entirely consistent but reflects Levinas’s struggle to clarify
the concepts that structure his work. This struggle, as Gonzales rightly notes, appears in
Levinas’s complex retrieval of Platonic Eros.
Speech and writing
In addition to retrieving Plato’s conception of Desire, Levinas also draws inspiration
from the primacy that Socrates gives to speaking over writing in the Phaedrus in the myth of
Theuth. And it is by combining this privileging of speech with the Desire for a transcendent
reality that Levinas finds his own philosophy reflected in the Phaedrus. That is, for Levinas,
metaphysical Desire for that which lies beyond being is, as we saw in Chapter Two, conceivable
concretely in the relation with the Other who faces me and, in doing so, speaks to me.49 In his
own way, therefore, Levinas finds the Phaedrus to reflect his claim that “[l]’absolument Autre,
c’est Autrui.”50 The absolutely Other of Desire is concretely realized in the human Other who
speaks to me.
The myth of Theuth from which Levinas takes inspiration appears at the end of the
dialogue after Socrates and Phaedrus have considered what makes a good speaker and
determined that good speaking requires that one be both skilled at dialectic and have knowledge
of human souls. That is, the speaker must be good at crafting speeches but also good at knowing
when and to whom to give particular speeches. Having discussed the characteristics of excellent
49
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speaking, Phaedrus insists that they complete their inquiry by investigating what makes writing
good, and Socrates responds with a myth.
The Egyptian god, Theuth, he says, invented many things and went to the king of the
gods, Thamus, to show him the arts [technai] that he created. As they go through his various
inventions and come to writing, Theuth is especially proud, claiming that he has “discovered a
potion [pharmakon] for memory [mnēmē] and for wisdom [sophia].”51 Thamus responds, saying
that Theuth, as the father of writing, is too close to his own creation and is, therefore, mistaken
about its worth. Thamus insists that writing will not aid memory but will cause people to forget
because they will no longer practice remembering but will rely “on signs that belong to others,
instead of trying to remember from the inside, completely on their own.”52
Phaedrus and Socrates discuss this claim of Thamus and declare that he is right that
writing is problematic. Socrates claims that writing is like painting insofar as the “offspring” of
painting, like written words, remain silent when you question them. The problem with writing,
Socrates claims, is that written discourse is untethered from its author.
When it has once been written down, every discourse roams about everywhere, reaching
indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business with
it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not. And when it
is faulted and attacked unfairly, it always needs its father’s support; alone, it can neither
defend itself nor come to its own support.53
Unlike the skilled speaker who knows the souls of those to whom he speaks, a written speech
cannot answer for itself but needs its “father” to come to its assistance in order to explain and
contextualize the writing for a particular audience.
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There is, however, according to Socrates, a “legitimate brother” of written speeches, viz.
writing in the souls of students. This kind of discourse can defend itself and knows to whom it
should speak. Phaedrus clarifies as follows: “You mean the living, breathing discourse of the
man who knows, of which the written one can be fairly called an image.”54 To write in the souls
of students is to teach others in such a way that they themselves come to share the knowledge of
the teacher and can defend it themselves.
It is this ability of the speaker to be present to take part in a “living, breathing discourse”
that inspires Levinas’s account of the primordial teaching relation. That is, for Levinas, the
teaching dimension of speech brings conversation to life and by shattering the solitude of the
subject and opening up the plane of question and answer. As we saw in Chapter Three, Levinas
argues that the Other is my teacher insofar as she is present in speaking to me.55 Teaching, he
writes, is “explaining oneself with respect to speech.”56 And teaching occurs through “an
attendance of being at its own presence.”57 The teaching dimension of speech opens up the
possibility of conversation that, as we have seen, Levinas argues lies at the origin of the
meaningfulness of the world. Quoting the Phaedrus, Levinas writes,
Plato maintains the difference between the objective order of truth, that which
doubtlessly is established in writings, impersonally, and reason in a living being, ‘a living
and animated discourse,’ a discourse ‘which can defend itself, and knows when to speak
and when to be silent’ [Phaedrus 276a].”58
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Levinas finds in the critique of writing in the myth of Theuth in the Phaedrus, an affirmation of
the priority of the address in conversation which, in Totality and Infinity, he names the teaching
dimension of speech.
Maurice Blanchot, Levinas’s close friend and interlocutor, however, has challenged
Levinas’s emphasis on speech over writing. In his work, Infinite Conversation (1969), Blanchot
argues against Levinas’s assertion that Socrates is correct in privileging speech over writing.
Blanchot’s work is itself written as a conversation with a number of thinkers and reveals both in
its execution and in its themes, the ability of a text to be dialogical. In conversation with Levinas,
he writes:
Levinas often invokes Socrates on this point, recalling the well-known pages of Plato
where the pernicious effects of writing are denounced. But I wonder whether this
comparison doesn’t introduce into Levinas’ thought some ambiguity--unless it is a
necessary ambiguity. On the one hand, language is the transcendent relation itself,
manifesting that the space of communication is essentially non-symmetrical, that there is
a kind of curvature of this space that prevents reciprocity and produces an absolute
difference of levels between the terms called upon to communicate...yet suddenly, this
speech once again becomes the tranquil humanist and Socratic speech that brings the one
who speaks close to us since it allows us, in all familiarity, to know who he [the
interlocutor] is and from what country, according to Socrates’ wish.59
Blanchot points to a tension or ambiguity in Levinas’s text between the absolute transcendence
of the Other and the concrete presence of an Other who is “familiar,” who can be known as a
concrete and particular being. In this way, Blanchot, like Gonzales, wonders whether or not
Levinas can maintain the absolute separation of the terms of the metaphysical relation and also
emphasize the concrete encounter between interlocutors as the site of the ethical relation.
Blanchot, however, unlike Gonzales and Achtenberg who find resources in Plato for
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resolving the tension in Levinas’s text, rejects the critique of writing in both Levinas and Plato.
For Blanchot, Levinas’s problem is that he is too Platonic. Blanchot, and Derrida after him,60
argue that in fact it is writing that should be given priority over speech, because writing, in not
being fully present, opens up the possibility of an infinite conversation. That is, writing, because
it does not fully answer for itself remains open to a multiplicity of interpretations. The text opens
itself up to an ongoing conversation precisely because the author does not have the final say.
But in this way, as Michael Naas points out, Levinas and Blanchot are not as far apart as
they may seem.61 Both seek to emphasize the dimension of language that prevents it ever being
fixed and completed. That is, both Levinas and Blanchot are concerned with ensuring that
conversation remains alive and ongoing. Levinas argues that it is the presence of the Other that
brings speech to life while Blanchot finds this possibility of an infinite conversation in the
varieties of interpretation that the author’s absence makes possible. The question, therefore, is
whether or not we locate the unending unsettling of language in the absence inherent in texts or
in the overflowing presence of the one who comes to their defense.
And to respond to Blanchot’s critique, it is important to note that Levinas’s emphasis on a
living discourse, as for Socrates, does not amount to a rejection of writing. For both Levinas and
Socrates, a text can speak, but it needs someone to come to its defense. That is, the text needs
someone to read it and engage with it to bring it to life, to turn it into a “creature,” a living text,
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as we saw Levinas describe the teaching quality of texts in Chapter Three and as Plato
describes the living seed of discourse that is planted when one writes in the souls of students.
We also see this kind of living engagement with a text in the analysis of Lysias’s speech
in the Phaedrus. Lysias himself is not present, so Socrates has Phaedrus read Lysias’s speech out
loud so that they can examine it. Phaedrus comes to the defense of Lysias’s speech, standing in
for Lysias and serving as the “father” of the discourse, as Socrates calls him. Not only does
Phaedrus read the speech at the beginning of the dialogue, he later comes to its defense again by
re-reading the opening so that he and Socrates can more closely examine it. Socrates asks
Phaedrus to reread it so that he “can hear it in his [Lysias’s] own words.”63 Thus we see that,
while Socrates is concerned about writing, he also exhibits a way in which we can engage with
written texts so that they open up the possibility of engaging with texts in a way that keeps
discourse alive.
And we have seen also that Levinas does not reject writing, a rejection that would be
absurd given that he is a writer of philosophy. Rather, as we saw in his discussion of turning the
Talmud into “teaching texts” in Chapter Three,64 Levinas’s emphasis is on bringing texts to life
through an ongoing conversation. Bringing texts to life by allowing them to enter into ongoing
conversations is what he names the teaching dimension of all speech, whether that speech be
written or spoken.
But while Levinas may not reject writing in the way that Blanchot worries, the ambiguity
that Blanchot identifies between the Other who is absolutely other and the concrete interlocutor
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who approaches in familiarity is nevertheless important. As I have argued, the Other who teaches
me is simultaneously my master who comes from on high and the intimate Other who welcomes
me in gentleness and familiarity. Both of these modes of alterity are necessary for ethics as well
as for teaching relation. And Levinas, especially in Totality and Infinity, does not consistently
recognize the presence of both modes of alterity in the Other who teaches me. This is especially
true, as we will see in the following section, in his rejection of Socratic education understood as
anamnēsis and maieutics.
Levinas’s critique of Socratic education
The first reference to Socratic education in Totality and Infinity appears in Section I in
the important chapter, “Metaphysics Precedes Ontology.” In this chapter, Levinas argues that in
Socratic education, we find an account of teaching and learning that defines learning in terms of
the mastery characteristic of comprehension. He makes this argument by distinguishing between
two ways of understanding the theoretical attitude that gives rise to knowledge.
On the one hand, Levinas claims, knowledge involves a respect for the alterity of that
which the knower knows. The knower “lets the known being manifest itself while respecting its
alterity.”65 This kind of knowing involves allowing what is known to remain other. Insofar as
theory maintains this attitude of respect for the alterity of its object, it can be traced back to the
metaphysical relation in which the terms of the relation remain separate. Levinas writes, “In this
sense metaphysical desire would be the essence of theory.”66 That is, insofar as the theoretical
attitude allows the alterity of what is known to persist, this attitude can be traced back to the
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ethical relation wherein the Other remains other.
On the other hand, knowledge can also involve the loss of the alterity of what is known
through the comprehension of the knower who appropriates what is known to himself. When
theory operates in this mode, knowing “is identified with the freedom of the knowing being
encountering nothing which, other with respect to it, could limit it.”67 That is, as a kind of comprehension, theory exhibits the subject’s attempt to take up a position of mastery and control
over that which he knows.
In his 1957 essay, “Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite,”68 Levinas makes a similar
distinction between two dimensions of truth. On the one hand, truth involves what he names
“experience.” As experience, the truth involves a heteronomous encounter, an encounter with
something that is unfamiliar, different from our everyday comfortable dealings with a world in
which we feel at home. At the same time, however, he insists that truth can also function as an
appropriation of otherness, an expression of autonomy rather than heteronomy. That is, truth can
involve the generalizing of the particular. When something other presents itself to me in this
mode, I reduce it to something that I can understand. The thing is a tree, a bicycle, a jump
rope. In this sense, truth involves a preservation of the feeling of being at home in the world; it
is a “refusal to be alienated.”69
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The alterity that I encounter in experience can be transformed and reduced into
something that is mine, that is the Same. ”Western” thought, for Levinas, has largely understood
truth only in terms of an appropriating autonomy, a reduction of otherness to sameness. For
Levinas, this reduction of otherness to sameness is an expression of the freedom of the subject.
This freedom, however, must be understood, not as liberating moment, but as a dominating,
unjustified “conquest of being by man over the course of history” (PhI 74, PI 91). This conquest
is what characterizes the self-identifying movement of the I.70
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas no longer describes these dimensions of our search for
truth in terms of autonomy and heteronomy, but instead draws a distinction between two
theoretical attitudes--metaphysics, which maintains alterity, and ontology, which does not.
Metaphysics, Levinas argues, inherently involves a critique of our very ability to know. It “does
not reduce the other to the same as does ontology, but calls into question the exercise of the
same.”71 But in order for the theoretical attitude to operate in this mode, Levinas argues, it
requires an encounter with the Other, with something that cannot be encompassed by its powers
of understanding.
This encounter is concretely manifested, according to Levinas, in our being spoken to by
one whose appearance reveals to me my responsibility. In this way Levinas argues, the encounter
with the Other “accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge.”72 That is, for Levinas, insofar
as knowledge requires exteriority to call it into question, it is dependent on the relation with the
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Other. This relation is concretely manifested in my being spoken to by the Other who calls me to
responsibility. This relation with alterity that allows the Other to remain other, Levinas names
metaphysics, as opposed to ontology, which neutralizes alterity by converting it into the Same by
means of a third term.
After describing these two possibilities of theory—metaphysics which respects alterity
and ontology which does not—Levinas goes on to claim that “Western philosophy has most
often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and
neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being.”73 We have seen that Levinas finds
exceptions to this tendency of Western philosophy, most notably in Plato’s concept of a
transcendent Good/Beautiful in the Republic and the Phaedrus,74 and in Descartes’s idea of the
Infinite.75 Nevertheless, the tendency of Western thought, on the whole, he believes, has been
towards a reduction of alterity. And despite Plato’s formulations of transcendence, Levinas
insists that Socratic education is a manifestation of this tendency.
For example, he writes, “This primacy of the Same was Socrates’s teaching: to receive
nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all eternity I was in possession of what
comes to me from the outside—to receive nothing, or to be free.”76 In this passage, we see that
Levinas seems to find Socratic education to be at odds with Plato’s conception of philosophy as
the pursuit of that which is “beyond being.” Socrates’s teaching, according to Levinas, does not
represent learning as a movement of transcendence but prioritizes the Same, insofar as what I
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learn is already within me.
One of the ways in which Plato presents this idea, that what I learn is already within me,
is through the myth of recollection. In the Meno, Socrates introduces the theory of recollection as
a way of resolving Meno’s famous paradox concerning the apparent impossibility of inquiry. If
we do not know what we are searching for when we seek knowledge, Meno insists, then we
cannot search for it, but if we do know that for which we are searching, we do not need to search
for it; thus, inquiry appears impossible. Socrates introduces recollection as a way of resolving
this paradox. He suggests that inquiry is possible if the soul has seen the true nature of reality in
a previous existence before birth. To learn is to recall this prior vision of reality. We do know
what we are searching for in one sense, he claims, but we have forgotten. And learning is the
process of recollecting knowledge that we previously possessed.
Socrates goes on to “prove” to Meno that learning is recollection by giving a
demonstration with one of Meno’s slaves. Through a series of questions, Socrates guides the
slave to the knowledge that a square made on the diagonal of another square will be double the
size of the original. Socrates never explicitly tells the slave that this is the case but uses
questioning to lead the slave first into and then out of aporia. Because Socrates never directly
tells the slave what he teaches him, Socrates claims that he must have already known what he
learned and that his learning was, in fact, a process of recollection.
A similar account of learning as recollection appears in the Phaedo. This dialogue takes
place in Socrates’s jail cell just before he is executed by the city of Athens. The two main
interlocutors in addition to Socrates are Simmias and Cebes, both of whom are Pythagoreans.
Unlike the Meno, which is explicitly a dialogue about teaching, especially the teaching of virtue,
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the arguments of the Phaedo are primarily aimed at demonstrating the immortality of the soul.
Socrates introduces the argument that learning is recollection to support his larger argument that
the soul is immortal and that the philosopher ought not fear death.
Levinas indicates throughout Totality and Infinity that the idea that learning is
recollection involves a neutralization of the alterity of the Other. As noted above, he writes that
Socrates’s teaching is “the primacy of the same” and presents knowledge “as though from all
eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside--to receive nothing, or to be
free.”77 The idea that freedom means receiving nothing from outside, is a modern notion of
freedom in which freedom is found in autonomy. This freedom is not exhibited as an ability to
do whatever one wants. Rather, as Levinas writes, “Its ultimate meaning lies in this permanence
in the same, which is reason.”78 Freedom, for modern philosophers like Kant, is found not in the
whims of a will that does whatever it wants, but in the universal demand of reason. That is,
freedom is the ability to rule oneself in accordance with what reason demands of all of us. For
Levinas, the image of the learner in anamnēsis as already possessing the knowledge that he
seeks, is another affirmation of our power as subjects. We do not need anyone to teach us
because we already know everything that we need to know if we just consider carefully what
reason demands of us. For this reason, Levinas worries that anamnēsis presents the subject as
fully independent and without need of the Other’s teaching.
Furthermore, insofar as we understand reason to be universal, Levinas finds that the
unique particularity of the Other is neutralized by being reduced to a third term, in this case a
shared logos that lies in all of us. He writes:
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The relation with the other is here accomplished only through a third term which I find in
myself. The ideal of Socratic truth thus rests on the essential self-sufficiency of the same,
its identification in ipseity, its egoism. Philosophy is an egology.79
The teaching relation, Levinas worries, is hereby reduced to a moment of recognition within
myself. The teacher only serves to activate something that is already in me. The encounter with
the teacher is, thus, not an encounter with a concrete, unique person who speaks to me as a
concrete individual. Rather, the teacher could be anyone or even anything which sparks this
moment of recognition. This process does not call me into question but reaffirms my autonomy
and mastery over the world.
Complementing the idea in Plato’s work that learning is anamnēsis, is the notion that
teaching is a practice of maieutics or midwifery. This idea is presented by Plato in the
Theaetetus. In this dialogue, Socrates converses with the mathematician Theodorus and the
young Theaetetus who is presented as one of the most promising young men of Athens.
Theaetetus is both courageous and thoughtful, quick to learn but exhibits self-control, and is
genuinely dedicated to the pursuit of philosophy. In conversing with the impressive young man,
Socrates claims that he himself, like his mother before him, practices the art of maieutics. When,
as anticipated, his interlocutors are surprised by this claim, Socrates elaborates. He insists that he
is a midwife to the souls of young men, helping them to give birth in their souls by prescribing
the right treatments to them and also determining which of their offspring are genuine and which
must be abandoned.
For Levinas, the fact that maieutics also presents students as already having within them
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that which the teacher helps bring to light reveals that maieutics and anamnēsis are two aspects
80

of the same egological understanding of teaching and learning. Levinas writes, “Teaching is not
reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I can contain.”81 Just
as the idea that learning is recollection emphasized the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the
subject, maieutics also fails to leave room for the teacher as Other to play an essential role in
learning as the one who offers me the sens unique that orients me to responsibility. For Levinas,
the Other’s concrete presence in speaking to me overflows the categories by means of which I
understand the world. To be taught by the Other is, as we have seen, not to realize what I already
know but to encounter an alterity that can never and must never be made commensurate with my
understanding.82 For this reason, Levinas views Socratic education as problematic in its portrayal
of teaching as maieutics.
But while Levinas criticizes Socratic education, he nevertheless also recognizes that
Socrates represents, in a positive way, the advent of philosophy. Levinas claims that Plato and
the “admirable Greek people” are to be credited with overcoming a certain kind of “false
spiritualism.”83 The introduction of philosophy, Levinas claims, “substituted for the magical
communion of species and the confusion of distinct orders a spiritual relation in which beings
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remain at their post but communicate among themselves.” Even when philosophy fails to
recognize that the freedom and self-sufficiency of the subject are illusions, philosophy is to be
credited with recognizing the need for the separation of the subject from the world that is
required so that we can represent and analyze it. He writes, “To be sure, representation does not
constitute the primordial relation with being. It is nonetheless privileged, precisely as the
possibility of recalling the separation of the I.”86 For Levinas, as we have seen, separation is
necessary for the terms of the metaphysical relation to remain “absolute” in the sense that they
are “absolved” of the relation.87 “The separation of the I”, he writes, “is thus affirmed to be noncontingent, non-provisional.”88 And philosophy, he claims, originates in the recognition of the
necessity of separation by Ancient Greek philosophers.
In fact, in this passage, Levinas distinguishes between three kinds of transcendence: 1) an
ecstatic, fusional transcendence whereby the individual is lost through participation in a false
spiritual reality wherein one does not question the traditions and norms of one’s culture; 2) a
philosophical transcendence in which the interiority of the subject is created and the individual
transcends her situation to accomplish the separation necessary for representation; 3) the genuine
transcendence of the Other beyond being. In explaining these three kinds of transcendence,
Levinas first distinguishes between the ecstatic transcendence of pre-philosophical religion
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wherein one is unified with the divine, and philosophical transcendence which involves the
separation of the subject. He writes:
Philosophical transcendence thereby differs from the transcendence of religions (in the
current thaumaturgic and generally lived sense of this term), from the transcendence that
is already (or still) participation, submergence in the being toward which it goes, which
holds the transcending being in its invisible meshes, as to do it violence.89
What Levinas here calls religion, which must be distinguished from his positive characterization
of religion as the genuinely transcendent relation with the Other itself, is overcome by the
introduction of philosophy. While philosophy’s attempt at total mastery and control, epitomized
by the self-sufficient subject must also be called into question by the relation with the Other, this
initial separation between oneself and the world is, for Levinas, the overcoming of what he
considers to be a dangerous loss of the self in participation.
Socratic philosophy, Levinas claims in the passage quoted above, marks an important
first step in that it recognizes the need for the individual to break away from unreflective
participation in a community’s practices. Socrates teaches us that we must examine ourselves,
and in doing so, we will discover that we already have within ourselves a means to critique
ourselves and our practices. This provisional praise of Socratic education is also repeated later:
Levinas writes, “Socratic maieutics prevailed over a pedagogy that introduced ideas into a mind
by violating or seducing (which amounts to the same thing) that mind.”90 Again we find that
Socratic education, by recognizing the value of what the student already knows, overcomes a
violating form of pedagogy that foregoes reason and “teaches” by seducing the student.
But while Socratic education overcomes the dangerous ecstatic transcendence wherein
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the self is lost, the transcendence of Socratic education, also must be differentiated from a further
kind of transcendence, viz. the genuine transcendence of the Other. He writes:
To think the infinite, the transcendent, the Stranger, is hence not to think an object. But to
think what does not have the lineaments of an object is in reality to do more or better than
think. The distance of transcendence is not equivalent to that which separates the mental
act from its object in all our representations, since the distance at which the object stands
does not exclude, and in reality implies, the possession of the object, that is, the
suspension of its being.91
Our relation to objects of thought, Levinas argues, involves a kind of distance, but this distance
is illusory insofar as it, in fact, implies adequation between my thought and the object. Although
the object is separate from me, in thinking about the object, I suspend its being as an existent and
understand it as something that I can represent to myself and others. Genuine transcendence
found in the relation with the Other, Levinas insists, must be differentiated from this
philosophical transcendence that allows objects to be represented by us.
This genuine transcendence is found, according to Levinas, in only a few moments in the
history of philosophy. He writes, “We find that this presence in thought of an idea whose
ideatum overflows the capacity of thought is given expression not only in Aristotle’s theory of
the agent intellect, but also, very often in Plato.”92 He then goes on to quote the passages from
the Phaedrus concerning the divine madness of the lover that were explored above.93
But while Plato expresses genuine transcendence “often,” Levinas insists that this
transcendence is not found in Socratic education. At the end of the chapter “Transcendence and
the Idea of Infinity” he writes, “It [the face] signifies the philosophical priority of the existent
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over Being, an exteriority that does not call for power or possession, an exteriority that is not
reducible, as with Plato, to the interiority of memory, and yet maintains the I who welcomes
it.”94 In this passage, we see again the tension that often characterizes Levinas’s relationship to
Plato. While for Levinas, Socrates took an important first step in recognizing the need for us to
think for ourselves, and Plato at times expresses the genuine transcendence of the Other, Plato’s
work also exemplifies the philosophical desire to neutralize the exteriority of the Other through
the knowing powers of an independent subject. In this way, Plato is, for Levinas, a complicated
figure exemplifying both the promise and the danger of philosophy.
This critique of Socratic education both as anamnēsis and as maieutics continues to
appear throughout Totality and Infinity. For example, Levinas writes, “[Speech] first of all
teaches this teaching itself, by virtue of which alone it can teach (and not, like maieutics, awaken
in me) things and ideas.”95 And also, “Teaching does not simply transmit an abstract and general
content already common to me and the Other. It does not merely assume an after all subsidiary
function of being midwife to a mind already pregnant with its fruit.”96 In these places in the text,
Levinas’s critique of Socratic education remains consistent. He worries that anamnēsis and
maieutics present learning as though it involves uncovering a universal reason already possessed
by an independent subject. As such, Levinas worries Socratic education overlooks the way in
which all knowledge relies on the relation with the Other who teaches me in a primordial sense.
In criticizing anamnēsis and maieutics for affirming a notion of the subject as selfsufficient and in possession of a universally shared reason, we see that Levinas’s critique of
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Socratic education is rooted in Levinas’s insistence that the Other who teaches me comes from
the exterior. The teacher must be absolutely other and bring me something that could never be
found within myself, namely responsibility. Levinas worries that in Socratic education, the
alterity of the Other is lost and is subsumed in the Same. The Other who teaches me would be
not a concrete existent who speaks to me and thereby offers me a sens unique irreducible to a
particular cultural expression, but simply an occasion for the student to share in a universal
reason common to all.
But is Socratic education really so incompatible with Levinas’s account of the teaching
relation? I will argue in the following chapter that it is not. The Other who teaches me appears
both as one who comes from the exterior and calls me into question and also as one who is
familiar and welcomes me generously into a way of being in the world. Socratic education, I will
show does not deny the alterity of the Other but recognizes instead the dual nature of teaching as
at once both foreign and intimate.
A Defense of Socratic Education
While Levinas worries that Socratic education offers us a vision of the subject as selfsufficient and independent, I will argue here for a different reading of both anamnēsis and
maieutics. I will show that it is possible to read Socratic education in such a way that it does not
deny the alterity of the Other but recognizes instead the dual nature of teaching as at once both
foreign and intimate. In Plato’s account of recollection, I contend, we find a description of Desire
insofar as anamnēsis describes our fundamental receptivity to the Other. Furthermore, maieutics,
I will argue, offers us a way of understanding the practice of teaching as one in which it is
incumbent on us to attend to our students as concrete, vulnerable individuals who are necessarily
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in relation to the Other. To make this case, I begin with a discussion of the Symposium in which I
show that there is an implicit account of anamnēsis before turning to the more explicit accounts
of recollection in the Meno and the Phaedo. Following this analysis of anamnēsis, I turn to a
discussion of maieutics in the Theaetetus.
The role of Desire in teaching and learning: anamnēsis
The Symposium
While the Symposium is not explicitly a dialogue about teaching, Diotima’s speech at the
heart of the dialogue presents us with a distinct pedagogical strategy whereby the teacher serves
as a guide who directs the student’s already existing orientation toward the Beautiful. In the
speech, Diotima claims that Eros serves as a messenger between humans and gods. As we have
seen, she describes the nature of Eros as the child of Poros (Wealth) and Penia (Poverty).97 As an
inheritor of both of these traits, Eros is never completely without resources but he is also never
rich. Instead, he is always desirous of beauty and wisdom, never fully possessing them but never
fully lacking them either. If Eros utterly lacked what he sought, she argues, he would not even
know that he needed to look for it. In a claim that is strikingly similar to Meno’s paradox,
Diotima states, “[i]f you don’t think you need anything, of course you won’t want what you
don’t think you need.”98 In describing this pre-existing relationship to the Beautiful, Diotima
emphasizes a receptivity on the part of the learner. To progress in wisdom, we need not possess
wisdom, but we do need to want wisdom, which means we are in a relation of desire with regard
to it.
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In the activity of perpetually pursuing the object of his desire, Diotima claims, Eros, is
like a philosopher. Philosophers are not wise but neither are they ignorant. Philosophers know
enough to pursue wisdom, but as long as they remain mortal, they will never possess wisdom
fully. But while we can never fully possess wisdom in this life, we can, however, come in closer
contact with the source of reality, the Beautiful (or the Good) itself. Eros helps humanity by
being a spirit or daimon that serves as a mediator between humans and gods, mortality and
immortality, ugliness and beauty, ignorance and wisdom. Eros compels us to seek out higher and
higher objects of desire and in this way serves as a kind of catalyst that makes the transcendent
movement of philosophy possible.
Diotima is Socrates’s teacher who has taught him all about matters of love (ta erōtika).99
And if we proceed correctly in loving, Diotima teaches, we will progress through a series of
stages in which we refocus our desire onto a desideratum that is closer to the source of that
which compels us. According to Diotima’s famous description of the so-called “ladder of love,”
the lover begins with desiring one beautiful body, then all beautiful bodies, then the beauty of the
soul (which animates and directs the body), then the customs of the city that shape the soul, then
the knowledge that gives rise to customs. And finally, if one is lucky, one catches a glimpse of
the ultimate source of beauty, the Beautiful itself.100 To progress as a philosopher is to ascend,
insofar as one is able, towards this original source of all good and beautiful things.
When we consider what Diotima can teach us about teaching philosophy, one important
insight is that we are all already oriented by a desire for what we think is good and/or beautiful.
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The object of desire, for the new student, is not yet the Beautiful itself, but we are all, according
to Diotima, lovers. That is, we are all compelled by or filled with wonder at what we believe are
beautiful things, although our understanding of those things is flawed. The role of the teacher is
to correct the student’s false understanding and direct her to a more accurate vision of beauty.
But in order to pursue beauty in the first place, we must already be in a relationship with
it. If Socrates came to Diotima with no conception of or desire for beauty, she would not have
been able to direct him in his learning. The desire for the beautiful is what fuels the ascent up the
“ladder of love.” This condition of the possibility for learning as a process of being guided by a
teacher is what Plato describes when he offers the myth of recollection, as I will show in greater
detail below.
While Levinas worries that the myth of anamnēsis is meant to assure us that we already
possess a rationality common to all, I argue that its role is instead to reveal and describe a Desire
for the truth of the Good and Beautiful that is a necessary condition of learning. What we share
in anamnēsis, need not be understood only or even primarily as a set of universally shared ideas.
Rather, what we share in this account is an orientation towards transcendence, which Plato
characterizes as a pursuit of the Good/Beautiful that is never fully satisfied. The primary role of
the teacher in Socratic education, I argue, can be seen not as attempting to reveal commonly held
ideas, but as motivating and guiding the student’s pre-existing orientation towards the
Good/Beautiful.
In this way, anamnēsis may be read as presenting education as structured by the Desire
that Levinas finds in the Republic and the Phaedrus and not as a moment of the appropriating
movement of the same. That is, if we understand the myth of anamnēsis to be a description of
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our pre-existing desire for the Good/Beautiful, then anamnēsis need not be interpreted as a
description of our possession of a universal knowledge common to all, but rather a description of
our longing for transcendence.
In fact, this idea that teaching depends on a prior receptivity to the Other on the part of
the student is something that Levinas himself recognizes when he writes:
To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each
instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive
from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of
infinity. But this also means: to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is
a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this
conversation is a teaching [enseignement].101
In this passage, we find that Levinas recognizes that in order to be taught, I must welcome the
Other as my teacher, and it is only through a welcoming on the part of the student that a
conversation is a teaching conversation. Levinas thus identifies a receptivity on the part of the
subject that is necessary in order for that which the Other teaches me to be received. In other
words, in order for the Other to be able to teach me that I am responsible, I must be capable of
welcoming the Other’s teaching.
This receptivity, as Derrida notes, has a strange and paradoxical temporality. In order to
welcome the Other, I must exist as a separate being with my own dwelling into which I can
welcome the Other. He writes, “The possibility of the welcome would thus come--so as to open
them up--before recollection, even before collecting, before the act from which everything
nonetheless seems to be derived.”102 I am receptive to the Other “before” I am. As Derrida notes,
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Levinas insists that “to possess the idea of infinity is to have already welcomed the Other.”

That is, as we have seen, I must have already accomplished subjectivity through the recollection
that occurs in the dwelling in order to open up my home in hospitality to others.104 And as I am
suggesting here, understanding Socratic anamnēsis as an articulation of this receptivity to
transcendence allows us to resolve the conflict that Levinas finds between his own account of
teaching and Socratic education.
The Meno
To further make the case that anamnēsis can be understood as a receptivity to
transcendence, it is helpful to take a closer look at the Meno. In this dialogue, we find that
Socrates uses the myth of recollection to encourage Meno, who is a difficult student enamored of
sophistry, to remain committed to philosophical inquiry. The dialogue begins with a famous
question from Meno to Socrates. Meno asks, “Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue [aretē] be
taught [didaktos]? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but
men possess it by nature or in some other way?”105 The dialogue, from the beginning, is oriented
by the question of education, and specifically the nature of the development of virtue.
Socrates proceeds by asking Meno to first define virtue and in doing so successfully
brings him to aporia. When Socrates urges Meno to continue, nevertheless, in their pursuit of a
definition, Meno introduces his famous paradox. He says, “How will you look for it [virtue],
Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you
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do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you
did not know?”106 Socrates, upon hearing this apparently common paradox, which he refers to as
a “debater’s argument,”107 introduces the idea that learning is anamnēsis. Claiming to have heard
the idea from priests and priestesses and from Pindar and other divine poets, he explains:
As the soul is immortal, has been born often, and has seen all things here and in the
underworld, there is nothing which it has not learned; so it is in no way surprising that it
can recollect the things it knew before, both about virtue and other things. As the whole
of nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents a man, after
recalling one thing only--a process men call learning--discovering everything else for
himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search, for searching and learning are, as a
whole, recollection. We must, therefore, not believe that debater’s argument, for it would
make us idle, and fainthearted men like to hear it, whereas my argument makes them
energetic and keen on the search. I trust that this is true, and I want to inquire along with
you into the nature of virtue.108
We see here that the idea that learning is recollection is introduced so that Meno will not give up
in his search for the truth. If Meno wants to be like the strongest, bravest, and wisest men
described by Pindar, Socrates tells him, he must not give up so easily. The advantage of
believing Socrates’s account, as Socrates states, is that it leads to persistence in inquiry. In this
way, we see that one of the primary purposes of the myth of anamnēsis is to get Meno, a student
who wants to be told all the answers, to be more diligent in his pursuit of knowledge and virtue,
to remain open to the possibility of finding new answers.
Later in the dialogue, Socrates again indicates that the goal of the myth is to inspire Meno
to pursue philosophy. After presenting his argument that what we learn must be something
recollected from a previous life, Socrates says:
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I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all
costs in both word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver, and less
idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if
we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know and that we must not
look for it.109
In this passage, we find Socrates at his most confident. Despite his numerous claims to ignorance
throughout this and other dialogues, he confidently and “at all costs,” asserts one thing--that we
are better off if we pursue knowledge than if we do not. Whether or not the soul really is
immortal it seems, is not the primary issue. If we are concerned about virtue and whether it is
teachable--the original question that structures the dialogue--we must begin by believing that it is
possible to learn. The myth of recollection, whether literally true or not, assures us that learning
is possible because it asserts that we are all already in relation to the truth. In this way, the myth,
is not aimed nostalgically at the past. Rather its purpose is an orientation towards an open future
of inquiry.
In addition to giving us hope that inquiry is worthwhile, we can also understand the myth
to be phenomenologically explanatory. What Socrates seems to be describing in the myth of
recollection is the fact that when we learn, we must be able to recognize the truth as the truth.
Our experience of learning is often one in which, upon discovering something new, we recognize
that what we have learned was true all along, waiting to be articulated. The myth of anamnēsis
offers a description of our experience of learning as involving this kind of re-cognition. And in
order for us to experience learning in this way, we must already be in relation to the truth in
some way. This is the crux of Meno’s paradox. As we have, seen, Levinas describes a similar
paradox in his account of the metaphysical relation. In order to welcome the Other, we must have
already accomplished subjectivity. But the accomplishment of subjectivity itself requires that we
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have received the hospitality of the intimate Other. In this way, the paradox of learning found in
the myth of anamnēsis parallels Levinas’s account of the metaphysical relation and in particular
the relation with intimate alterity.
In his work, The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For, Jean-Louis Chrétien offers an
interpretation of anamnēsis that supports this reading of anamnēsis as a fundamental receptivity
to transcendence and not as a claim about the self-possession of knowledge.110 Chrétien claims
that Plato's account of anamnēsis, seems to combine a "philosophical thesis"--knowledge as
contemplation of being, and a religious doctrine--reincarnation of the soul. While some111 have
tried to "purify" anamnēsis of its religious dimension by transforming it into a claim about a
priori knowledge, something that Levinas also at times seems to do, Chrétien insists that the
tension between myth and reason in anamnēsis is essential insofar as it is only through this
tension that our experience of what he terms an “immemorial past” is properly expressed.
For Chrétien, the immemorial is a past that has never truly been present but that serves as
an orientation, nevertheless, for the future. In Chrétien’s view, if we understand that which is
recalled in recollection to be a priori knowledge, the object of recollection is not forever lost, but
eternally present. To reduce anamnēsis to the recognition of a priori truth is, therefore, to deny
our experience of the immemorial as that which has been truly lost as opposed to merely covered
over or hidden. The immemorial as expressed in myth, Chrétien argues, gives us a means of
expressing a paradox at the root of our being, namely that to be a human being is to never
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completely be in possession of oneself. We can see that this image of the self as in relation to
that which it can never possess is resonant with Levinas’s account of the welcome prior to
teaching described above.112
Furthermore, the mythical dimension of anamnēsis, Chrétien argues, does not draw us
backwards into the past, but pushes us forward. "The thought of knowledge as recollection does
not lead to an exercise of memory,” he writes, “but to an exercise of anticipation."113 Our
experience of the loss of the immemorial motivates us to do philosophy, to recollect what we
have lost. "The way of recollection, just like the way of love,” he writes “begins with emptiness
and dispossession, and not with the accumulation of rediscovered or re-conquered memories."114
Chrétien follows Plato in portraying our longing for the immemorial, which we have always
already lost, as that which motivates our seeking. To be a human being is to experience oneself
as insufficient, finite, and temporal. In our temporal mode of being, we long for that which we
express metaphorically as lost, even though it is not something that we have ever truly possessed.
Levinas, in his critique of anamnēsis, seems to find in it an expression of a priori truth.
Rather than reading anamnēsis as a description of receptivity to transcendence, Levinas finds in
it an account of eternal possession. But Chrétien’s reading of anamnēsis, helps us to see another
possibility, one that parallels Levinas’s notion of Desire. Desire, as we have seen, is, for Levinas,
an ongoing task that is oriented perpetually towards a future that will never be reached. Chrétien
finds just such a structure of human longing in Plato’s concept of anamnēsis.
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The Phaedo
The other dialogue in which anamnēsis plays a prominent role is the Phaedo. As in the
Meno, Socrates introduces the myth of anamnēsis, to inspire his interlocutors to remain
dedicated to the never-ending work of philosophy. In the Phaedo, however, Socrates faces a very
different pedagogical challenge. His students are not stubborn and difficult, but are instead
devoted followers. Simmias and Cebes, the primary interlocutors, love Socrates and are
devastated that he is about to die. In this context, the hope that Socrates offers his students is of a
different kind than that offered in the Meno. While Meno needed to be brought into aporia to
understand the necessity of continuing to seek the truth, Simmias and Cebes need consolation so
as to remain committed to philosophy and not fall into despair. We find that the myth of
anamnēsis is offered by Socrates in the dialogue as a kind of consoling remedy for his students’
souls.
That Socrates’s aim is to soothe his interlocutors and spur them on to continue
philosophy is apparent when, after several arguments for the immortality of the soul have failed
to convince those present, they become, as Phaedo claims, depressed. He says that they had been
convinced by the earlier arguments but that now they doubted the conclusion. Echecrates, to
whom Phaedo is offering the entire account, speaks up saying that he too was convinced by
Socrates’s earlier arguments but is now doubtful. He admits that he “is quite in need, as if from
the beginning, of some other argument to convince [him] that the soul does not die along with
the man.”115 Phaedo explains how Socrates responds, saying:
I have certainly often admired Socrates, Echecrates, but never more than on this occasion.
That he had a reply was perhaps not strange. What I wondered at most in him was the
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pleasant, kind, and admiring way he received the young men’s argument, and how
sharply he was aware of the effect the discussion had on us, and then how well he healed
our distress and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and defeat and turned us around to
join him in the examination of their argument.116
For Phaedo, what is really impressive about Socrates is not primarily that he is able to give
successful arguments. Rather, Phaedo is most amazed at Socrates’s ability to recognize what he
and his friends needed and to offer remedies that allowed them to continue on in their pursuit of
the truth. And as Socrates soothes them, Phaedo says that Socrates “stroked [his] head and
pressed the hair on the back of [his] neck.”117 We see here Socrates’s tenderness towards Phaedo.
The arguments that Socrates presents must, therefore, be read in this context of concern for his
friends. That is, Phaedo draws our attention not just to Socrates’s ability to make arguments but
to his skill as a teacher/healer. Socrates’s goal in making his philosophical arguments is not
simply to convince his interlocutors of the truth of a proposition, but to comfort them in their
despair and offer them hope for a meaningful life.
That one of Socrates’s goals is to serve as a healer to his friends is further indicated when
he compares the arguments that he presents to incantations.118 After presenting his argument for
the immortality of the soul on the basis of anamnēsis, when Simmias and Cebes are still
unconvinced, Socrates gently scolds them saying “You seem to have this childish fear that the
wind would really dissolve and scatter the soul, as it leaves the body, especially if one happens to
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Cebes laughs in response and says “[P]erhaps

there is a child in us who has these fears; try to persuade him not to fear death like a bogey.”120
Socrates then replies that Cebes should “sing a charm over him every day until you have
charmed away his fears.”121 We see here an indication that part of the goal of the arguments in
the dialogue is to provide such a remedy. Furthermore, one argument is not enough but several
are needed and they must be repeated again and again, like a song. This need for repetition
further indicates that Socrates’s goal is not simply to make a logical argument for a proposition-namely that the soul is immortal. If this were the goal, one argument would be sufficient. Instead,
Socrates’s aim is a transformation of his interlocutors’ souls through the use of song.
The term for singing incantations, epaeido appears in several of Plato’s dialogues,
including the Republic, the Phaedo, and the Phaedrus. In each case, philosophical conversation
or argumentation is compared to singing chants designed to have a particular effect on the soul.
We see that here in the Phaedo the incantatory dimension of philosophy is meant to soothe the
fears of the interlocutors about death. Similarly, in the Phaedrus, Socrates claims that a
rhetorician knows how “to inflame a crowd and, once they are inflamed how to hush them again
with his words’ magic spell.”122 In Book X of the Republic, Socrates claims that the argument he
has given against poetry can ward off a childish predilection for immoral poetry. Socrates insists
that he and his interlocutors must “repeat the argument...like an incantation so as to preserve
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ourselves from slipping back into that childish passion for poetry which the majority of people
have.”123 Thus, we find that in several of the dialogues including the Phaedo, philosophical
discourse has an incantatory power to transform the soul, to inflame or soothe its passions, and
this power can be used by a philosopher/teacher to guide students down the proper path.
In the Phaedo, the argument for anamnēsis is a part of a larger set of arguments for the
immortality of the soul. But these arguments are presented in the context of music, and Socrates
describes them as incantations. These incantations are intended to transform the souls of his
interlocutors to orient them towards a philosophical life. Belief in the immortality of the soul is
only important insofar as it is a part of a broader practice of living.
In fact, after Socrates goes to bathe in preparation for drinking the poison, Crito asks
Socrates for his final instructions, and he replies saying:
Nothing new...but what I am always saying, that you will please me and mine [kai emoi
kai tois emois] and yourselves by taking good care of your own selves in whatever you
do, even if you do not agree with me now, but if you neglect your own selves, and are
unwilling to live following the tracks, as it were, of what we have said now and on
previous occasions, you will achieve nothing even if you strongly agree with me at this
moment.124
As in the Meno, Socrates emphasizes that he is not so concerned with whether or not his
interlocutors are convinced by the arguments that he has offered for the immortality of the soul.
If they agree with the arguments but fail to lead their lives well, they will achieve nothing. In this
way, Socrates again insists that his main concern is with living well, not with convincing his
interlocutors of a particular doctrine. It is only insofar as believing that the soul is immortal will
help one to live well that one should “risk belief” in the immortality of the soul.
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Levinas criticizes anamnēsis because he sees it as presenting knowledge as a kind of
eternal a priori knowledge that we all have access to insofar as we are rational beings. I have
argued here, however, that anamnēsis is not unlike the Desire for the ethical in Levinas’s work.
As we know, the Other, according to Levinas, does not offer me specific principles by which I
can live my life. Rather, the Other disrupts my possession of the world. The face of the Other, we
might say, reminds us of our responsibility. And this reminder must be encountered again and
again and again. We are never finished with ethics just as, for Socrates in both the Meno and the
Phaedo as well as in the Phaedrus and the Republic, we never remain in view of true reality but,
insofar as we are mortal, always fall back to the world of forgetting. Levinas views anamnēsis as
representing a need to return to a point of origin. But, I have presented an alternate interpretation,
namely that anamnēsis represents the structure of Desire insofar as describes us as being
fundamentally in a state of longing for transcendence.
Concretely, throughout the dialogues, Socrates’s interlocutors, for the most part, do seek
out what they believe to be good and beautiful things, even though many of them may have
mistaken views about what constitutes goodness or beauty. They may think, like Phaedrus, for
example, that beauty is found in the bodies of young men. Or they may believe, like Meno, that
goodness can be equated with honors bestowed by one’s culture. But most of Socrates’s
interlocutors desire something that they believe to be of value. Furthermore, Phaedrus and Meno
and the rest of Socrates’s students are usually not entirely wrong in their appraisals. There is
beauty, according to Socrates, in the body, and there can be goodness in the honor bestowed by
a city. The problem is the mistaken view that beauty is nothing more than the beauty of a body or
that goodness is whatever the city deems worthy of honor. An understanding of the reason why

137
these objects are good and beautiful is needed so that we can avoid being tricked by false
appearances. The role of the teacher is, thus, to guide the student by correcting students’
mistakes and directing their attention, step by step, to more fundamental understanding of that
which makes good and beautiful things what they are.
Teaching as hospitality: maieutics
Just as anamnēsis can be read in a way that pushes back against Levinas’s criticisms,
understanding teaching as a practice of maieutics can also, I argue, be read in a way that renders
it consonant with Levinas’s philosophy. Rather than emphasizing the self-sufficiency of the
student as Levinas worries, I contend that the metaphor of midwifery offers us a way of
understanding the student as open to a relation with genuine alterity. Furthermore, the metaphor
of the teacher as midwife reveals the necessity of familiarity and intimacy in the teaching
relation. The teacher, as midwife, is presented as one who knows her students well and cares for
them not only as autonomous cognizers but also as affective, vulnerable, beings who are always
in relation to others. In this way the figure of the teacher as midwife, in my view, can be read as
a description of what Levinas names intimate or “feminine” alterity.
The account of teaching as maieutics is found in Plato’s Theaetetus. The dialogue is
framed by a conversation between Terpsion and Euclides after the death of Socrates and just
before the tragic and untimely death of Theaetetus. After the introductory dialogue, there is a
brief conversation between Socrates and the mathematician Theodorus in which they discuss
which of the youth of Athens show the most promise. Theodorus sings the praises of Theaetetus,
claiming that he is an especially good student. Soon after, Theaetetus approaches with his friends
and Socrates engages him in conversation to see if he is indeed as promising a thinker as
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Theodorus claims. The question which Socrates poses to Theaetetus is that of the definition of
knowledge, and through the discussion, they arrive at several answers--knowledge is perception,
knowledge is true opinion, and knowledge is true opinion with an account--each of which is
found to be unsatisfactory, and the dialogue ends aporetically. The interlocutors, however, plan
to continue the discussion the next day, a conversation that is recounted in the Sophist.
In talking to Theaetetus, Socrates presents his own pedagogical style as being one of
maieutics. He claims that he, like his mother before him, practices midwifery, and he goes on to
enumerate several characteristics of midwives, which he claims to share. Midwives are barren
but were previously able to bear children.125 They have techniques (namely, drugs [pharmakia]
and incantations [epadousai]) that can bring about and relieve labor pains.126 Their best skill,
which is both surprising and controversial according to Socrates, is that they are excellent matchmakers, best at knowing what erotic encounters are likely to be fruitful.127 Socrates claims that
his own art is like that of a midwife except that he is concerned not with the body but with the
soul and he deals with men and not women.128 Furthermore, because he deals with ideas and not
children, he must also determine whether the ideas that his art gives rise to are “real” or mere
“phantoms.”129 Theaetetus is, Socrates suspects, “pregnant and in labor.”130 It is Socrates’s task
to help Theaetetus to give birth to his ideas and to determine whether or not they are worthy of
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maintaining or if they must be rejected.
The themes of intercourse, conception, pregnancy, and birth appear throughout the
dialogue. When Theaetetus is introduced, he is described as a “thoroughbred” [gennikon]131 and
also as looking like Socrates, with the same snub nose, bulging eyes, and aptitude for
philosophy.132 This comparison invites us to think of Theaetetus as a kind of child of Socrates,
the product, perhaps, of Socrates’s fertile dialogical encounters with the men of Athens. We find
that Theaetetus has grown up and has been, thus far, well educated in the city and he now comes
to Socrates pregnant and in need of help in giving birth to his own ideas.
If we reimagine the course of Theaetetus’s “conception” and “pregnancy” as well as
Socrates’s maieutic pedagogy, we discover that Levinas’s claims that maieutics presents the
learner as a self-sufficient, autonomous subject who already knows what she learns, are not
justified. First, maieutics requires that the student become pregnant through an encounter capable
of resulting in conception. Levinas insists that teaching must bring me “more than I can
contain.”133 Maieutics is criticized because, according to Levinas, it does not recognize that
exteriority is necessary for knowledge. When we examine the metaphor of midwifery, however,
we find that maieutics not only allows for exteriority, but requires it. In being “pregnant,”
Theaetetus certainly has within him “more than [he] can contain,” something that Theaetetus
himself claims at the end of the dialogue when he says, “As far as I’m concerned Socrates,
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you’ve made me say far more than ever was in me, Heaven knows.”

Maieutics, contrary to Levinas’s criticisms, presents us with a relational subject who not
only encounters exteriority but is capable of welcoming and embodying this alterity within
himself. The subjectivity of the student as metaphorically pregnant in the maieutic model is,
therefore, not the dominating, self-sufficient, independent, autonomous subject that Levinas
criticizes. Rather, knowledge originates, in the maieutic model, through fertile dialogical
encounters with others. As we saw in the analysis of the Phaedrus above, learning, for Socrates
involves having another “write” in your soul. He describes the process as follows:
The dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it discourse
accompanied by knowledge--discourse capable of helping itself as well as the man who
planted it, which is not barren but produces a seed from which more discourse grows in
the character of others.135
In understanding teaching and learning as a generative encounter, Socrates’s conception of
teaching as maieutics does not, therefore, indicate that one is always pregnant. Rather, one
becomes pregnant through conversation. Thus, the maieutic metaphor does not deny the
exteriority of the Other qua teacher, but, rather requires it.
In fact, Levinas himself uses the metaphor of maternity to describe the ethical subject in
Otherwise than Being. In this later work, Levinas’s account of the subject is such that
subjectivity is substitution, the-one-for-another. I am utterly vulnerable and passive in my
responsibility for the Other. The maternal body represents, for Levinas, the corporeality of this
vulnerability and passivity. For the later Levinas, the corporeality of responsibility in the form of
sensibility is represented in the pregnant body, which literally holds and nourishes another within
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making his earlier rejection of maieutics all the more puzzling.

Further evidence that knowledge, understood through the maieutic metaphor, is not
possessed for all time by a self-sufficient soul, but is generated through encounters with others
can be found in the case of Theaetetus’s “first-born child,” i.e. the idea that knowledge is
perception, Socrates says:
So we find the various theories have converged on the same thing: that of Homer and
Heraclitus and all their tribe, that all things flow like streams; of Protagoras, wisest of
men, that man is the measure of all things; and of Theaetetus that, these things being so,
knowledge proves to be perception. What about it, Theaetetus? Shall we say we have
here your first-born child, the result of my midwifery? (160d-e)
We find that Theaetetus’s first fully formed idea--that knowledge is perception--does not spring
from his own soul alone, but is the product of several generations of thought. Homer and
Heraclitus introduce the idea that everything is in flux. Protagoras inherits this idea and
transforms it to say that, because everything is in flux, humans are the measure of everything.
And finally, Theaetetus develops Protagoras’s idea into the conclusion that knowledge is
perception. The picture of learning that is presented here is not one of isolated souls all in
communion with a shared, abstract, universal logos, as Levinas worries, but of ideas generated
through fertile encounters between teachers and students with each generation contributing
something new.
Finally, we also find in the Theaetetus that maieutics presents us with an example of
teaching that is attentive to the contextual situation of the students. This recognition of the
concrete situatedness of the interlocutors is precisely what makes speech preferable to writing
according to Socrates in the Phaedrus. In Levinas’s retrieval of Socrates’s argument favoring
136
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speech, it is the unique and concrete presence of the Other in the address that opens up the field
of conversation. In insisting on this presence, Levinas emphasizes the way in which knowledge
originates in concrete encounters with others, with existents, who always exceed the categories
that I use to understand them. The maieutic model, I argue, is attentive to the uniqueness of
interlocutors insofar as it presents learning as a process of coming to an understanding that
occurs over time that involves a contextualized negotiation. The midwife/teacher, Socrates
insists, must use his art to make practical decisions about when to bring about pain and when to
relieve it based on the particularities of the situation.
In fact, we find that Socrates himself exhibits this ability to attend to the particularities of
the situation and his interlocutors, most strikingly in his dealings with Theodorus. Throughout
the dialogue, Socrates attempts to get Theodorus to engage in the dialogue and Theodorus
repeatedly refuses, urging Socrates to talk with the young Theaetetus instead.137 Eventually,
however, Socrates convinces Theodorus to take part, which leads to the important digression in
the middle of the dialogue about the difference between the philosopher and the sophist. The
reason that Socrates is finally successful is that he appeals both to Theodorus’s friendship with
Protagoras and to his passion for mathematics, asking Theodorus to consider whether
Protagoras’s claim that humans are the measure of all things can apply also to the proofs of
geometry. At this point, Theodorus can no longer refuse to take part. Socrates, the skillful
teacher, knows who Theodorus is and what he cares about. As a result, Socrates is able to engage
Theodorus in the discussion. As Theodorus says, “Socrates, it is not easy for a man who has sat
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Thus, we see that the skillful midwife who knows when to

bring about and when to relieve labor pains must attend to the concrete particular student who
comes to him ready to give birth. In this way, contrary to Levinas’s critique, maieutics presents
us with an example of a teacher who attends his speaking, who is present in the conversation to
answer the students’ questions and fulfill the promise that is made by the opening of the plane of
conversation.
In these ways, maieutics presents the teacher-student relationship as a concrete, intimate,
and contextualized relationship of care. And the knowledge that results from maieutic encounters
is not the illumination of a priori knowledge possessed for all time. Rather, knowledge is seen,
through the metaphor of fertility, as something that is produced over time through productive
encounters between interlocutors. In this way, maieutics like anamnēsis can be seen as
presenting us with a conception of the learner as receptive and vulnerable to transformation by
teaching.
Levinas worries that Socratic education presents the teaching relation as one in which the
subject is free and independent of the Other, in no need of learning from her. This critique,
however, is only valid if we fail to recognize that the Other who teaches me appears not only as
an unsettling exterior presence but also as an intimate Other who approaches in gentleness and
affection. When we recognize that this intimate alterity is just as necessary as absolute alterity
for the ethical relation, we see that Levinas need not reject maieutics insofar as the teacher as
midwife in fact exhibits characteristics of what Levinas calls “feminine” alterity.
First, Socrates, in acting as midwife, serves as a gentle and welcoming presence who is
concerned for students not only as thinking beings but as affective and vulnerable beings.
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Furthermore, the midwife is also “barren.” She does not claim to possess the truth, but rather
provides the opportunity for the student to learn through struggling on his own. Like the intimate
Other who abides in silence to allow me space to accomplish subjectivity, the teacher as midwife
knows when to withdraw from the conversation to let the student struggle with an idea. In this
way, by not giving his own ideas, Socrates makes room for the student to think for himself.
While identifying silence, affection, and hospitality as “feminine” is problematic, as I
argued in Chapter Three,139 the practice of teaching is nevertheless one in which the effective
teacher acts both as the Socratic gadfly who calls students into question and as the Socratic
midwife who generously welcomes students into a conversation. We see Socrates expertly show
his ability to prescribe the right treatment to his interlocutors throughout the dialogues. For
instance, in the Meno, Socrates is tough on his student, recognizing that Meno needs to be
shaken from his stubbornness and brought to the uncomfortable state of aporia if he is to
advance in wisdom. In the Phaedo, by contrast, the interlocutors are distressed and need their
teacher to provide a soothing remedy. They are afraid of death and distraught about losing their
teacher, and Socrates recognizes that what they need is comfort not further distress. In the
Theaetetus, we see Socrates provide both comfort and discomfort to Theaetetus, reassuring him
when he feels uncertain but also pushing him on to relentlessly pursue the truth even when it
means acknowledging that he was previously mistaken. In this way, in both his actions and his
accounts of teaching and learning, Socrates provides us with a model of teaching that is not
aimed at awakening a universal logos but one in which students are recognized and cared for in
their unique particularity.
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Summary
In this chapter, we have seen that Levinas’s relationship to Plato is complex. On the one
hand, Levinas is inspired by the Phaedrus and, in his own way, finds a unity within the disparate
themes of the dialogue. For Levinas, the relation with the ultimate object of deepest human
Desire is concretized in the ethical face-to-face conversation between interlocutors. If we
understand the structure of Desire as a break with interiority that aims at that which is beyond
what can be grasped by signification grounded in interiority, it is the Other who speaks to me and
calls me into question that presents me with precisely that which transcends signification.
Levinas’s goal in Totality and Infinity is to show that the relation with genuine transcendence,
i.e. transcendence in which the Other is “beyond being,” is concretely realized in the epiphany of
the face of another who speaks to me and in doing so, teaches me. In this way, Totality and
Infinity may be read as a “return to Platonism.”
But while Levinas finds in the Phaedrus and in the Republic expressions of genuine
transcendence that he sees as lacking in the work of his contemporaries, he also has reservations
about “Western” philosophy, which, as Levinas understands it, is fundamentally indebted to
Plato and to Greek thought more generally. Not only does Levinas reject Plato’s characterization
of Desire as rooted in lack, but he also finds in Socratic education an expression of the
“Western” subject as self-sufficient and independent. Rather than viewing Socratic education as
an expression of transcendence, he sees in anamnēsis and maieutics, a vision of the student as
autonomous, and independent from the Other.
I have argued, however, that Levinas fails to see that Socratic education is, in fact,
consonant with his own understanding of teaching. Rather than affirming the self-sufficiency of
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the subject, Socratic education, I have argued, offers us a way of seeing teaching and learning as
practices that recognize our vulnerability as subjects and our Desire for transcendence.
Furthermore, the practice of maieutics makes manifest the intimate dimensions of the teaching
relation that Levinas himself often ignores. Socrates offers us a model for the teacher as both
gadfly and midwife, both one who unsettles us and one who welcomes us into the practice of
philosophy with affection and hospitality.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE PRACTICE OF TEACHING
Throughout this work so far, my concerns have largely been grounded in questions concerning the history of philosophy and the interpretation of Levinas’s texts. I have attempted to
understand what Levinas means when he insists that the Other is my teacher in a primordial
sense and how this understanding of a primordial teaching is shaped by Levinas’s critical retrieval of Plato’s texts. But if we are to fully receive the teachings that Levinas’s texts offer us, we
must also read his work as a demand to better respond to the concrete others who call us to responsibility every day. In this chapter, therefore, I explore how we can better respond to those
concrete others who show up as our students, by drawing inspiration from the works of both
Levinas and Plato.
But as we make this move to an examination of the practice of teaching, it remains unclear exactly how the primordial teaching relation that Levinas describes relates to the concrete
practice of teaching insofar as, for Levinas, all speaking has a teaching dimension. Therefore, I
will begin in the first section with a consideration of the difficulties of relating Levinas’s ethics
to concrete ethical situations. I will argue that while we cannot “apply” Levinas’s thought as one
applies a principle to an instance, we can conduct a phenomenological investigation of a concrete
situation in order to better understand what the Other demands of us in that situation. That is,
through phenomenological description, we can work to listen to what the Other has to teach us in
particular context. In the second section, I consider what the phenomenon of teaching reveals to
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us about our responsibilities as teachers. This phenomenological investigation will lead me to
claim, in the third section that the task of teaching philosophy should be understood as a practice
of hospitality whereby we give the world to students as a place in which they are responsible to
the Other.
A phenomenological ethics
The move from Levinas’s account of the primacy of the ethical to the practice of responding to the Other in a concrete situation is a complex task. While Levinas aims to reposition
ethics at the center of philosophical questioning, he is not interested in providing a set of rules or
principles against which we can check our actions to see if they are good or bad, permissible or
impermissible. Rather, he is in search of what makes ethics possible in the first place.
The only way that we are not “duped by morality”1 as he writes in the Preface of Totality
and Infinity, is if our responsibility to the Other precedes our freedom as subjects. We do not
choose to be responsible; we simply are responsible whether we want to be or not. And this unchosen and inevitable responsibility is, he claims, a condition of any genuine ethics, which must
not begin from a self-interested war of all against all. He writes, “The moral consciousness can
sustain the mocking gaze of the political man only if the certitude of peace dominates the evidence of war.”2 That is, for Levinas, prior to the political rationality of self-interest whereby my
freedom is limited by the freedom of others, is a peaceful relationship of responsibility to the
Other. For Levinas, it is only because I am in relation to an Other to and for whom I am responsible, that I can become an autonomous and self-interested subject.
The primordiality of this relationship, however, makes it difficult to understand how
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Levinas’s ethics might inform our practices. That is, because the ethical relation to the Other
precedes the very meaningfulness of the world and even reason itself, it can never be entirely
captured by a set of articulated norms or principles. In The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, Diane
Perpich discusses this problem, arguing that Levinas’s ethics must be understood as a kind of
normativity without norms. What Levinas offers us, she insists, is not the solution to a problem.
Rather, his philosophy amounts to a demand that we perpetually allow ourselves and our ways of
responding to be unsettled and interrupted by the call of the Other who faces us.
Levinas’s insistence that the face of the Other calls me to responsibility is not, in the first
place, an empirical or ontological claim about the nature of human beings. Although the claim is
in some sense phenomenological, Levinas also insists that we cannot understand the face of the
Other as a phenomenon in the typical sense. Our relation with the Other is a relation that challenges the definition of intentionality itself. The Other is not a phenomenon that is adequate to an
intention. Rather, the Other demands that I take her on her own terms. The Other does not exclusively receive her meaning from her relations to other phenomena but speaks for herself, “attends” her expression, and offers me a sense that is irreducible to the meanings offered to me by
the signs offered by my culture.
Levinas himself recognizes the challenges of writing about something that, by its very
definition (or rather, its lack of a definition) unsettles every attempt to thematize it in language.
In the conclusion to Totality and Infinity, he writes,
The description of the face to face which we have attempted here is told to the other, to
the reader who appears anew behind my discourse and my wisdom. Philosophy is never a
wisdom, for the interlocutor whom it has just encompassed has already escaped it.3
Levinas emphasizes that what he writes is written to a reader and, as such, his own writing is it3
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self a kind of addressing. And in speaking about the Other whom he also addresses, the Other
has already eluded the thematization that he has offered.
What Levinas teaches us is not that we can ever avoid this slipping away of that which
we attempt to thematize, but that we must always remind ourselves of it. In our thematizing,
which is inevitable, we must always be careful not to thematize the Other such that we can no
longer hear him. As Perpich argues, we ought to view Levinas’s claim that we are responsible
for the Other not as a claim about a being but as itself a performative repetition of the call of the
face of the Other. That is, Levinas’s work must be seen as yet another instance of the call of the
Other who teaches us. Levinas’s own text is itself a demand that I be more vigilant in ensuring
that I am serving the Other in the best way that I can. The content of Levinas’s teaching is thus a
demand that we continually work towards responding better to the needs of concrete others. In
this way, Levinas does not tell us exactly how to act but orients us toward the Other by reminding us of the necessity of listening to what the Other has to teach us.
The way that we respond to this call cannot be articulated as a set of rules that must be
followed. Rather, our responsibility, as Levinas shows, is endless. Unlike Kant, for whom
“ought” implies “can,” for Levinas, what we ought to do always exceeds what we can do. As we
have seen, the work of ethics is never finished but has the structure of Desire; it increases as we
progress in it. For this reason, it would be impossible to concretize Levinas’s ethics by offering a
list of guidelines that would somehow be sufficient for describing the ethical task. But, while we
cannot deduce our responsibilities in a given situation from a set of clearly defined principles, we
can, nevertheless, engage in a phenomenological investigation of a concrete situation in order to
explore how the face of the Other calls us to responsibility in that particular context by listening
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to what the Other’s presence teaches us. Here, I will examine the concrete situation of teaching
in order to better hear what the Other qua student demands of us in the particular context of the
classroom.
Before offering this analysis of what the Other demands of me as a teacher, it is first necessary, however, to explain in greater detail the relationship between the primordial teaching relation that Levinas describes and the concrete practice of teaching. The primordial teaching relation, as we have seen, refers to the dimension of the relation with the Other whereby I am offered
the possibility of a meaningful world. The world is proposed to me by the Other, who makes it
possible for me to understand the world as something about which we can speak. The Other’s
presence as one who escapes every thematizing, is what opens up the plane of discourse and the
possibility of inquiry. As the relation that makes possible the very meaningfulness of the world,
the primordial teaching relation is, therefore, presupposed by every event that we would normally call teaching. But how do we define the practice of teaching? And what are we doing when we
teach others philosophy?
A phenomenological definition of teaching and learning
To answer the questions of what it means to teach and what it means more specifically to
teach philosophy, we might begin by considering what it is we can learn. One kind of learning is
coming to understand what experts in a certain field have discovered about the world by using
the particular methods of inquiry that define their discipline. This kind of learning can occur in
different ways with different levels of understanding. For example, someone may be said to have
“learned” the laws of thermodynamics when she can recite these laws to someone else. A deeper
level of learning, however, might be achieved when a person can not only recite the laws, but
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apply them in a novel context or explain them to someone else. But both of these forms of learning involve understanding, at differing levels of sophistication, what others have already discovered about the world.
In addition to this kind of knowledge about the world, one can also learn how to implement the methods that govern a specific discipline. In this way, a person learns how to produce
the kind of discipline specific knowledge that makes up the content described above. For example, a person can learn how to carry out a scientific method or how to evaluate the authenticity of
a historical document. This kind of learning gives us a set of inquiry tools that guide our approach to the world. When we master a particular method, we gain expertise and can eventually
contribute to the growing body of knowledge that particular disciplines provide.
In addition to learning the results and methods of particular disciplines, we can also learn
skills that do not seek to produce content in a discipline. For example, I can learn how to play the
piano, how to build a house, how to cook, and so on. In these cases, what I learn is a way of interacting with the world that is aimed at something other than propositional knowledge. This
kind of learning often involves the explicit development of new ways of embodied relations with
the world. When I learn how to play the piano, for example, I learn a way of physically interacting with the piano to produce sounds that evoke a particular feeling. Or when I learn to cook, I
learn to anticipate how heat will affect different ingredients and become able to imagine what
flavors will taste like when combined. When I learn to paint, I learn to see differently so that I
gain an intuitive sense of which colors ought to go where. In learning these kinds of skills, I am
thus transformed not only in my knowledge about the world but also in my corporeal modes of
relating to the world.
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Furthermore, and in a related way, some kinds of learning involve the development of
dispositions, like being more critically minded, humble, empathetic, inquisitive, and so on. This
kind of learning also involves a transformation in my ways of responding to particular situations.
If I learn to be more curious, for example, I may develop a habit of asking questions or of looking for the causes of phenomena. If I learn to be more self-critical, I am transformed in my manner of responding to others. I develop a habit of hesitating, of asking myself if I am sure of what
I claim. Such changes involve both a cognitive transformation and also an affective shift in how I
physically and emotionally respond to others. For example, I can learn to stay calm and patient
when I am faced with someone who disagrees with me, or learn to experience uncertainty with
less anxiety, and so on.
In trying to offer a definition of learning, as Socrates might ask us to do, we are, thus,
faced with the question of whether there is any “form” that unites these different kinds of learning. Is there anything in common between knowledge about the world, methods that produce that
knowledge, other skills, and dispositions? If we follow a phenomenological account of meaning,
I propose that we can unite these forms of learning by seeing that they all involve the development or transformation of modes of intentionality. That is, whether we learn facts, methods,
skills, or dispositions, when we learn, our ways of relating to a meaningful reality are transformed.
Teaching, however, is not necessarily identical with learning. Not every instance of learning involves an explicit act of teaching. Although in many cases we learn from our parents,
school teachers, professors, friends, colleagues, etc., we also say that we learn from our experiences or our mistakes. In these cases, if there are people who teach us, they may not intend to or
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even know that they are teaching us. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that in cases in which
we learn from our experiences, we teach ourselves by using our experiences as the material from
which to learn.
It is also the case that once we have learned a method of inquiry or a skill that leads to
further learning, we do not necessarily need a teacher to continue to gain knowledge about the
world. For example, once I have learned how to conduct a scientific experiment, I may no longer
need a teacher to guide me through the process of performing an appropriate method of inquiry.
In the case of scientific research, it is the natural world itself that becomes, in a sense, my
“teacher.” We find, therefore, that, while all teaching requires or aims at learning—even if it is
not always successful in this aim—not all learning seems to require an explicit act of teaching.
As we have seen, however, for Levinas, all learning does in fact presuppose a certain
kind of teaching, a primordial teaching that underlies ontology itself. All learning, insofar as it
involves our relationship to a meaningful world, is made possible by the Other’s teaching which
opens up the very possibility of conversation. In this way, for Levinas, the primordial teaching
encompasses much more than the everyday understanding of teaching. In fact, every time another person addresses me, she is my teacher in the primordial sense if not in the everyday sense.
The everyday notion of teaching is only one possible manifestation of the broader phenomenon
of the primordial teaching--the dimension of my relationship with the Other whereby the Other
offers me the sens unique that is both the condition of the possibility and the orientation of meaning.
Considering the particular nature of the practice of teaching within the context of
Levinas’s philosophy, we therefore find that the practice of teaching, in the everyday sense, is to
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take responsibility for giving the world as meaningful to others. That is, when I teach, I aim to
change, in some way, how my students live in and relate to the world. For example, when I teach
students a text of Plato, one of my goals is to transform how students interact with texts. Many of
my students come to philosophy classes skeptical about the value of reading Ancient Greek philosophy. The texts of Plato often show up in their experience as “homework,” “drudgery,” “an
obstacle to getting an ‘A,’” and so on. In my own practice of teaching, therefore, I work to transform how the text shows up to students. I work to help them experience the texts instead as “interesting,” “relevant,” “puzzling,” “worth re-reading,” and so on.
I may or may not be successful in accomplishing this or the many other transformations
that I hope to accomplish in my classes, but all teaching necessarily aims at achieving some kind
of change in how students see, understand, and/or relate to the world and others. To bring about
such a change in other people is no small matter. When we teach, we take responsibility for nothing less than giving the world to students in new ways. Sometimes these changes in the world
may be relatively minor when, for instance, I teach students facts about the history of particular
philosophers. But at other times, my goals are much more important when, for example, I aim to
help students to develop habits of thinking critically and being more attentive to the evidence
that they use to support their positions. In these latter cases, I take responsibility for the very responsibility of my students as thinkers and citizens.
It is important, however, to note that from the perspective of the primordial teaching relation, the roles of student and teacher will be reversed. Because I am here considering the concrete practice of teaching philosophy from the perspective of the teacher, it is, in fact, the student
who appears to me as the Other, and, therefore, as my teacher in the primordial sense. In the pri-
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mordial sense of teaching, as opposed to its practical everyday sense, I can only ever approach
the Other from the perspective of the I who receives the Other’s teaching. In this sense, therefore, it is the students who teach me in the primordial sense even as I teach them in the everyday
sense.
What students teach me is not, however, the same as what I teach them. What the Other
as primordial teacher provides is the sens unique that offers an orientation for meaning [signification]. The sense that the Other presents to me is a sense that calls me to responsibility. As a
philosophy teacher, I offer students a new way of being in the world that is characterized by
philosophical questioning. This way of being in the world involves the development of
knowledge about, for example, the history of philosophy, as well as a variety of capacities and
dispositions such as openness to a multiplicity of points of view, and the use of evidence to support positions. What the Other qua student teaches me is what my responsibility as a teacher is.
To say that the student is my teacher in a primordial sense is not to say that my students teach me
about philosophy per se (although this may also be true) but, rather, to say that students are my
teachers insofar as their concrete presence continuously teaches me how to remain open to learning from them the orientation of responsibility that their presence demands of me. In other
words, my students teach me how to continue to listen to them and learn what their needs are as
students so that I can better serve them as their teacher.
To illustrate this point, a concrete example may be helpful. Recently in one of my courses, I was planning a class with the goal of helping students to understand how systems of oppression are intersectional. In particular, my goal was to help students to realize that often when people talk about “women” in general or “men” in general, what they often have in mind without
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realizing it are “white women” and “white men.” In order to help students to realize their unconscious tendency to think of “white people” as the default when they thought about “people,” I
asked students to list stereotypes about “women” and stereotypes about “men.” They generated
a fairly predictable list. “Women,” they said, are stereotyped as submissive, domestic, small,
quiet, empathetic, and so on. “Men,” they said, are stereotyped as strong, unemotional, providers,
etc. Then I asked students for stereotypes about “black women.” Student were uncomfortable at
first, but before long, they generated a predictable yet disheartening list. “Black women,” they
said, are stereotyped as loud, bossy, and aggressive. “Black men,” they said are stereotyped as
criminals, absent fathers, violent, threatening, etc.
While generating these lists was uncomfortable, the point of the lesson became starkly
clear to the students. When they were originally generating the list of stereotypes about “women”
and “men,” what they had in mind without recognizing it, were stereotypes about “white women” and “white men,” and not only white but also young and middle to upper class American
men and women.
In the end the activity was quite effective at helping many of the students to realize why
being vigilantly intersectional is necessary for deconstructing systems of oppression. That is,
many students realized that it is impossible for us to talk about “women” or “men” in general as
a monolithic category. We have to realize how these conversations often render people of color,
not to mention people who otherwise fall outside the norm, invisible. But while in a certain sense
the lesson was effective, after this lesson, a black student in the class was clearly upset by the
ease with which her classmates generated stereotypes about black women. She expressed how
hard it was to know what was in people’s minds and she felt stuck, unable to escape the racist
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gaze of her peers.
In this moment, my student taught me just as much or more about teaching than I had
taught the students in the class about racism. This student’s response to my lesson flooded me
with uncertainty about whether or not my lesson had been a good one. I was immediately confronted with a number of questions. Did my attempt to help white students understand their own
racism come at the expense of students of color in the class? My aim in the exercise was to help
students to see their complicity in systems of domination, but in doing so, was I failing to respond appropriately to marginalized students? In one sense, my aim was to center the needs of
marginalized students by teaching in a way that brought to light the structures of inequity that
infiltrate our minds and culture. But was I engaging in an idealized mission that allowed me to
see myself and my teaching as anti-racist but in fact, harmed the concrete students in front of
me?
I still do not have answers to these many questions, but there is no doubt that I have
learned and continue to learn from this student’s response to my teaching. And it is only by listening to students that I can continue to learn how to be a better, more responsible teacher to my
students. So, it is in this sense that my students teach me how to teach them. If I listen carefully,
they send me subtle and not so subtle indications of how I can better respond to their needs as
students.
And if we continue to interrogate our responsibilities as teachers, we find that when we
engage in the practice of teaching, we are not only responsible to our students. We are also responsible to colleagues who may teach the same students in the future, to other philosophers who
rely on us to help maintain the traditions of philosophy, to the authors of the texts that we read to

159
do justice to their writing, to other members of our political community who rely on us to help
educate our fellow citizens, and so on. The face of the Other, as Levinas shows, always contains
within it the face of all of the other others.
This complex web of responsibility, thus, raises the question of the larger purpose of
teaching philosophy in our current social and political context. And while philosophers are certain to disagree about the purpose of philosophy, my own view takes guidance from Levinas by
way of Claire Katz. Katz, in her work on Levinas’s conception of teaching, argues that Levinas
views the goal of Jewish education to be to respond to a crisis in humanism. This crisis is the fact
that the humanist principles of egalitarianism and individual liberty are insufficient on their own
to prevent horrors like those of the twentieth century. In her work, Katz implies that we have yet
to fully learn this lesson. We sometimes think, Katz argues, that teaching humanities classes and
offering students the skills of “critical thinking” will automatically make students “better” people. What Levinas shows us, however, is that “critical thinking” on its own, if it is not oriented
by an ethical sense, does not guarantee justice. For education to be able to respond to the crisis of
humanism that Levinas identifies, Katz argues, it must teach not only skills of reasoning, but also
the lesson that responsibility precedes freedom, that the Other demands that we break with egoism and decenter ourselves by orienting ourselves to the demands of the Other. This, Katz argues, is what Levinas believes is the fundamental teaching of Jewish education, the particular
lesson that Judaism offers the world.
While philosophers may not agree entirely about what philosophy is or what texts we
should teach when we introduce students to philosophy, one of the central goals of philosophy
courses, that most philosophers agree on is that we aim to teach students to be “better thinkers.”
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But if Levinas is right that ethics is first philosophy, then it is impossible to “think well” without
thinking about what the Other demands of us. That is, if we follow Levinas, then one of the primary goals in teaching philosophy is to offer the world to students in a way that invites them to
see the Other as one to whom they are responsible and to recognize that this responsibility is
perpetual and requires ongoing critique.
One might, however, object to this line of thought by saying that, for Levinas, it is impossible to not hear the call of the Other, and, therefore, that there is nothing that can teach anyone
to hear this call. If someone claims not to feel obligated by the face of the Other, there is no argument that can be given to convince him that he is, indeed, responsible. For Levinas, our responsibility is what grounds reason, not the other way around. But as Katz notes, and common
sense also tells us, we can learn to listen better, to be more or less receptive to the Other’s demands. We can become better students of the Other’s teachings, better equipped to respond to
their concrete needs. But in order to do so, we have to practice listening to our students so that
we can better hear what they have to teach us.
Teaching as a practice of hospitality
In order to hear what students have to offer us as teachers, we must begin by understanding who students are and what they care about. Only then can we figure out how to connect what
they care about to what we it is we are teaching. This is the approach to pedagogy that we saw
Diotima take in the Symposium. That is, Diotima insists that we are all lovers and that the role of
the teacher is to help the student to progress in loving by directing this love towards more fundamental truths.
In fact, this approach to pedagogy is not limited to Socrates, but has long been recognized
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as the cornerstone of constructivist theories of education. What thinkers like John Dewey have
recognized is that learning happens when we build on the positive pre-existing interests, questions, and desires of our students. Students are not empty vessels that need to be filled with facts,
but are actively involved in the construction of meaning from their experiences. The teacher
must recognize the active engagement of students with their worlds and build on this already existing openness to the world as a dynamic reality. Doing so, therefore, requires that we get to
know students so that we can make these connections.
Or to use Levinas’s framework, we might say that students demand that I welcome them
in hospitality into the classroom, which means that I must welcome them as they are in their concreteness as unique existents. As we saw in Chapter Three, it is precisely this ability to respond
to another as an individual that makes speaking preferable to writing in the Phaedrus. That is, the
benefit of speaking is that we can respond to one another in a specific and concrete context. As
we have seen, Levinas finds in Socrates’s argument for the priority of speaking an expression of
the face-to-face encounter described in Totality and Infinity. A pedagogy oriented by Levinas’s
philosophy, therefore, necessarily involves a recognition that students present us with an absolute
alterity that obligates us endlessly to welcome them as concrete particular existents.
In practice, extending hospitality to students means not asking them to transform themselves to suit our own needs. As Derrida has acknowledged in his work on Levinas’s ethics, in
this way, being a host requires that one be a guest in one’s own home, in a certain sense. In being
a host, I become a kind of hostage to the needs of the Other. That is, as we have seen, for
Levinas, to be a subject is to establish oneself at a site of possession, but subjectivity also always
involves having one’s right to one’s site called into question. To be a subject, for Levinas, is to
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be a sojourner in a foreign land. We establish ourselves in a dwelling, but we are always responsible for making sure that the Other has a place within our dwelling.
In the practice of teaching philosophy, the “home” or “dwelling” into which I welcome
students can be understood as both the physical space of the classroom but also as the discipline
of philosophy itself. Here I understand philosophy to be at root a series of ongoing conversations. Welcoming students into the conversations of philosophy, thus, requires that I allow for
students to bring themselves and their worlds to these conversations. As the host who is welcoming students into the dwelling of philosophy, I must not ask students to leave their interests, questions, skills, etc. at the door of the classroom. Rather, I, as the host, must figure out how to make
room for their questions and ways of being within the dwelling of philosophy. I have to build on
their prior receptivity to the Other and show how their particular concerns, interests, desires, and
talents make their contributions to philosophical discourse important and meaningful.
In his work, For White Folks Who Teach in the Hood...and the Rest of Y’all Too, Christopher Emdin expertly what teaching hospitably entails.4 Emdin focuses his work on teachers
whose students are largely young people of color growing up in poor urban settings. In studying
the schools at which these teachers work, he finds that the schools devalue both explicitly and
implicitly the ways the students’ pre-existing ways of being in the world. Schools often reject
students’ fashion choices, hair styles, manners of speaking, musical tastes, etc., claiming that
such ways of being are “inappropriate” in the context of the school.
In fact, Emdin even compares many of these urban schools to assimilation schools, like
the Carlisle School, that attempted to integrate indigenous students in the United States into
4
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mainstream society in the late nineteenth century. While arguably well-intentioned, these schools
harmed students and native cultures by requiring students to leave their relationships to family
and friends, languages, and cultural and religious practices behind.
Emdin argues that we can understand students in poor urban communities as, in a sense,
“neo-indigenous,” insofar as these students are also asked to leave their ways of being and relating to the world at the door of the school. That is, the ways of speaking, interacting, and engaging that students have received from their communities, are often unwelcome in the classroom,
considered to reflect a lack of intelligence or obedience. In his own teaching, Emdin works to
legitimize his students’ already existing ways of being in the world by incorporating music and
hip hop into his teaching practices. In this way Emdin sends the message to students that who
they are and what they care about are not only welcome in the classroom but essential for their
own learning.
While as a philosopher, my own context of teaching may be different from that of Emdin
insofar as my students are older and tend to be more economically well-off, his work demonstrates what pedagogy can look like when it is oriented by hospitality. Emdin starts by learning
from his students what they need rather than assuming that he already knows what is best for
them. He does not try to fundamentally change who students are but to creatively construct his
lessons to connect with who they are. What Levinas reveals and Emdin puts into practice, is the
need for teachers to transform the space of learning into a place of hospitality by celebrating students as concrete existents, not devaluing their ways of being in the world or asking them to
leave themselves behind when they enter the classroom.
While many of the students we teach in philosophy may not have the same backgrounds
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as Emdin’s students, the world of philosophy can seem quite foreign and even inhospitable to
many beginning college students. And philosophy has long suffered from a lack of voices coming from perspectives other than those of well-prepared “elite” students. We have a responsibility, however, I argue, to make our classrooms welcoming to all of our students, which requires
that we work to understand our students and what they care about so that we can make the necessary connections between their interests and desires and the material at hand.Doing so requires
that we take the time to learn about students. We have to ask them what they care about, what
they are interested in, what questions motivate them, and so on. And we have to be open to the
fact that students may have concerns that differ from our own.
Of course, the fact that there are a multiplicity of unique others in the classroom, each of
whom obligates us infinitely, also raises difficulties for teaching insofar as it presents us with the
challenges of our sometimes conflicting responsibilities. The fact that there are multiple others in
the class to whom we are responsible as well as the many others to whom we are responsible
outside of the classroom, requires that we sometimes view the students from what Levinas would
understand to be a political perspective. That is, there are times when I have to treat all the students as equal qua students, which requires that I approach them from the perspective of reason
or justice. For example, it may be the case that a particular classroom policy conflicts with the
needs of a particular student, but out of a concern for fairness, I maintain the policy nevertheless.
For Levinas in Totality and Infinity, this kind of political perspective, wherein
one is treated similarly is necessary for ethics, but it requires the orientation offered by the ethical. That is, taking up a position in which everyone is considered equal cannot be the starting
place of ethics. Levinas writes, “Equality is produced where the other commands the same and
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reveals himself to the same in responsibility; otherwise it is but an abstract idea and a word. It
cannot be detached from the welcoming of the face, of which it is a moment.”5 The notion of
equality is necessary for acting responsibly, but this equality is a “moment” of the ethical relation, not its underlying principle. With regard to teaching, this means that seeing students as the
same must be grounded in and oriented by a desire to welcome each student into philosophy as a
concrete individual. The rules and policies that I adopt as a teacher must be aimed at creating a
classroom space that allows each individual student to bring herself and world to the discourse of
philosophy, rather than seeing her as first falling into the category of “student.”
Much more work needs to be done to fully develop a pedagogy inspired by Levinas, and
here I have only begun to explore what this pedagogy might look like. Such a pedagogy, however, will never take the form of a list of classroom policies. Levinas cannot tell us exactly how to
go about establishing rules that best welcome our students. Rather, what Levinas teaches us is
that we have to be always responsive to the call of the Other in the context in which the Other
appears. As teachers we must constantly listen to our students and interrogate our practices to
discover what we need to do to better meet our responsibilities, even as we know that we will
never be able to fully satisfy our Desire to serve the Other. Most importantly, we must remember
that while we teach our students the content and skills of a particular discipline, our students continue to teach us how best we can teach them.
Summary
This chapter has explored the relationship between Levinas’s primordial teaching relation
and the concrete practice of teaching others. We have seen that an investigation of the experience
of teaching presents us with a demand that we orient our teaching practices around making the
5
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“dwelling” of our classrooms and of the discipline of philosophy welcoming to our students. But
this account does not give us specific principles that will apply in every context. Rather, the responsibility to be a hospitable teacher, in fact, involves a responsibility to be open and flexible to
the particular needs of students which can never be totally foreseen in advance and continue to
change as our students change.
In this sense, we have to look to students to teach us how to teach them. That is, the Other
who is my student is also my teacher in the primordial sense. As the Other, the student overflows
whatever idea I may have of him and demands that I listen. The student “attends” her presence
and this attendance brings me more than I can know in advance. In this sense, teaching in the
practical sense is always a response to the Other’s primordial teaching.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The study of a philosopher whose work is as complex and difficult as that of Levinas allows for multiple points of entry, each of which opens up our understanding of the work in new
ways. The fertility of Levinas’s work is borne out by the rich scholarship that has emerged as his
status as an essential figure in the development of European philosophy has been solidified. One
of the central goals of the present work has been to contribute to this scholarship by conducting
an analysis of a concept that has not yet been fully explored by scholars, that of the primordial
teaching relation. My aim has been to show that this concept is an especially fruitful lens through
which to examine Levinas’s work insofar as it helps us to better understand both Totality and
Infinity itself as well as Levinas’s relationship to Plato.
At the same time, in exploring these themes in Levinas’s work, I have also tried to show
that questions concerning the nature of teaching and learning lie at the heart of who we are as
human beings and that these questions are essential to understanding the practice of philosophy.
If we were unable to learn from and transform one another through dialogical encounters, philosophy, it seems, would have no goal and no inspiration. Philosophy, as both Plato and Levinas
recognize, is not a solitary, but a dialogical endeavor that is constituted by an ever-evolving tradition of questioning. To do philosophy is, in fact, to learn from and to teach others.
And yet, in our contemporary situation, discussions of learning and teaching are at times
relegated to the margins of philosophical discourse. Teaching is often seen as a craft that one
167
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must develop in order to make a life as a philosopher and not as a practice that involves us as
philosophers. While not every philosopher needs to dedicate her research to the theme of teaching, I have attempted to show here that we ought not see the practice of teaching as entirely separate from the work of philosophy. I have tried in this dissertation to challenge the marginalization
of questions concerning teaching and learning in the discipline. And in doing so, I have also
sought to better understand how we ought to engage in the practice of philosophy, which is always, in some sense, a practice of teaching and learning.
With regard to conversations about Levinas scholarship, I have proposed here that an examination of the concept of teaching, particularly in Levinas’s writings surrounding Totality and
Infinity, illuminates a number of important themes in Levinas scholarship. In particular, I have
shown that the concept of teaching illustrates the complexity and ambiguity of Levinas’s relationship to Plato, which itself is reflective of a broader tension in Levinas’s work between the
intimacy of the relation with the Other in interiority and the absoluteness of the Other who is
characterized by exteriority. As we have seen, many scholars, including Derrida and Blanchot, as
well as more recently Gonzales and Achtenberg, have been perplexed by Levinas’s reluctance to
embrace the intimacy and ambiguity inherent in the metaphysical relation with the Other. In the
present work, I have argued, following thinkers like Katz and Guenther, that Levinas’s concept
of the “feminine,” while problematic and underdeveloped, can nevertheless help us to better understand and come to terms with this tension between interiority and exteriority in Totality and
Infinity.
In particular, I have argued that the problem of the relationship between interiority and
exteriority in Totality and Infinity, is one for which Levinas himself provides a solution, though
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not one that is fully articulated. The introduction of the “feminine” Other who is at once one who
obligates me and one who appears as a welcoming presence in the space of interiority is the key
to resolving the problem of how I, as a separated being, am capable of welcoming another in intimate hospitality. That is, in order for it to be possible for me to welcome the Stranger into my
home, one who is exterior into the interior, I must have been given a home in the first place. The
dwelling is not something that I am capable of establishing on my own. I only have the possibility of receiving the Other in my own sphere of interiority because of the Other who welcomed
me in intimacy and made it possible for me to become a separated being and showed me how to
be hospitable. In this way, we have seen that the introduction of “feminine” alterity is essential to
the coherence of Totality and Infinity as a whole. That is, without the welcoming presence of the
Other in the dwelling, the metaphysical relation in which the terms of the relation remain ‘absolved’ of the relation is not possible.
And yet, it has also become clear that Levinas worries that the communion and participation of intimacy present dangers for ethics. If it is not interrupted by the Other of exteriority, intimacy can allow us to forget our responsibilities, to close ourselves off from the demands of justice. Interiority, by its very nature as an enclosed space, presents us with the possibility of excluding others. We can close ourselves in with those we love, shutting our doors and windows
and refusing to acknowledge the Stranger who knocks at the door. Thus, while the gentle and
intimate presence of the “feminine” other in the dwelling is necessary, this very intimacy can
lead to a failure to listen to the Other who appears in a mode that is foreign.
Levinas’s legitimate worry about the dangers of intimacy, however, ought not prevent us
from recognizing how the metaphysical relation inevitably and necessarily involves intimacy.
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That is, while the exteriority of the Other of ‘absolute’ distance is essential for ethics, so too is
the intimacy of the Other who is gentle and welcoming. This view is not inconsistent with
Levinas’s own, but there are times in the text when he seems to draw what is, in my view, too
harsh of a distinction between these two modes of alterity. That is, there are moments in the text
when Levinas seems to indicate that the ethical relation is incompatible with intimacy. We have
seen this for example, when Levinas claims that the relation with the “feminine” Other is a relation without teaching. As I have shown here, however, the ethical relation must be one of both
intimacy and distance. In my view, our understanding of the metaphysical relation is deepened
when we recognize the ways in which these modes of alterity intertwine and support each other.
This intertwining of intimacy and distance, interiority and exteriority, is apparent when
we closely examine the Other who appears as my teacher. To encounter the Other as my teacher
is to encounter one who both appears as a foreign presence who calls me into question and as a
gentle presence of one who welcomes me into a conversation. As the sens unique that orients the
world as meaningful, the Other who teaches me appears as an exteriority whose sense cannot be
understood by means of the network of significations given to me by my cultural context. But
although the Other cannot be reduced to the network of significations, the Other is also the one
who gives me this network of meanings. As a child, I am taught a language and a particular way
of being in the world. My parents, friends, and teachers tell me what things are, how to interact
with others, what one ought or ought not to do, and so on. Furthermore, throughout my life, my
friends, colleagues, and family continue to sustain the world for me and also give it to me in new
ways. Thus, these intimate others, others whom I know and who know me, act as my teachers by
opening the world up to me and allowing me to make sense of things. All the others with whom I
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am in relation give me a place in the world from which I can live, work, and understand the
world. As Levinas recognizes, the Other is, in this way, the giver of the given.
And in teaching me, the Other not only speaks herself but, as Levinas shows, by attending her presence before me, the Other also allows me to speak. The Other opens up the plane of
conversation by allowing me to ask questions and promising by her presence to remain to answer
them. In this way, the Other who teaches me approaches me also as one who welcomes me into
the world.
This attendance of the Other to her presence in teaching me is, as we have seen, influenced by Plato’s prioritization of speech over writing in the Phaedrus. And in fact, as noted in
Chapter Four, Levinas views Totality and Infinity as a retrieval of a certain kind of Platonism.
The Phaedrus in particular is especially influential for Levinas because of the surprising unity of
its seemingly disparate themes. The Phaedrus, on Levinas’s reading, brings together the Desire
for transcendence and the priority of speaking over writing. For Levinas, it is precisely the Other
who speaks to me and attends his concrete presence in speaking that provides the orienting sense
that motivates Desire.
And yet, Levinas criticizes Socratic education because he finds in it an assertion that the
student is free and self-sufficient. While Levinas believes that Plato at times expresses genuine
transcendence, he also sees in Plato’s work the danger of a philosophy that aims to identify our
search for truth with powers that can be found in us. For Levinas, the idea that I already know all
that I learn is emblematic of a denial of the genuine exteriority of the Other on whom I depend
and to whom I am responsible.
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In this dissertation, however, I have argued instead that anamnēsis and maieutics reveal
to us the inevitable complexity of the teaching relation as one that involves both intimacy and
distance. Rather than presenting the student as already in possession of what he learns, anamnēsis, I have argued, can be understood to reveal the fundamental receptivity that necessarily
precedes the welcoming of the Other who teaches me. Similarly, maieutics does not obviate the
need for the teacher, but shows instead that the student is always in relation to alterity, to the
point that the student embodies alterity within himself. And the role of the teacher in maieutics
is not incidental. Rather, in his role as a midwife, we find that Socrates cares for his students and
gives them room to give birth to their own ideas. And, in this way, Socrates’s hospitable withdrawal allows his students to enter into the conversations and ways of thinking that make up philosophy. Thus, anamnēsis and maieutics reveal that learning and teaching do not deny but require a recognition of intimacy, vulnerability, and receptivity.
Furthermore, I have argued that Socratic education, understood in this way, has much to
teach us about the concrete practice of teaching. In particular, by acknowledging and embracing
our vulnerability as learners and teachers, Socratic education recognizes that all learning involves a prior relation to that which we learn. We are all, as Diotima claims in the Symposium,
lovers of the beautiful and the good. The challenge of the teacher is to channel and direct this
pre-existing receptivity, which Levinas, following Plato, names Desire. Understood in this way,
Socratic education does not presuppose that we are already in possession of all that we learn. Instead, it recognizes the Desire that underlies our capacity to learn and shows how a teacher who
has taken up the responsibility of teaching others might go about encouraging and guiding this
Desire.
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When we choose to engage in the practice of teaching others, I have argued, we must understand teaching as a practice in which we deliberately take on the responsibility of the giving
the world to others. Following Levinas, we see that the world has been given to us and continues
to be given to us by our parents, teachers, friends, and others. And whether we are explicitly engaged in the practice of teaching or not, we are always involved in and responsible for giving the
world to others. To speak to one another is, in a sense, always to teach, just as to receive the Other as a teacher is always to learn. To be a teacher in the traditional sense, therefore, is simply to
engage in this practice more explicitly and within the context of a particular discipline and institution.
Taking guidance from Levinas’s ethics, I have argued that to teach philosophy is to give
students a world that involves philosophical questioning and to welcome students into this world
by making a space for them in the conversations that make up this questioning. Doing so means
recognizing that while I may be the teacher in the classroom, the students are still my teachers in
the primordial sense. That is, even as I take responsibility for giving the world to my students in
a new way, my students teach me my responsibilities as a teacher. To welcome my students as
teachers is to recognize that I must listen to what my students have to teach me about how to
teach them. In this sense, what I teach my students and what they teach me is not identical. My
students may not teach me how to read Plato, but, if I am willing to listen, they can teach me
who they are and what they care about. And in this way, I can learn from them how best to be a
host to their learning.
To read Levinas’s work well, one must receive his texts as “teaching” texts. That is,
Levinas’s work must not be approached as a mere object of history, but as a living, breathing
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presence that challenges us to recognize our unending responsibility to the Other. The lesson that
Levinas’s work teaches us as readers is the lesson that we are responsible. In this way, his work
is not so much a description of the way things are, but an iteration or reminder of the perpetual
demand of the Other in our own lives. Levinas’s claim that ethics is first philosophy is, therefore,
not a claim about what philosophy has been but a reminder to never forget that when we do philosophy, we are always involved in the project of serving the Other.
This dissertation has been my own attempt to respond to the challenge and the welcome
that Levinas’s work offers. Levinas, in his difficult generosity has, together with my many other
teachers past and present, made it possible for me to do philosophy. And what I have learned
from Levinas is that my work as a teacher is to give the gift of responsibility to my students in
turn.
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